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An active fund manager
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines various aspects of risk for UK investment trusts from the
shareholders' viewpoint.
For conventional trusts, a model is developed which splits the variance of returns to
shareholders into three components - variance of net asset value (NAV) returns,
variance of discount returns and twice the covariance between NAV returns and
discount returns. Using historical data, the relative importance of each of these
components is estimated for different return intervals and for different periods of
observation. There is clear evidence of excess volatility of trust share returns
compared with NAV returns. Since Big Bang in 1986, there has been a significant
'double whammy' effect, meaning that discounts tend to widen when NAVs fall and
narrow when NAVs rise. Overall, the results contradict the efficient market model
but are consistent with the noise trader model.
Discount volatility is generally an important component of total risk for conventional
trusts using monthly returns but there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the
magnitude of this discount volatility. These are interesting aspects of the closed-end
fund discount puzzle which have received little attention in the literature, and a cross-
sectional analysis is carried out to explain the variation in discount volatility across
the sector. The results suggest that the main drivers of discount volatility are new
information hitting the market for trust shares and volatility of NAV returns.
Discount arbitrage traders try to take advantage of discount anomalies but their
activities are restricted, particularly for less marketable trusts. There is no evidence
that either individual investor sentiment or UK specific sentiment has any impact on
discount volatility.
Statistical measures of risk based on historical data are useful tools for conventional
trust securities but are of limited use for split capital trust securities. Analysts are
often more concerned with the sensitivity of these securities to changes in the
underlying fundamental variables and an alternative approach to the risk assessment
of split capital trusts is proposed. By differentiating discounted cash flow valuation
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formulae with respect to the underlying fundamental variables, 'sensitivity measures'
are derived for most split capital securities. These measures show how the present
value of expected future cash flows will vary as the real discount rate changes, the
real growth of income or capital value of the underlying fund changes and the
estimated rate of inflation changes.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets out the objectives of the thesis, provides an introduction to the
investment trust industry, outlines the structure of the thesis and provides an
overview of the remaining chapters.
1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
The objectives of this thesis are:
(i) to identify, from the shareholders' viewpoint, the main components of risk
for UK investment trusts;
(ii) to quantify the importance of these components;
(iii) to discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings.
Although perceptions of risk vary, the volatility of a trust's share performance is
widely accepted as an important measure of risk from the shareholders' viewpoint
and is adopted as the measure of risk in this thesis. Share beta, which measures the
sensitivity of the trust share's return to the return on the market, suffers from the
problem of having to choose an appropriate benchmark index and is rarely used by
investment trust practitioners.
1.2 THE INVESTMENT TRUST INDUSTRY
Investment trusts are UK public companies whose assets consist of a portfolio of
shares or other securities. They enable investors to purchase an interest in a
professionally managed fund. 'Generalist' investment trusts combine investment
flexibility with the opportunity to diversify by spreading investments over several
markets and sectors. 'Specialist' investment trusts provide a vehicle for investment
in some specialist area such as a particular geographical region or a specific sector of
industry. 'Split capital' investment trusts (splits) have innovative capital structures
which attempt to match the risk, income and tax preferences of different types of
potential investor.
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Investment trusts are subject to the regulation of the Companies Acts and the London
Stock Exchange. In addition, to secure certain tax concessions, investment trusts
seek approval from the Board of the Inland Revenue for each accounting period1 (see
Adams, 1989). Investment trusts themselves are not regulated by the Financial
Services Act 1986 although their savings schemes are subject to this legislation.
Ultimate responsibility for running the affairs of an investment trust lies with the
board of directors, but day-to-day administration and investment management is
normally delegated to professional investment managers. These investment
managers will usually be members of a management group rather than directly
employed by the investment trust. The group may also manage other investment
trusts together with other types of fund such as pension funds or unit trusts.
In common with any other company, an investment trust has a fixed (or 'closed')
capital structure which must contain share capital but which may also include loan
capital. The life of an investment trust normally starts with a new issue of ordinary
shares (see Levis and Thomas, 1995). The number of ordinary shares then remains
fixed apart from subsequent share issues, the most common type of issue nowadays
being the C share issue2 (see Adams and Szakacs, 1996). To liquidate their holdings,
investors must normally sell their shares to other investors.3 An advantage of this
'closed-end' structure is that the fund managers can act in the best long-term interests
of their shareholders without having to worry about a possible reduction in the
1
Approval will not be granted to an investment trust unless inter alia: it is resident in the UK for tax
purposes; its income is derived wholly or mainly from shares and securities; no holding in any one
company represents more than 15% by value of its investments; its ordinary share capital is listed on
the Stock Exchange; its Memorandum or Articles of Association prohibit the distribution by way of
dividend, of surpluses arising from the realisation of investments; it does not retain more than 15% of
the income it derives from shares and securities.
2 The new money raised by a C share issue is kept separate from the investment trust's existing funds
until a specified percentage (e.g 80%) has been invested, at which point the new pool of money ceases
to be run independently and its shares (the C shares) are converted into ordinary shares on an NAV
basis.
3 However, a number of trusts have a limited life. There may be a fixed redemption date but very
often there are a number of optional winding up dates. Furthermore, 'buy backs' are becoming
popular (see Section 2.2).
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underlying portfolio of assets in adverse market conditions, as is the case with unit
trusts.4
Investment trusts pay corporation tax on unfranked income5 after deduction of
management expenses and loan interest paid; witholding tax on income from
overseas investments may be offset against UK tax liabilities provided there is a
double taxation agreement. Franked investment income may be passed on to
shareholders without incurring further tax.6 If approved by the Inland Revenue, an
investment trust fund is exempt from tax on capital gains (Finance Act 1980, s81). In
practice, it is unusual for investment trusts to pay much corporation tax, apart from a
few overseas specialists.
Investors in an investment trust are taxed on the same basis as for investment in the
securities of any other type of company. This means that for some institutional
shareholders, contingent capital gains tax liabilities may be an important factor
restricting the sale of investment trust holdings. Private investors often hold
investment trust shares under a Personal Equity Plan (PEP) which, subject to certain
restrictions, means that both income and capital gains are tax-free.
As the ordinary shares of an investment trust must be listed on the Stock Exchange,
the procedure for dealing in the shares is the same as for other listed shares. So
investors who wish to buy or sell investment trust shares do so at a price that reflects
the supply and demand for the shares, rather than the underlying net assets of the
n
company. Nevertheless, investors generally regard conventional investment trust
shares as essentially claims on assets, and investment trust analysts watch the
relationship between the price of the investment trust shares and the value of the
underlying net assets very carefully.
4 Unit trusts are 'open ended' so that if a sufficient number of unitholders wish to sell their units, it
may be necessary to sell assets in the underlying portfolio to generate sufficient cash to meet the
demand. Unit trust prices are determined by a fixed 'break up' formula.
5 The term 'unfranked income' includes all income received other than UK dividend income.
6
Although not taxable, the franked investment income is reported gross in the investment trust's
accounts with a provision made for the total of tax credits associated with dividends received. If the
franked investment income reported in the accounts is greater than the dividends the trust pays to its
own shareholders, the balance of franked investment income is carried forward and set against
dividends for the following year.
7 Conventional investment trusts are those without a split capital structure (see 2.3).
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The net asset value (NAV) of a conventional investment trust is obtained by
o
deducting prior capital from the value of underlying assets, and is normally
expressed on a per share basis.9 Discount to NAV is then defined as NAV less share
price, expressed as a percentage of NAV. Discounts vary widely from one trust to
another and also vary over time, but attempts to explain these variations have met
with no more than limited success. Sometimes analysts talk of the sector average
discount. This is a weighted average of discounts across the conventional investment
trust sector, where the weights are the market capitalisations of the individual trusts.
Some analysts argue that the concept of a sector average discount is less valid
nowadays given the high degree of specialisation within the industry.
The management of an investment trust will attempt to 'add value' by skilful
portfolio management, and the benefits and costs of the professional management
will be reflected in the NAV performance. In measuring the investment performance
of the fund managers themselves, the correct approach is therefore to use underlying
NAV rather than the market value of the shares.10 But the actual return obtained by
an investor in the investment trust shares will include the effects of a change in
discount ('discount return') as well as NAV return.
Discounts are important in the context of investment trust risk analysis. As part of
the return from a conventional investment trust share is due to changes in the
discount, discount variation over time contributes to the variance of returns from
investment trust shares. Furthermore, discount changes over a period may be related
to returns from the underlying net assets of the trust over the same period. If there is
positive correlation between discount returns and NAV returns (i.e. a tendency for
discounts to narrow when NAVs rise), this will increase the variance of share returns.
These are interesting aspects of the discount puzzle that have received little attention
in the literature.
8 Prior capital is normally deducted at nominal value.
9
Complications can arise in calculating NAV when there are warrants (or convertibles) in issue - see
4.4.2.
10 Specialist trusts' performance should be measured against appropriate benchmarks. The managers
are responsible only for performance within the specialist area, the choice of area having been made
by the investors.
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The investment trust is not the only type of UK corporate investment vehicle that
trades at a variable price relative to its underlying net assets. For example, property
investment and development companies normally trade at a discount to NAV. As
with investment trusts, the discount varies widely from one company to another
within the sector and the sector average discount varies over time (see Adams and
Venmore-Rowland, 1990).
Over one-tenth of the investment trust sector by value consists of split capital
investment trusts (splits) which is a sub-sector distinct from conventional investment
trusts. Each split trust has more than one main class of share capital and is designed
to meet simultaneously the needs of different types of investor. Expected cash flows
for a class of share capital may be defined in nominal terms or may depend on the
income growth or capital growth of the underlying fund, which is generally invested
in the UK. Split securities are normally assessed by considering the profile of
expected cash flows and not with reference directly to underlying assets.
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis is essentially made up of three parts. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the
necessary institutional and academic background for the later research chapters.
Chapters 4 and 5 adopt a statistical approach based on historical data to analyse the
risk of conventional investment trusts. One would expect that the volatility of the
NAV return and the volatility of the trust share return to be equal. Minor factors
have been suggested to explain any differences but these seem incapable of
explaining observed differences in the US. It is interesting to see if this is the case in
the UK. Chapter 6 then analyses the sensitivity of split capital investment trust
securities to changes in the underlying fundamental variables using a mathematical
rather than a statistical approach. The restricted life of these trusts means that the
risk profile of split securities changes over time and a statistical approach is therefore
of limited use.
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1.4 CONTENTS OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS
Chapter 2 provides the institutional background for the thesis. It gives a history of
the investment trust industry, outlines the different types of investment trust security
and introduces the discount to net asset value puzzle. US closed-end funds are
described and compared with UK investment trusts. Risk assessment methods
employed by practitioners for both conventional and split capital investment trusts
are then examined.
Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature relating to efficient markets, asset pricing
and closed-end funds (including conventional investment trusts). This includes work
on topics relating to the excess volatility of investment trust shares and the factors
that influence discount volatility. Market efficiency and its relevance for this study is
examined. Most of the research in this area concerns US closed-end funds rather
than UK investment trusts. The chapter contains predictions from the literature
which will be investigated in later chapters.
Chapter 4 investigates the importance of the three components of the variance of
share returns for conventional investment trusts with a view to assessing the
importance of discount volatility and whether investment trust shares tend to
underreact or overreact to changes in NAV. This has implications for efficient
markets and noise trader theories. The analysis is carried out using different return
intervals and over different periods of observation. The results are compared and
contrasted with those of other published research, which generally relate to US
closed-end funds.
Chapter 5 identifies possible trust attributes that may influence the cross-sectional
variation in discount volatility for conventional trusts, where discount volatility is
defined as the square root of the variance of monthly discount returns. Regressions
are then carried out to explain the cross-sectional variation in discount volatility
using the identified trust attributes as explanatory variables. The linkages between
the results of the regression analysis and the results of both Chapter 4 and previous
research are discussed. In particular, the implications of the results for possible
explanations of the discount volatility phenomenon are assessed.
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Chapter 6 develops simple valuation models for split capital trusts and discusses how
the fundamental variables which determine the present values should be estimated.
Recent extensions to the concept of equity duration ('sensitivity measures') are also
discussed. Sensitivity measures for split securities are then calculated with respect to
each of the underlying fundamental variables and the practical importance of the
work is discussed.
Chapter 7 summarises the main conclusions of the thesis. The contribution of each
of the chapters is reviewed and the results qualified by identifying shortcomings in
the models employed. Finally, future research questions raised by the thesis are
identified.
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CHAPTER 2 - INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the institutional background required for later chapters, in
particular industry perspectives of risk. Some of the information is derived from
interviews with practitioners (see acknowledgements). The historical development
of the UK investment trust industry is first examined in some detail to aid
understanding of the industry as it stands today. The discussion is extended to
include US closed-end funds as most of the relevant academic research discussed in
Chapter 3 relates to these vehicles.
2.2 HISTORY OF THE INVESTMENT TRUST INDUSTRY
The origins of the investment trust industry can be traced back to the launch of
Foreign & Colonial Government Trust in 1868 (McKendrick and Newlands, 1999).
The aims of this trust, set out in its prospectus, were:
"to give the investor of moderate means the same advantages as the large
capitalist, in diminishing the risk of investing in Foreign and Colonial
Government stocks by spreading the investment over a large number of
stocks."
Before this issue, a straightforward and easily accessible method of gaining exposure
to a spread of stocks simply did not exist for 'the investor of moderate means'. The
only credible alternative was considered to be 'The Funds' (British Government
stock), typically yielding about 3% while overseas government bonds generally
offered over twice as much (Fredman and Scott, 1991).
Great Britain was the dominant economy in the world around the time of the Foreign
& Colonial issue, generating large amounts of investment capital, and emerging
economies, especially the US, were keen to encourage inward investment. There was
particular interest in US investment amongst Scottish investors, and the Scottish
American Investment Trust was formed in Dundee in February 1873. This was partly
modelled on the Foreign & Colonial Government Trust and was remarkable in that
Dundee was not a financial centre. Then two months later in April 1873, the Scottish
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American Investment Company Ltd was formed in Edinburgh. This was constituted
as a company rather than a trust and was the first investment trust company in
Scotland (Newlands, 1997).
By the beginning of 1875, a total of 20 trusts had been launched and listed on the
Stock Exchange, 11 as unregistered common law trusts and 9 as investment trust
companies (Scratchley, 1875). Then in 1878 the unregistered common law trusts
were declared illegal (Sykes v Beadon, 1878) and had either to restructure and
become investment trust companies registered under the Joint Stock Companies Acts
of 1862 and 1867 or had to be liquidated.
The remaining years of the nineteenth century saw continued growth of the
investment trust industry, with the fixed-interest securities of US railroad companies
and US land mortgages particularly popular investments for the companies. By
1900, there were 58 investment trust companies with a total market capitalisation
estimated at £60m to £70m and generally invested mainly in fixed-income securities.
There followed a period of further steady growth so that by the beginning of World
War I, there were 90 trusts, 58 of them English and 32 Scottish (Burton and Corner,
1968).
Following the introduction of corporation profits tax in 1921, many investment trusts
made their first moves into equity investment. This was because UK equities
provided franked investment income that could be passed through to the investment
trust shareholders without incurring further tax. Arnaud (1983) estimates that by the
late 1920s a typical investment trust's portfolio consisted of equal proportions of
debenture, equity and preference investments.
British investment trusts survived the 1929 Wall Street Crash relatively unscathed,
having resisted the rush into risky investments which was so prevalent among US
investors, and having sold US securities ahead of the crash in many cases. But the
ensuing Great Depression was a difficult period, particularly for those trusts which
reinvested too early after the initial slump and those that had remained exclusively in
the mortgage business (Newlands, 1997).
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A gradual recovery began after 1932 and continued until the outbreak of war in 1939.
During World War EI, investment trusts were required by the Defence Acts to place
all US investments in the hands of the Treasury. It is estimated that around £45m of
US securities were requisitioned from the investment trust sector (Burton and Corner,
1968). When dollars were needed by the British government, the securities were sold
and the sterling equivalent returned to the trusts. As a result, the US proportion of
investment trust portfolios were considerably reduced by the end of the war.
Exchange controls were reduced in 1947, but foreign investment could only be made
through an artificial 'investment dollar' which, being a scarce resource, traded at a
variable premium to the official exchange rate. Nevertheless, this did not stifle major
reinvestment by investment trusts in US stocks, a process that continued well into the
1950s.
The Companies Act of 1948 was significant for investment trusts because it
introduced a requirement for the market value of investments to be included in the
annual Report and Accounts. Thus, for the first time it was possible for analysts to
calculate the NAV and hence the discount to NAV (Gammell, 1971). Prior to the
1948 Act, the true underlying value of a trust's assets was known only to those
closely involved with the management and auditing of that trust.
The 1950s were buoyant years for the investment trust industry with expansion via
both new issues and rights issues. The 'cult of the equity' led to significant increases
in the value of underlying equities and investment trusts made use of their ability to
'gear up' using long-term debt at low rates of interest. As a consequence, NAVs
rose substantially (Arnaud, 1983).
The 1965 Finance Act introduced corporation tax, long-term capital gains tax and an
investment currency premium surrender tax, all of which had a negative impact on
the investment trust industry (Arnaud, 1983). The new capital gains tax applied to
disposal of assets after 5 April 1965, irrespective of how long the assets had been
held. Capital gains were simply determined by deducting the acquisition cost of an
asset from the disposal proceeds; losses were allowable against gains of the same or
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future years. But the 30% rate of tax on chargeable gains was generally far lower
than marginal rates of tax on unearned income.1 The investment currency premium
(often referred to simply as the 'dollar premium') surrender tax required 25% of the
investment currency premium on sale of non-sterling securities to be surrendered to
the Bank of England (Day and Jamieson, 1975).
There was a shift in investment trust ownership from private to institutional
shareholders over the 1960s and 1970s for a number of reasons. Provision for old
age was moving away from the creation of private wealth towards participation in
occupational pension schemes. The tax regime penalised private investors while
offering tax incentives for life assurance and pension provision. Private investors
were net sellers of investment trusts throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
However, there was a clear need for investment trusts which catered precisely for
private investors' preferences for capital gains or income, and the first split capital
investment trust, Dualvest, was launched in May 1965, soon after the 1965 Finance
Act. The ordinary share capital of this trust was split into two distinct categories -
income shares and capital shares. The success of Dualvest led to the creation of a
number of similar vehicles, which would all be known nowadays as 'traditional
splits' (see 2.6.1).
The equity market boom of the early 1970s generated an upsurge in the volume of
investment trust new issues. During the period 1970 to 1972, 40 new trusts were
formed, adding over £500 million to the sector. By the end of 1972, total assets of
the sector exceeded £8 billion (Arnaud, 1983) and a classic case of supply exceeding
demand was created. The equity market peaked in 1972 and there followed a severe
bear market lasting until the end of 1974. The sector average discount widened from
below 10% to around 40% during the course of this bear market and remained high,
oscillating around 30%, for the rest of the 1970s2 (see Figure 2.1). Both private and
institutional investors had lost interest in investment trusts. This left many trusts
1 The highest marginal rate of tax on unearned income, including an investment income surcharge of
15%, was 98%.
2 Discounts would be narrower than shown over the period 1970-80 if allowance were taken for the
contingent investment dollar surrender tax and contingent capital gains tax.
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vulnerable to take-over by an institutional investor or industrial/commercial
company.3 Several nationalised industry pension funds made successful bids for
trusts. In 1977 and 1978 alone, corporate action took over 11% of the UK
investment trust industry (Newlands, 1997).
Figure 2.1 - The investment trust sector average discount since 1970
Source: Datastream
Exchange controls were lifted when the Conservatives came to power in October
1979. The consequent removal of the investment currency premium initially had an
adverse effect on a number of investment trusts as it reduced the portfolio valuation
of overseas securities. But the 1980 Finance Act helped the sector by exempting
investment trust funds from tax on capital gains. This allowed tax-exempt investors,
such as pension funds and charities, to invest in investment trusts without any capital
gains tax disadvantages.
The 1980s saw a gradual narrowing of the sector average discount from over 30% to
below 15% (Figure 2.1). In response to the threat of takeover, a number of
3 An institutional investor could acquire a substantial portfolio of investments at a relatively attractive
price. An industrial/commercial company could offer its own shares to the investment trust
shareholders and then sell off the underlying assets of the investment trust for cash, as an alternative to
a 'rights' issue.
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investment trusts took action to reduce or eliminate the discount by setting optional
winding-up dates or by adopting a more specialised investment policy. A more
drastic measure was 'unitisation', whereby the investment trust turned itself into a
unit trust, which immediately removed the discount because unit prices are directly
related to the value of underlying assets.4 More generally, it is widely accepted
among practitioners that the narrowing of the sector average discount during the
decade was partly due to incremental demand from private investors resulting from
the introduction of savings schemes and PEPs by many trusts.5 Other possible
factors included greater financial incentives for independent financial advisers to
recommend investment trusts and more prominent newspaper advertisements
publicising annual results.
In 1987, a conventional trust, River & Mercantile6, was reorganised to create a
traditional split capital structure, with its ordinary share capital divided into income
shares and capital shares, resulting in the virtual elimination of the trust's previous
20% discount. Two other conventional trusts, River Plate & General and General
Consolidated, followed suit shortly afterwards. Then later in 1987, Scottish National
reorganised into a split with certain novel features. The idea was to create a more
aggressive structure by the inclusion of both stepped preference shares (see 2.6.7) and
zero dividend preference shares (ZDPs, see 2.6.6) as well as income shares, capital
shares and warrants. This was the first time ZDPs had been issued by an investment
trust. Since 1989 it has been more common to create 'quasi splits' with only two
principal classes of share - ZDPs and highly geared ordinary income shares (now
known as 'income & residual capital shares', see 2.6.8). Stepped preference shares
have been less popular and have featured in only four trusts.
The early 1990s were characterised by a significant growth in investment trust funds
due to rising equity markets and considerable new issue activity. The period also saw
a further reduction in the sector average discount to reach a low of 3% at the
beginning of 1994. Then followed the remarkable year of 1994 which saw a huge
4
Although unit trusts were not created until the 1960s, the unit trust industry overtook investment
trusts in terms of assets under management in the mid-1980s (Adams, 1989).
5
Savings schemes are effectively execution-only share-dealing services, whereas PEPs are tax-
efficient 'wrappers' with entry fees and management fees.
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injection of new money into the sector. A total of £4.6bn was raised, excluding the
£3.6bn listing of 3i. Practitioners argue that this led to an oversupply of investment
trust shares and a widening of the sector average discount to reach a level of 12% by
the end of 1997 (see Figure 2.1).
The conventional investment trust sector has been undergoing a period of
consolidation and contraction in recent years. A number of trusts have being wound
up or have undergone capital reconstruction, offering discontented shareholders the
option of a cash exit. Some of the biggest trusts have been standing on sizeable
discounts and therefore vulnerable to attack. Institutional shareholders resent paying
investment trust management fees when they have their own in-house fund
management teams, and are therefore likely to support the winding-up of trusts. In
response, the AITC started a nationwide publicity drive in the autumn of 1999 based
around the slogan 'its' and financed by the investment trust industry. The AITC
hopes that the publicity campaign will lead to an increase in the number of shares
held by private investors (AITC, 1999).
The abolition of advance corporation tax (ACT) from April 1999 opened the way for
widespread share buy-backs.7 Buy-backs increase a trust's NAV provided that the
shares are purchased at a discount, since the trust is buying its own assets cheaply. In
addition, by reducing the supply of shares in the market and taking out disgruntled
institutional shareholders, a buy-back can arguably reduce the discount to NAV.
Previously, buy-backs were subject to ACT on the amount by which the payment
exceeded the shares' value when they were first issued, which made the mechanism
prohibitively expensive for most of the older trusts.
With the marked fall in interest rates over recent years, the quest for income among
private investors has caused something of a renaissance of the split capital
investment trust sector. Zero dividend preference shares are being issued with
redemption yields of over 8% per annum and income & residual capital shares offer
starting yields which are unattainable elsewhere in the market. As a consequence,
6 River & Mercantile became Fleming Income & Growth in November 1996.
7 A share buy-back is a transaction in which a company buys its own shares and then cancels them.
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£1.8bn of new money has flowed into the split capital trust sector in 1999 (Williams
de Broe, 2000). However, some commentators (e.g. Cazenove & Co, 1999) warn
that hurdle rates (see 2.6.9) are very aggressive for high yield portfolios in a low
inflationary environment. Should any shareholders in some of the more recent issues
suffer total capital loss due to overstretched capital structures, the whole investment
trust industry could be affected by the consequent adverse publicity. There is a clear
need for more sophisticated risk measures relating to the fundamental risks that
investors in split securities face.
2.3 CONVENTIONAL TRUSTS
Conventional investment trusts are those without a split share capital structure.8
They generally invest almost entirely in equities, often with a heavy overseas
involvement. The trusts may be categorised in various ways but a useful starting
point is to place them in broad geographical categories. The NatWest Securities
(NWS) (subsequently BT Alex.Brown) Investment Trust Indices9 have five main
sub-sectors: International; UK; European; Geographical specialists; and Venture &
development capital (see Appendix 2A). Table 2.1 shows the number of trusts in the
FT-SE Actuaries Investment Trust Index and their aggregate market capitalisation for
Table 2.1: Size of the Conventional Trust Sub-sectors on 31 December 1997





Venture & dev. cap. 7 4,625
Source: BT Alex.Brown
8
Lloyds corporate capital vehicles and the new housing investment trusts, which can be regarded as
separate types of investment, are not generally regarded as conventional trusts.
9 NatWest Securities, 1995.
10
Constituents of the FT-Actuaries Investment Trust Index
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each of the five sub-sectors on 31 December 1997. The trusts may also issue other
securities such as convertible loan stock or warrants.
2.3.1 International trusts
These trusts hold less than 80% of their assets in any one geographical region, and
account for around a quarter of the market capitalisation of all conventional
investment trusts. Many of the largest investment trusts are international trusts.
They combine investment flexibility with the opportunity to diversify by spreading
investments over several markets and sectors. The high level of diversification
reduces the volatility of the underlying portfolio of assets although the average
exposure of the international generalists to the UK is a little over 50%. Management
fees are generally low and they are often held as long-term investments so that share
turnover by investors is relatively low. For many international trusts, there is a
Scottish connection which dates back over a century.
2.3.2 UK trusts
These trusts hold at least 80% of their assets in UK-registered companies, so
diversification benefits are restricted to some extent, and there is little foreign
currency exposure. They generally offer higher dividend yields than other investment
trusts. Venture & development trusts, which invest mainly in the UK, are discussed
separately in 2.3.5.
2.3.3 European trusts
These trusts hold at least 80% of their assets in Continental Europe. The sub-sector
was boosted in 1994 with the launch of two massive trusts which attracted
considerable private investor interest, Kleinwort European Privatisation (KEPIT)
and Mercury European Privatisation (MEPIT). Unfortunately, they were launched
right at the top of the market and European governments turned out to be slower than
Britain to sell off state assets. Both trusts ran into difficulties and slid to large
discounts. KEPIT was wound up and MEPIT broadened its mandate.
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2.3.4 Geographical specialists
Since the removal of exchange controls in 1979, many geographical specialist trusts
have been formed. These provide a vehicle for investment managers, even those
managing UK equity funds, with a strong view of a particular geographical region to
purchase a diversified portfolio with the desired exposure almost instantly. Other
benefits compared with direct investment include economies of scale, lower dealing
costs and the provision of specialist investment management. But geographical
specialists tend to be volatile. Historically most geographical specialists have
concentrated on investment in North America or the Far East, but in recent years,
there has been an emphasis on the formation of geographical specialists which invest
solely in shares quoted on specific foreign stock exchange(s) located in one particular
country ('single-country funds' or just 'country funds'). Some developing countries,
such as Taiwan and Korea, restrict access to foreign equity ownership, so that a
country fund may be the only readily available vehicle for investing in that particular
country.
2.3.5 Venture & development capital trusts
These trusts invest in unlisted companies. They adopt a positive policy of providing
capital for buy-outs, start-ups, etc. and a 'hands on' approach to the management of
investments. The largest of such trusts is 3i, a constituent of the FTSE 100 Index.
Included in this category are the 'new' venture capital trusts, introduced in the 1995
Finance Act, which offer private shareholders certain tax advantages." The purpose
of these tax breaks is to encourage start-ups or small companies.
2.3.6 Warrants
Some trusts have warrants in issue. These are similar to long-term call options.12
They give the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy ordinary shares in the
trust at a predetermined price (the 'exercise price') on one or more future dates.
Unlike ordinary shares, warrants are not part of the company's capital. Holders
11 'New' venture capital trusts (VCTs) offer 20% up-front income tax relief on investments up to
£100,000; investors can defer paying capital gains tax on profits from other investments which are
used to buy VCT shares; and there is no income tax on dividends received from the VCT and no
capital gains tax on profits from the sale of VCT shares.
12
Strictly speaking, warrants are not the same as options, because exercising warrants causes dilution.
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receive no income and are not entitled to vote except in special circumstances such as
liquidation votes.
Most investment trust new issues in recent times have come as packages with 'free'
warrants attached, typically one warrant for every five new shares. At a
predetermined date, typically two or three months after issue, the warrants may be
'detached' and traded separately.13 The exercise price of the warrants is usually set
at the issue price (roughly equal to NAV) of the trust's ordinary shares. If the share
price fails to rise above the exercise price by the expiry date, holders will not
subscribe for shares. If, on the other hand, the share price rises to stand above the
exercise price at the expiry date, then holders will eventually subscribe. The
resulting sale of shares to investors would mean an inflow of funds to the trust, an
increase in the issued share capital and dilution14 of NAV.
When the warrants are traded separately from the shares, the share and warrant
packages generally trade at a greater value than issues without warrants. Gemmill
and Thomas (1997) argue that this is due to investor 'confusion'. Warrants are not
really 'free' as they give investors claims on the fund they already own as
shareholders, and this should be reflected in the share price. From the issuer's
viewpoint, however, this 'confusion' increases the chance of a successful issue.
Warrants can create a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders.
Warrant prices can, at times, drop to a level at which it makes sense for the manager
to buy them in to enhance NAV and reduce future dilution. But such action may
reduce the future size of the fund (and hence management fees) and also removes a
barrier to outside bids.
2.3.7 Convertible loan stocks
A total of fifteen conventional trusts had convertible loan stocks in issue on 31
December 1996 and many of these were only small issues. Holders have the right, at
given dates and on specified terms, to convert all or part of their holdings into
13 In some issues, the warrants are split off and traded separately on the day of issue.
14 The cash paid for each new share will normally be less than the trust's NAV per share. So NAV per
share will normally fall when warrants are exercised.
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ordinary shares of the trust. The terms of conversion are normally given in the form
of a 'conversion ratio' e.g. 60 ordinary shares per £100 nominal.
2.3.8 Annual management charges
Annual management charges vary from one investment trust to another, ranging
from about 0.2% to 2% of assets under management. The very large long-established
trusts typically charge fees of around 0.2% to 0.4% whereas more recently launched
trusts specialising in narrow or exotic markets (e.g. Latin America) typically charge
fees of around 1.5%. The level of management charges influences NAV
performance; the higher the management charges, ceteris paribus, the worse the
expected performance. Some dealing may be necessary so as to adhere to the
objectives of the fund, but fund managers may carry out unnecessary dealing with
associated costs. The important question is whether this 'unnecessary' dealing leads
to improved performance. Proponents of the Efficient Market Theory (see 3.2.1)
would not expect that active portfolio strategies would lead to 'excess returns'
without the management having access to non-public information.15
2.3.9 Net asset value
NAVs are published monthly with many investment trusts nowadays publishing the
figures weekly or daily. Published NAVs are generally considered to be reasonably
accurate16 but if a significant proportion of investments held are unquoted, there will
be some uncertainty as to the true value of underlying assets. Changes in the values
of unquoted investments take time to come through, via changes in the underlying
profits, revaluation by the trust's directors and then possibly by a sale or listing of the
underlying companies held. There has also been some debate as to what value
should be deducted for prior capital. Trust fund managers have argued that
investment trusts should be treated as continuing businesses implying that prior
capital should be deducted at nominal value. This is consistent with current
15 In a study ofUK pension fund equity portfolios, Adams and Lambert (1998) suggest that there is a
'home and away' effect. Active dealing in overseas equity portfolios is generally detrimental to
investment performance whereas for UK equity portfolios there is no significant correlation between
activity and returns.
16 The month end NAVs are generally not known until up to ten days after the month end but
Datastream and Reuters estimate NAVs for most investment trusts on a daily basis.
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accounting requirements (FRS13).17 But institutional investors often regard
investment trusts as potential takeover candidates, suggesting that NAVs should be
1 Q
calculated with prior capital deducted at market value. The former approach is
employed by The Association of Investment Trust Companies and by Datastream in
calculating NAVs and is also adopted in this thesis. If there are convertibles or
warrants outstanding, it is standard practice in the investment trust industry to make
adjustments on a per share basis to give a 'fully diluted' figure i.e. convertibles are
assumed to be converted and warrants are treated as exercised if dilution of NAV
would occur. This is the approach generally adopted in this thesis.
2.4 DISCOUNT TO NET ASSET VALUE
Investment trusts are characterised by one of the most interesting puzzles in finance -
the discount to NAV. There are a number of parts to this puzzle. Trust shares are
issued at an average premium to NAV of about 2% (Levis and Thomas, 1995). This
premium largely represents underwriting fees and start-up costs which must be
subtracted from initial proceeds. Subsequently, often within a matter of months,
shares generally trade at a discount. Discounts then fluctuate widely over time and
some trusts can on occasions trade at a premium to NAV. At the end of the life of a
trust, due to 'open-ending' or liquidation, the discount narrows as the share price
rises to meet NAV less liquidation costs.
Investment trust discounts are of interest to market operators, not least because it
may be possible to take advantage of discount anomalies to obtain excess returns,
assuming market inefficiency. For more than a decade, large 'hedge' funds
(arbitrageurs) and 'predatory' funds have been buying trust shares standing on a
wide discount and simultaneously selling short a portfolio of securities replicating the
assets held by the trust. The arbitrageur's objective is to buy into trusts standing on
large discounts to take advantage of pricing anomalies and then encourage the Board
to take measures to narrow the discount or realise value in other ways. In practice,
17 Under FRS13, companies only have to disclose the market value of their debt in the accounts, they
do not have to give market values in their balance sheets.
18 In a takeover, prior capital is repaid at market value or at the gross redemption yield on an
equivalent gilt, plus any redemption penalties.
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perfect replication of sale of the underlying portfolio is impossible and the
arbitrageur will use a combination of index proxies which are highly correlated with
movements in the trust's underyling assets. The explosive growth of derivative
security markets has clearly made this type of activity easier and cheaper to carry out.
But the more complex, diversified and secretive a trust in the components of its
underlying portfolio, the more difficult it is to carry out this arbitrage activity and the
greater the required discount anomaly before the arbitrageur will make a move.
Investment trust discounts are also of great interest to investment trust directors and
managers because investment trusts standing at a substantial discount to NAV may
be vulnerable to takeover. A better understanding of the discount can help trust
managers maximise shareholder value and thereby avoid the possibility of
unwelcome bids.
A vast array of factors have been advanced by practitioners to explain conventional
investment trust discounts but there is considerable argument as to the relative
importance of these different factors. Suggested factors giving rise to a discount or
premium include: management performance record; management expenses; taxation;
marketability; financial gearing; diversification; uncertainty as to true net asset value;
specialist portfolios; supply of shares; limited life; dividend yield; liquidation costs;
debt should be deducted at fair value; warrants; interest rates; insider ownership;
corporate activity and investor sentiment. It is important to note in the context of
this thesis that, with the exception of the last two - corporate activity and investor
sentiment, each of these factors normally changes only slowly over time.
Investment trust discounts are also of particular interest to academics as they provide
an almost unique opportunity to compare the stock market valuation of a company
with the value of that company's net assets. One of the most important hypotheses of
modern finance theory, market efficiency, can then be tested (see Section 3.2).
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2.5 INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES OF RISK
The methods adopted by investment analysts in assessing the risk of conventional
UK investment trusts include: consideration of the investment objectives of the trust;
assessment of the management from a risk perspective; financial ratios; and
statistical measures of risk. Investors will normally assess the risk profile of a trust in
the context of their existing portfolios of assets (and liabilities!).
Whether a trust is a 'specialist' or a 'generalist' is important. Specialisation can take
many forms but is principally by geographical region (e.g. Japan, Europe), by sector
(e.g. technology, financials) or by style (e.g. income growth, smaller companies).
Specialists are normally considered to be higher risk than the more broadly-based
general trusts as the latter are cushioned against unexpected events affecting a
particular industry or geographical region. Some underlying markets are inherently
more volatile (e.g. emerging markets or smaller companies) and, for the geographical
specialists, currency movements add to the risk. Concentration of the portfolio in
particular companies or sectors within the specialist area restricts the level of
diversification and also needs consideration. Furthermore, specialist trusts are
subject to fashion so that discounts tend to be more volatile (see Table 5.3).
For general trusts, the degree of international diversification can be assessed by
observing the percentage of assets in the different geographical regions. Particular
attention would be given to any concentration of the portfolio in risky areas such as
emerging markets. Correlations between the returns from shares held in the 'world'
market should be less than those between the returns from shares confined to a
particular domestic equity market such as that of the UK, so international
diversification should reduce risk. International diversification involves foreign
currency exposure but changes in exchange rates can offer protection against
(unanticipated) higher relative UK inflation as in the long run exchange rates tend to
mirror relative inflation in their economies. Foreign currencies may even be regarded
as assets in their own right which can be used to reduce the overall portfolio risk.
However, currency exposure can be managed independently of the underlying
portfolio and this may be carried out with the aim of boosting returns rather than
reducing risk.
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Fundamental analysts will also assess the management from a risk perspective. Is
there a history of the managers taking large 'bets' on individual companies or
sectors? Are the managers of the highest integrity? Management can change, so the
stability of the trust's management will also be a consideration.
The more important financial ratios used by fundamental analysts in comparing the
risk of different investment trusts include gearing, relative discount range, portfolio
yield and percentage of total assets which are unquoted.
Investment trusts that issue fixed-income capital acquire the benefits and risks of
gearing. The term gearing is normally taken to mean the ratio of total assets to
shareholders funds; sometimes fixed-interest and cash investments are deducted from
total assets as this effectively reduces the level of gearing. As holders of fixed-
income capital are normally entitled to repayment of a fixed amount of capital in a
liquidation, any increase or decrease in the value of underlying assets is wholly
attributable to the ordinary shareholders. Thus, there is increased variation in NAV
with higher levels of gearing. It should be borne in mind, however, that a trust's
level of gearing can change, with some trusts actively managing their level of gearing
by buying or selling equities for cash.19
The magnitude of the discount range over a given period (e.g. the last year) compared
with that which is typical for the sector gives an indication of risk associated with
changes in discount. Analysts may also judge that a discount which is high (or low)
relative to its recent range may be more likely to fall (or rise) with obvious
implications for risk in the short term.
A high (or low) portfolio yield is generally associated with low (or high) risk, where
portfolio yield is defined as gross revenue expressed as a percentage of gross
underlying assets. But the reasons behind the level of the portfolio yield need careful
examination. For example, a high yield might reflect the possibility of dividend cuts
19 Trusts are not active traders in futures contracts, partly because they fear being classed as 'traders'
by the Inland Revenue.
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from shares in the underlying portfolio or a more concentrated portfolio with some
sectors missing. On the other hand, a high portfolio yield might reflect a high level
of cash which would be regarded as less risky. Portfolio yield will, of course, be
highly correlated with the investment trust shareholders' dividend yield.
Uncertainty as to true net asset value is greatly influenced by the percentage of total
assets which are unquoted, despite British Venture Capital Association guidelines
being followed by most trusts. Directors' valuations of unquoted investments may be
unreliable and historic to some extent, only changing when 'something happens',
such as a share stake changing hands.
Statistical measures of risk based on historic returns are increasingly being used in
evaluating investment trust risk. The most commonly used and best known statistical
measure of risk is standard deviation (or variance) of share returns, often known as
'total risk' or 'volatility'. The measure uses historic returns to estimate the amount
by which share returns will deviate from 'mean' return. It incorporates many of the
traditional methods of assessing risk in a single statistic, but being estimated from
historic data, makes the implicit assumption that returns will behave in the future as
they have in the past. Money Management, Micropal and numerous investment
banks now publish volatility figures for investment trusts on a regular basis. A paper
by Fleming (1995) for the Association of Investment Trust Companies advocated the
use of volatility in the risk assessment of investment trusts but the paper was
regarded as controversial by many analysts. Although monthly intervals are
generally employed, total risk could be calculated using time intervals other than one
month. After all, the investor's time horizon will typically be much greater than one
month.
For institutions holding diversified equity portfolios, it may seem natural to use the
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Market Model for risk assessment. Share beta measures the sensitivity of the trust
share's return to the return on a chosen market index. Not only share beta but also its
two components, NAV beta and discount beta could be calculated.21 But what
20 See Appendix 1.
21 Share return is equal to NAV return plus discount return. It follows that share beta is equal to NAV
beta plus discount beta.
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should be used for the market index? The FT All Share Index could be used for
investment trusts specialising in the UK, but would be inappropriate for other trusts
and is seldom used for them in practice.22 An alternative approach is to use the
trust's own benchmark. The extent to which the managers are making large 'bets' on
individual companies or sectors could also be measured by the 'tracking error'. This
is the annualised standard deviation of the monthly differences between NAV returns
and benchmark returns. A low tracking error means that NAV return is usually close
to the benchmark return. Calculation of betas and tracking errors against an
appropriate benchmark index is carried out by certain investment banks. But there
are almost as many benchmarks for investment trusts as there are investment trusts!
Several fund management groups have started issuing risk gradings for their
investment trusts. They involve a broad grading of trusts into categories on
consideration of their investment objectives, a number of financial ratios and
possibly certain statistical measures of risk. These categories might be: well above
average risk, above average risk, average risk etc. The risk gradings are for the
benefit of private investors.
2.6 SPLIT CAPITAL TRUSTS
The evolution of split capital investment trusts was described in Section 2.2. They
may be defined as investment trusts with more than one main class of share capital,
offering different rights to income and capital. They are targeted mainly at private
investors and are designed to be wound-up by some future date, with most splits
having an original term of seven to ten years.23 If the trust is wound up, its assets are
sold and the proceeds are used to pay off the various classes of share capital after
meeting the entitlements of holders of debt, if any. Shareholders always have the
option to take cash but in practice, the directors and managers often try to retain the
22 Nevertheless, beta and specific risk are calculated for investment trusts in the London Business
School Risk Measurement Service, published quarterly.
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They normally have a fixed wind-up date but for some splits there may be a range of wind-up dates
and the life of others may be extended if an extension resolution is passed. Recently, there has been a
trend towards 'undated splits' in which the ordinary shares are undated. This has been made possible
by issuing ZDPs via a subsidiary company. It is the subsidiary which winds up, to be replaced by a
follow-on subsidiary if the split structure is to be maintained.
25
funds under management by encouraging roll-over into an existing trust or
restructuring, rather than liquidation.
Investors in splits are more able to take advantage of tax concessions which apply to
their individual circumstances. For example, higher rate taxpayers will prefer capital
gains, which will be free of tax up to the annual capital gains tax exemption
allowance, rather than income. By creating gearing from their financial structures,
splits also have the advantage of offering widely different levels of risk to different
investors.
The combination of fixed life and gearing means that, unlike with conventional
trusts, discount to NAV is not the most important statistic for assessing split capital
trust securities. Investors are more concerned with prospective returns, in particular
the estimated redemption yield. But despite their obvious attractions for analysis by
financial mathematicians, virtually nothing has been written in the academic
literature on UK split capital investment trusts.
A number of splits have run into difficulties because the intricate structure reflects
the inflationary expectations and the level of nominal interest rates prevailing at the
time they were created. Inflationary expectations and nominal interest rates are now
generally much lower and, as a result, the whole structure of some splits has been
called into question. However, splits have had a resurgence in recent years and are
very much 'flavour of the month' at present. This partly reflects the strength of stock
markets which encourages investment in risky securities and partly the fact that the
discount to NAV of splits (as a package) has held up better than that of conventional
trusts.
There are two types of splits - 'traditional splits' and 'quasi-splits' as illustrated in
the NWS Split Capital Index24 (see Appendix 2B).
24 NatWest Securities, 1995.
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2.6.1 Traditional splits
A basic traditional split has its ordinary share capital divided into two distinct
categories - income shares and capital shares. Holders of income shares are entitled
to all or most of the distributed income and a predetermined capital value (normally
par value) on liquidation. Thus, they receive a much higher yield than from the
underlying portfolio. Holders of capital shares receive little or no income but are
entitled to the remaining assets on liquidation after the income shares have been
redeemed.25 So they obtain geared growth.
A conflict of interest is inevitable in any traditional split because the pursuit of high
yield causes lower capital growth. Capital shareholders lack the same management
performance monitoring that income shareholders possess through their dividend
entitlement, so capital shareholders tend to be prejudiced against. In particular, the
practice of dividend stripping and/or holding a larger than intended proportion of
fixed-interest securities to meet income objectives will adversely affect capital
growth.26 This conflict of interest can be avoided in quasi-splits (see 2.6.2).
There can be other types of securities in the capital structure of traditional splits,
designed to add gearing to both income shares and capital shares, including ZDPs
and stepped preference shares. In this case, the capital shares receive what is left (if
anything) after all classes of prior capital have been paid their redemption values.
Warrants (on the capital shares) may also be issued.
2.6.2 Quasi-splits
Quasi-splits (also known as 'hybrid splits', 'new splits' or 'highly geared splits')
always have ZDPs in issue but there is only one class of ordinary share capital,
25 The Statement of Recommended Practice for the Financial Statements of Investment Trust
Companies (AITC, 1995) recommends that 'Investment management fees should be allocated between
capital and revenue in accordance with the board's expected long-term split of returns, in the form of
capital gains and income respectively, from the entire portfolio of the investment trust company.
26 Kumur et al (1978) address the problem of conflict of interest, between two classes of shareholder,
in the selection of investments for dual purpose funds, the US equivalents of UK traditional splits (see
2.7). They develop a Goal Programming model which can be applied to resolve the inherent conflict
of interest. Kumur and Philippatos (1979) then provide an empirical demonstration that dual purpose
fund managers could have improved their investment selection by the use of Goal Programming
methodology. Litzenberger and Sosin (1977) also show that high turnover of dual purpose fund
portfolios does not improve investment performance and causes unanticipated redistributions of wealth
between income and capital shareholders.
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namely income & residual capital shares. When such a trust is wound up, ZDPs are
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repaid first. This structure avoids the conflict of interest problem described above
for traditional splits and is also a sensible structure from a taxation perspective.
Again, warrants may also be issued.
2.6.3 The size of the split security markets
Table 2.2 shows the number of issues and aggregate market capitalisation of the
different split capital trust securities at 31 May 1999.
Table 2.2: Size of the Split Capital Security Markets on 31 May 1999
Type of security Number of issues Market cap. (£m)
Income shares 33 1,027
Capital shares 28 1,040
ZDPs 54 2,432
Stepped preference shares 1 60
Income & residual capital 38 1,784
Source: Lipper Ltd.
Some splits also offer 'units' which are a package of securities, typically one of each
type of security held within that trust. This allows arbitrage, thereby encouraging
more trading and more efficient pricing.
We now consider in turn the characteristics of the above main categories of shares
found in splits.
2.6.4 Income shares
Income shares form part of the capital of a traditional split capital trust. As they
receive most if not all of the income generated by the trust's underlying portfolio,
they are suitable for investors who require a high income, such as elderly people or
non-taxpayers with a potential capital gains tax liability. Some income shares are
27 In recent years, many quasi-splits have raised significant amounts of bank borrowing.
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entitled to a substantial capital repayment when the trust is wound up whereas other
income shares are more like annuities, with very little capital repayment.
Given their high yields and the fall in interest rates over recent years, many income
shares stand at a price well above the predetermined capital repayment. So investors
will suffer a capital loss on redemption and the shares in effect offer investors the
choice of receiving returns in a different form.
Income shares can be valued by discounting the estimated future income stream plus
capital repayment. Alternatively, the yield to redemption can be calculated, based on
the estimated future income stream. If there is doubt as to whether sufficient assets
will be available for the capital repayment of the income shares at the wind-up date, a
more sophisticated option28 valuation model is required (see Section 6.2).
2.6.5 Capital shares
Capital shares receive the remaining assets of a traditional split capital trust at the
wind-up date, after all other classes of capital have received their entitlement. They
receive no income so their return depends entirely on the nominal growth of
underlying assets up to the wind-up date. They are the riskiest type of security in a
traditional split, apart from warrants, suitable for high rate taxpayers looking for
excitement or very long-term investors.
Capital shares of traditional splits often trade at a considerable discount to NAV, but
this discount is not comparable to that of a conventional trust because capital shares
have no entitlement to income. The discounts of capital shares tend to narrow as
equity markets rise and widen as equity markets fall. This is because of a reduction
(increase) in value of the income stream paid to income shareholders as a percentage
of NAV in rising (falling) markets. But the corresponding income shares are
relatively insensitive to changes in the equity markets.
28 An option is the right, but not the obligation, to buy a specified amount of an underlying asset at a
fixed price on a specified date.
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Suppose that there is little doubt that there will be sufficient assets at the wind-up
date to pay the entitlement of all other classes of capital. Capital shares can then be
valued by estimating residual assets on the basis of a predicted nominal growth rate
for underlying assets and discounting at a rate of interest which includes an
appropriate risk premium. But if there is doubt as to whether sufficient assets will be
available at the wind-up date to meet the capital entitlement of all other classes of
capital, an option valuation model is required (see Section 6.2).
2.6.6 Zero dividend preference shares
ZDPs pay a fixed capital sum when the trust is wound up before any distribution can
be made to ordinary shareholders, income shareholders or capital shareholders.
They have no entitlement to income so that, importantly, there is no liability to
income tax. Zero coupon bonds (or low coupon bonds) do not offer this tax
advantage. The main influence on the prices of ZDPs is movement in the prices of
gilts with similar duration.29 The comparison with gilts has been simplified since the
introduction of a gilt strips market in 1997, although tax differences with ZDPs and
the appropriate risk premiums for different ZDPs need careful consideration (see
Section 6.4).
ZDPs are attractive to investors who need a fixed sum at a future point in time and
are able to use their annual exemption allowance to avoid capital gains tax. If sums
of money are required at different points in time, an appropriate portfolio of ZDPs
can be created. They are suitable for school fees planning and retirement planning.
The tax status of zero dividend preference shares came under threat in the summer of
1995 when an Inland Revenue Consultative Document on the taxation of gilts and
bonds was published. Their tax status was confirmed later in the year, largely as a
result of lobbying by the investment trust industry itself, but they remain vulnerable
to a change in the tax rules given their favourable tax status.
2<) Duration may be defined as the weighted average of the times of receipts of payments, where the
weights are equal to the present value of those payments.
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2.6.7 Stepped preference shares
Stepped preference shares pay dividends which rise at a predetermined rate, together
with a fixed capital sum when the trust is wound up. They may or may not rank
ahead of ZDPs, if any, but rank ahead of all other split securities on wind-up. As
with ZDPs, an important criterion in assessing the attraction of stepped preference
shares is the redemption yield compared with that of a gilt with similar duration,
taking into account taxation and risk.
There were four trusts with stepped preference shares in issue on 31 December
1996.30 Three (General Consolidated, Fleming Income & Growth and Scottish
National) were traditional splits and one (TR Technology) was a quasi-split. Table
2.2 shows that by 31 May 1999, only one stepped preference share, Fleming Income
& Growth, remained in issue. We will therefore not consider stepped preference
shares further in this thesis.
2.6.8 Income & residual capital shares
These shares, which are also known as 'highly geared ordinary income shares', offer
high income plus all the remaining assets of a quasi-split trust at the wind-up date,
after the ZDPs (and any other prior capital) have received their capital entitlement.
They might be looked upon as equity partly financed through borrowing. The
income is relatively low risk but the entitlement to residual capital is relatively high
risk. They are suitable for PEP planning and, for some people, in retirement
planning.
Valuing these shares using a DCF approach requires an estimate of both income
growth and growth of the underlying assets up to the wind-up date. If there is doubt
as to whether sufficient assets will be available to repay the ZDPs an option valuation
model is required (see Section 6.3).
2.6.9 Industry perspectives of risk for splits
In this section, we define and discuss the main statistics currently used by investment
trust analysts in assessing the risk of different types of split securities. Analysts will
30 Source: NatWest Securities.
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not use these statistics in isolation. They will consider other factors such as the
quality of management and the quality of the underlying portfolio of assets (normally
UK equities). Some splits invest in other splits which can make them risky.
Statistical measures such as volatility or beta are rarely used for split securities.
Income shares
Asset cover is the ratio of total assets to the assets required to pay the predetermined
redemption amount of the income shares at the redemption date. It gives a rough
indication of the risk of the income shareholders not receiving their full entitlement at
redemption but does not take the term to redemption into account.
Hurdle rate is the required annual growth rate of total assets to pay the full
redemption amount of the income shares. This is a crude measure of the risk for
comparative purposes because it does not take into account the yield on the
underlying portfolio of assets. Clearly, the higher the yield on the underlying
portfolio, the more difficult it is to achieve the required annual growth rate.
Revenue reserve as % ofdividend shows the extent to which the current expected or
forecast dividend is covered by the existing revenue reserve. This is relevant to the
risk assessment of income shares because the dividend is the main element of return.
Capital shares
Hurdle rate is the required annual growth rate of total assets so that the capital shares
are repaid at the current share price, after paying off the other shareholders. The
higher the hurdle rate, the riskier the capital shares. This does not take into account
either gearing or the yield on the underlying portfolio.
Wipe-out rate for capital shares is simply the hurdle rate for income shares. It is the
annual growth rate of total assets for which the capital shares just become worthless
at redemption.
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Gearing may be defined as the ratio of total assets to the assets attributable to capital
shareholders. The ratio takes no account of the term to redemption, but it does at
least give some indication of short-term price volatility.
A further approach is to calculate the gross redemption yield (i.e. the pre-tax internal
rate of return to redemption) for different assumed growth rates of total assets. This
gives an indication of the sensitivity of the capital shareholders' returns to the growth
rate of total assets.
Zero dividend preference shares.
Asset cover and hurdle rate are as defined for income shares, and the same critcisms
apply as for income shares. Although ZDPs offer a fixed return if repaid in full and
held to maturity, they can be volatile in the short term, simply due to changes in the
gilt-edged market. This is not reflected in the asset cover or the hurdle rate.
Income & residual capital shares
31Hurdle rate, wipe-out rate, gearing and gross redemption yields may be used to
assess risk, as with capital shares. The same criticisms apply. Revenue reserve as %
ofdividend may also be used in assessing security of income, as with income shares.
2.7 US CLOSED-END FUNDS
The equivalent of investment trusts in the US are known as closed-end funds. They
have not been a very popular type of collective investment vehicle, with the market
for equity funds no bigger than that of UK investment trusts. Nevertheless, they have
attracted much research interest, particularly in respect of the discount anomaly. As a
result, most academic studies of UK investment trusts refer to studies of US closed-
end funds.
31 It is debateable as to what should be deducted for the ZDPs in the gearing calculation. The nominal
value of the ZDPs is not fixed but moves up over time in line with its predetermined entitlement to
capital (i.e. the theoretical amount at which they would be repaid were the trust to be wound up
immediately).
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US closed-end funds are regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the
securities they issue must be registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The majority of closed-end fund shares are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, but a small proportion is
traded on NASDAQ, the US over-the-counter market (Fredman and Scott, 1991).
The early British investment trusts served as a model for similar vehicles in the US.
The first US closed-end fund, the Boston Personal Property Trust, was formed in
1893, twenty-five years after the first UK investment trust (Anderson and Born,
1992). But the first US closed-end fund to employ borrowed funds and thus
introduce gearing, Railway and Light Securities Fund, was formed in 1904 (Fredman
and Scott, 1991). During the 1920s, the US closed-end fund industry enjoyed
phenomenal growth with several hundred funds being formed, often with highly
geared structures, to satisfy the speculative appetite of investors at that time. Many
of the funds invested in other highly geared funds thereby creating a dangerous
pyramid structure of several geared funds. As a result, massive losses were incurred
by closed-end fund investors in the 1929 Wall Street Crash (Herzfeld, 1980).
In response to the widespread speculation and abuses of the 1920s, several pieces of
legislation were introduced to regulate pooled investment vehicles, including the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Investment
Company Act of 1940 was comprehensive legislation which regulated the formation,
management and public share issues of investment companies. Following the 1940
Act, few closed-end funds were formed in the US for many years. The open-end
investment company industry grew to become much more important than that of
closed-end funds (Anderson and Born, 1992).
It was not until the 1960s that US individuals again showed any interest in closed-end
funds, with many convertible funds and bond funds being issued. Seven dual-
purpose funds were also created in 1967, modelled on the British traditional splits.
By the end of the 1960s, US closed-end funds were generally trading at a premium to
NAV and there were a number of new issues. Seventeen stock funds and fourteen
bond funds were issued over the years 1969 to 1973 inclusive. But then most funds
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started to trade at a discount and new issues effectively stopped for nearly a decade
(Fredman and Scott, 1991).
The second half of the 1980s saw dramatic growth in the US closed-end fund
industry. In 1985 there were 54 closed-end funds with assets amounting to $8 billion
but by 1992 there were over 300 funds worth more than $75 billion. As with UK
investment trusts, there was a trend towards specialisation of investment objectives.
There were 50 US country funds in December 1994 (Levis and Thomas, 1997)
whereas only four such funds existed in December 1984. But a major part of the US
closed-end fund industry still consists of bond funds which do not exist in the UK
due to the unfavourable tax treatment relative to authorised unit trust bond funds.32
Most US closed-end funds have unlimited lives and dual-purpose funds have played
only a minor role in the US. Indeed, the latter were dependent on a tax loophole
which was closed in 1989. As a result, no new dual-purpose funds may be
established in the US. All the original dual-purpose funds have now been liquidated
or converted to open-end status in accordance with rules laid down in their original
charters.
The main differences between US closed-end funds and UK investment trusts
concern taxation, ownership structure, gearing and the method of raising new equity
capital.
The taxation of US closed-end funds is based on the principle of avoiding double
taxation of shareholders, as with UK investment trusts, but there are nevertheless
important differences in their tax treatment. A US closed-end fund itself normally
has no tax liability. If the fund meets the requirements for investment company
status33, its net income, exclusive of capital gains, is not subject to corporate tax.
Dividends received by shareholders are treated as taxable income (Anderson and
Born, 1992). But to qualify for exclusion from corporate capital gain tax, closed-end
32 There are a number of reasons for this including the higher rate of corporation tax that applies to
investment trusts, and the special tax regime that applies to authorised unit trust bond funds.
33 To obtain investment company status, a closed-end fund must distribute at least 90% of its net
income (excluding capital gains) as taxable dividends.
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funds must distribute net realised capital gains34 in a given year to shareholders as a
capital gains distribution35 in contrast to UK investment trusts which are required to
retain all realised capital gains. Closed-end fund shareholders in turn are liable for
their proportion of capital gains tax, regardless of the length of time the shares have
been held. So new shareholders inherit a contingent capital gains tax liability.
Another difference is that management expenses are not deductible from taxable
income for US closed-end funds (Fredman and Scott, 1991).
There is a marked difference in the ownership structure of US closed-end funds and
UK investment trusts. Typically, individuals hold a much higher percentage of the
equity of US closed-end funds compared with UK investment trusts. Lee et al (1991)
report that US institutions owned only an average of 6.6% of US closed-end funds
in 1988. By contrast, only 27% of UK investment trust shares were held by private
individuals in 1997 (HSBC James Capel, 1997).
The level of debt in the capital structure of US closed-end funds is severely restricted
by the Investment Company Act of 1940. Funded debt and preferred stock must be
covered at least three times and twice by total assets respectively (Anderson and
Bom, 1992). In contrast, there are no legal restrictions on the level of debt or
preference capital for UK investment trusts and some trusts are highly geared.
If an existing US closed-end fund wishes to raise more equity capital, this is
generally done by means of a rights issue. In the case of funds trading at a discount,
this is against the interests of existing shareholders as they are subscribing cash
which immediately falls in value in the hands of the fund. But, unlike in the UK,
shareholders are unable to vote against and thereby stop a rights issue. The
Investment Company Act of 1940 effectively rules out the possibility of C share
issues in the US.
34 Unrealised capital gains are not taxed and need not be distributed until and unless realised.
35 Most closed-end funds elect to pay capital gains distributions to shareholders rather than retain
them. The corporate capital gain tax rate normally exceeds the corresponding tax rate for individuals.
Although the retention of realised gains is rare, any corporate capital gain tax paid is passed on to
shareholders on a proportional basis as a tax credit.
36
2.8 SUMMARY
The investment trust industry has a history dating back to 1868. The early trusts were
designed to give smaller investors the opportunity to obtain an interest in a
diversified portfolio of securities. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, there was a
shift in investment trust ownership away from private investors towards institutional
investors. The majority of investment trust shares are currently held by institutions, a
situation which the AITC is trying to reverse. The industry has had fluctuating
fortunes, with long periods of growth interspersed with shorter periods of
contraction.
There has always been an emphasis on overseas investment, but the early trusts
invested mainly in fixed-interest securities whereas trusts nowadays invest mainly in
equities. Trusts may be categorised according to the geographic region(s) in which
they invest, the largest trusts being international generalists investing in a diversified
portfolio of equities across different geographical regions and industry sectors. UK
generalists and geographical specialists are other important trust categories.
Investment trusts generally trade at a discount to their underlying net assets and there
is considerable variation in discounts both across the sector and over time. Many
arguments have been advanced by practitioners to explain why trusts stand at a
discount but opinions vary greatly on their relative importance. The discount puzzle
is of interest not only to market operators and investment trust directors/managers
but is also of particular interest to academics largely because of its implications for
market efficiency.
The traditional methods adopted by investment analysts in assessing the risk of
conventional investment trusts include consideration of the investment objectives of
the trust, assessment of the management and financial ratios. But statistical measures
of risk based on historic returns are increasingly being used in evaluating investment
trust risk. The most commonly used statistical measure is standard deviation of share
returns ('volatility').
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Split capital investment trusts have more than one main class of share capital,
offering different rights to income and capital. Although the first split was not
created until 1965, there has been strong growth in the sector in recent years. By
creating gearing from their financial structures, splits can offer widely different levels
of risk to different investors. Analysts use a variety of ratios and projected rates of
return to assess the risk of different split securities. Statistical measures of risk are
rarely used.
The equivalent of investment trusts in the US are known as closed-end funds.
Although US closed-end funds are similar in many respects to UK investment trusts
they have important differences relating to taxation, ownership structure, gearing and
the method of raising new equity capital. Some knowledge of US closed-end funds
is essential when carrying out academic research on UK investment trusts as there
has been much research effort directed at US closed-end funds, particularly in respect
of the discount puzzle.
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CHAPTER 3 - EFFICIENT MARKETS, ASSET PRICING AND
INVESTMENT TRUSTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Much research effort has been directed at rational explanations of conventional
investment trust (and US closed-end fund) discounts and whether decision rules
based on discounts can systematically provide excess returns. This literature is
discussed in Section 3.2. An alternative to the efficient market model, the noise
trader model, and its relevance to the closed-end fund puzzle, is then discussed in
Section 3.3. Section 3.4 reviews work relating to the excess volatility of closed-end
funds compared with their underlying net assets. Such excess volatility contradicts
the efficient market model but is consistent with the noise trader model.
3.2 MARKET EFFICIENCY AND INVESTMENT TRUSTS
In a perfect market, the market value of an investment trust must equal the net asset
value of its underlying portfolio. Otherwise there would be an opportunity for
profitable arbitrage. But the introduction of transaction costs, agency costs and
other problems breaks the link between market value of the trust and its net asset
value. Explanations of the closed-end fund discount puzzle cannot therefore be
within the framework of the perfect market model and there is now a vast literature
seeking to provide explanations of the discount puzzle which are consistent with the
efficient market model.
3.2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis
Academic research in the 1960s and earlier, mainly on shares quoted on the New
York Stock Exchange, seemed to suggest that share prices followed a random walk.
That is, successive share prices were independent of each other or, in statistical
terms, there was no serial correlation between successive share price changes.
Having established randomness, at least to their own satisfaction if not to that of
market participants, academics started to search for an explanation as to why there
should be randomness. The search led to the concept of market efficiency.
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A stock market is said to be informationally efficient if it fully reflects all available
information (Fama, 1991). In such a market, the activity of investors removes any
opportunity for systematically achieving excess returns. There is no way of formally
disproving informational efficiency but it is possible to carry out a number of tests.
By the early 1970s, it had become widely accepted among academics that major
stock markets, such as New York and London, were close to efficient, in the sense
that share prices fully reflected all publicly available information. Most of the tests
consisted of event studies. This involved testing the market's reaction to specific
announcements (such as takeovers or scrip issues) relating to the shares concerned to
see whether, on average, excess returns (after risk adjustment - see 3.2.4) could be
obtained by dealing immediately after the announcements.
During the 1980s, however, a number of stock market 'anomalies' were discovered
(Dimson, 1988). There seemed to be a considerable degree of return predictability on
the basis of certain fundamental variables such as discount to net asset value (not
confined to closed-end funds), dividend yields, P/E ratio and market capitalisation.
Various seasonal and day-of-the-week patterns were discovered. Furthermore,
contrary to the earlier research, it seemed that share returns over time were
correlated; they were positively correlated with short return intervals and negatively
correlated with longer return intervals.
There are two aspects to an efficient market - informational efficiency and rational
fundamental valuation. Informational efficiency means that share prices react
instantaneously to embody all new information. But just because new information is
assimilated by the market very rapidly, it does not mean necessarily that the market
values shares rationally. Share price changes in response to new information may
build upon an irrational valuation of the shares. The stock market crash of 1987
emphasised the distinction between informational efficiency and rational
fundamental valuation. Many commentators (e.g. Arbel et al, 1988) argue that,
despite the market being close to informational efficiency, a speculative bubble had
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built up immediately prior to the crash of 1987 and that the crash was the market's
way of realigning share prices to a more rational level.
A controversial body of research has developed in the last 20 years to test whether
variation in actual prices is consistent with that dictated by variability in
fundamentals. This 'excess volatility' literature kicked off with papers by Shiller
(1981) and Leroy and Porter (1981) both of which assert that share prices are too
volatile to have been generated by a rational valuation process. Excess volatility was
typically tested using a variance-bounds test which compared the variability of share
returns to the variability of dividends. However, Kleidon (1986) and Marsh and
Merton (1986) challenged the statistical validity of the variance-bounds test and the
intuitive appeal of this simple test was rather overshadowed by the statistical issues
surrounding the actual test procedures used. The controversy has now largely
subsided because it became clear that rejection of the constant discount rate model
for the present value of dividends is not the same as rejection of the efficient market
hypothesis. As Fama (1991) puts it: "It now seems clear that volatility tests are
another useful way to show that expected returns vary through time". Even if a
variance-bounds test allows variation in expected returns through time, the expected
return process may be misspecified.
One aspect of investment trust behaviour which is a powerful test of the efficient
market hypothesis is whether or not there is excess volatility of investment trust share
returns compared with the volatility of underlying NAV returns. The practical
problems associated with comparing dividend volatility with return volatility in most
variance-bounds tests are avoided. We might expect the discount rate for the
investment trust simply to equal the discount rate for the trust's underlying portfolio.1
If there is excess volatility of trust share returns then this contradicts the efficient
market model.
1 Elton et al (1998) argue that if the closed-end fund sells at a discount, the expected return to
investors exceeds the expected return on the underlying portfolio, but this has little impact on the
proposed excess volatility test of market efficiency.
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3.2.2 Rational explanations of the discount
Much of the research on closed-end funds has concentrated on explaining the
discount puzzle and has only indirectly addressed the question of market efficiency.
The literature mainly concerns US closed-end funds but some research has been
directed at UK investment trusts. Explanations consistent with market efficiency that
have been proposed include miscalculation of NAV, agency costs, tax timing and
investment opportunities.
Miscalculation of NAV covers a number of theories, the most relevant from the
perspective of UK investment trusts being the block discount hypothesis. This states
that the current market valuation of underlying assets is calculated using the trading
price of a marginal share whereas the proceeds from a liquidation, typically involving
the sale of large blocks of shares, would be much lower. Unfortunately, this
argument is not consistent with the evidence that large positive abnormal returns are
observed when funds are open-ended (Brauer (1984) and Brickley and Schallheim
(1985) for the US, and Draper (1989) for the UK). Nevertheless, this block discount
factor could still contribute to the existence of discounts.
For US closed-end funds, realised capital gains in the fund must be distributed to
shareholders and are then taxed, whereas any capital losses as a result of the
distribution cannot be realised by shareholders until their shares are sold. This means
that NAVs are generally overestimated. A fund with unrealised capital gains in its
portfolio should therefore sell at a discount because new investors will incur a
potentially higher capital gains tax liability than would be incurred were they simply
to purchase the fund's underlying net assets. However, empirical work on this issue
for US closed-end funds has provided mixed results (Malkiel (1977), Brickley et al
(1991) and Malkiel (1995)). In any case, this tax liability argument does not apply to
UK investment trusts because there is no equivalent capital gains tax problem.
A number of investment banks have recently stressed that published NAVs of UK
investment trusts are generally overestimated because liabilities are deducted at par
value (e.g. Merrill Lynch, 1998). With the reduction in interest rates over recent
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years, the fair value of investment trust liabilities is generally much higher than par
value. Cazenove & Co (1998) estimate that calculating NAVs with liabilities at fair
value rather than at par value would reduce the sector average discount by around
2%.
The agency cost theory says that discounts are a consequence of capitalising future
management fees or inferior future investment performance. However, for US
closed-end funds, Malkiel (1977) finds no correlation between discounts and
management fees, and Malkiel (1977), Lee et al (1991b) and Pontiff (1995) find no
significant relationship between discounts and future NAV performance. On the
other hand, Chay and Trzcinka (1999) find that US closed-end stock fund discounts
reflect NAV performance over the following year. For UK investment trusts, Draper
and Paudyal (1991), using pooled time series / cross-sectional data for the period
1983 to 1986, provide empirical support for the notion that discounts reflect past
investment performance but this does not mean that discounts reflect future
investment performance. Draper and Paudyal (1991) do not find statistically
significant evidence of management fees affecting UK investment trust discounts.
Nevertheless, Prior (1995) still interprets the discount as an agency cost.
Another agency cost explanation for UK investment trusts, proposed by Draper
(1989), arises from the fact that UK investment trusts are rarely managed 'in house'
but contract out their management to outside specialists. This acts as a disincentive
for managers to realise the underlying assets of the trust. Draper provides evidence
to suggest that termination (liquidiation or unitisation) costs are very low and that
shareholders have lost out due to the agency problem.
Closed-end funds deny taxpayers the valuable tax-timing option available if the
fund's underlying shares were held directly. As a result, closed-end funds might be
expected to trade at a discount. This is a quite separate argument from that relating
to US contingent capital gains tax liabilities discussed above. However, Seyhun and
Skinner (1994) find no relationship between the use of tax-motivated trading and US
closed-end fund discounts, and many investors (e.g. pension funds) in UK investment
trusts do not pay tax, which casts doubt on the importance of this factor.
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Investment by closed-end funds in foreign securities may influence discounts because
overseas diversification is expensive and time-consuming for investors. Some
countries may even impose restrictions on direct foreign ownership, making closed-
end funds invested in such countries more valuable and possibly causing a premium.
Bonser-Neal et al (1990) test for a relationship between announcements of a
liberalisation of investment restrictions and changes in US country fund discounts
over the period 1981-1989. They report that 80% of the country funds studied
experience a significant increase in the discount (or reduction in the premium) around
the time of the announcement of a liberalisation of investment restrictions. On the
other hand, Malkiel (1977) does not find a significant relationship between discounts
on US closed-end funds and a dummy variable which captures whether or not the
fund is invested exclusively in foreign securities.
Groups of investors may have different objectives/responses. For example,
individual investors may behave differently from institutions. Many commentators,
such as Prior (1995), argue that there is a relationship between the proportion of
investment trust shares held by institutions and the size of discounts. Institutions can
replicate the underlying portfolio without having to pay management fees or
incurring the risk of adverse movements in the discount, and are therefore only
prepared to buy the investment trust shares at a discount. A related argument is that
investment trusts trade at a discount because of poor sales effort and public
understanding.
Many arguments have been advanced to explain US and UK discounts but, even
taken together, they seem incapable of explaining all parts of the puzzle (see Section
2.4). In particular, they do not explain why there are wide variations in discounts
over time. If this discount variation over time is due to market inefficiency, it might




Various studies, both in the US and in the UK, have suggested that it is possible to
generate excess returns systematically through decision rules based on discounts.
One of the earliest and best known studies to document an apparently profitable
decision rule for US closed-end funds was by Thompson (1978). The study is based
on monthly data for 23 closed-end funds over the period 1940-1975. To examine any
relationship between discounts and returns, he constructs four separate portfolios of
closed-end funds based on the sign and size of their discounts. The funds are
rebalanced each year in response to changes in the discounts of constituent funds.
The 'all funds' portfolio acts as a control portfolio; at the beginning of each year an
equal investment is made in each fund in the sample. The 'premium' portfolio
consists of equal investment in all funds trading at a premium at the beginning of
each year. The 'discount, equal weights' portfolio consists of equal amounts of funds
trading at a discount at the beginning of the year. The 'discount, weighted' portfolio
consists of the same funds as the 'discount, equal weights' portfolio but the portfolio
weights are proportional to the size of the discount at the beginning of the year.
Thompson shows that investors receive higher risk-adjusted returns from funds
trading at a discount compared to other New York Stock Exchange common stocks.
Over the 32 year period from January 1940 to December 1971, the 'discount
weighted' strategy results in excess returns of over 4% per annum. The 'discount,
equal weight' strategy results in an excess return of approximately 2% per annum
over the same period. But the 'all funds' strategy does not produce excess returns
and the 'premium' strategy results in a negative abnormal risk-adjusted return of
approximately 8% per annum. However, Thompson stresses that it is not possible to
assess whether the results reflect market inefficiency or the inappropriateness of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model which is used to adjust returns for risk (see 3.2.4).
Sias (1998) investigates Thompson's decision rule further by adopting different
weights for the constituent funds. He finds that the more weight given to high
discount funds, the greater the excess return produced. His most extreme strategy
results in an excess return 21% per annum greater than an equally weighted strategy.
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Based on weekly data for a sample of 18 closed-end funds over the period 1970-
1976, Richards et al (1980) suggest that decision rules based on the sale of shares
when the discount has narrowed and the purchase of shares when the discount has
widened, produces excess returns. This strategy involves setting bounds for the
purchase and sales of fund shares according to the level of discount at which they are
trading. Anderson (1986) adapts the same strategy as Richards et al with a slightly
different sample and over the three periods 1965-1969, 1970-1976 and 1977-1984.
His findings generally support those of Richards et al but both studies ignore
transaction costs.
A strategy adopted by Pontiff (1995) also seems to achieve excess returns, even after
transaction costs. His approach is to construct seven portfolios of closed-end funds
from a total sample of 53 funds, where composition of the portfolio is determined by
the size of the discount the previous month. For the period 1965-1985, the average
monthly abnormal return for the high discount portfolio and low discount portfolio is
1.75% and -0.55% respectively. Funds with 20% discounts have expected one year
returns that are 6% greater than non-discounted funds. The correlation between
discounts and future returns is attributed to mean-reversion, not to anticipated future
NAV performance.
Corner and Matatko (1979) and Draper and Paudyal (1991) replicate Thompson's
decision rule for UK investment trusts. Both studies document higher returns for
higher discount trusts compared with lower discount trusts, but the results are not
statistically significant in both cases. However, Cheng et al (1994) claim to find
evidence for excess returns with a simple discount-based decision rule for UK
investment trusts. A strategy of buying high discount trusts results in excess returns
of about 3.5% per annum whereas a strategy of buying low discount trusts results in
negative abnormal returns of about 7% per annum. But whether excess returns could
be achieved after transaction costs is debatable.
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3.2.4 Models of risk
Almost all tests of the efficient market hypothesis, including decision rules, are
conditional upon a particular equilibrium model for returns and are therefore subject
to a serious 'joint hypothesis' problem. Thus discovery of an apparent inefficiency
could indeed be due to an inefficient capital market but it could also be due to the use
of an incorrect equilibrium model for returns, or both. Models of returns that have
been employed in empirical work include the Market Model, the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) and Arbtrage Pricing Theory (APT). It is not apparent that
any one of these models is more valid than the others, but results using different
models are generally confirmatory.
The most common model for returns in event studies has been the Market Model
(see Appendix 1). It segments the return on a share into a market index related
component and a return that is residual to the market index as follows:
Ril = ai + PiRmt +eit
where Ru is the return on share i in period t.
Rm is the return on the market index in period t.
a, is the constant return unique to share i.
Pi is a measure of the sensitivity of the return on share i to the return on the
market index, and calculated as oim/om
en is the random residual error in period t, assumed to be independently and
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance.
Estimates of the parameters a, and ft, are calculated using regression analysis with
return data from an estimation period. The 'abnormal' return in the test period is
then given by:
ARit =Rll-(ai+plRmt)
Another model of returns, which has often been employed in testing decision rules
(e.g. Thompson (1978) - see 3.2.3), is the CAPM. This also predicts that share
returns will be linearly related to a single common factor, the return on the market
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index. But it is a normative equilibrium model, derived from a set of assumptions
which concern investor behaviour and market conditions (see, for example, Adams et
al, 1993). The CAPM gives a simple relationship between expected return, E(R0, on
share i and its risk, as measured by beta:
E(Ri) = Rf +/3i{E(Rm)-Rf}
where Rf is the risk-free rate of return
and E(Rm) is the expected return on the market index.
The above CAPM formula can be transformed from its expectational form into an ex
post form by assuming that, on average, the expected return on the share is equal to
its realised return. The 'abnormal' return in the test period is then given by:
AR„=R,-(R,+P
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) carry out studies using simulated data to examine
the performance of models for detecting abnormal returns. They conclude that
beyond a simple one-factor market model, there is no evidence that more complex
models convey any benefit.
It has become clear in recent years that the ex post beta coefficient explains very
little, if any, of the difference between actual returns on different shares and
portfolios (see, for example, Fama and French, 1992). As a result, multifactor
models, in particular that developed by Fama and French (1993), have been
increasingly used as models for returns (e.g. Pontiff (1995) - see 3.2.3). A
multifactor model is based on the assumption that share returns are linearly related to
a number of common factors and can be thought of as a generalisation of the CAPM.
If a multifactor model is appropriate for the risk/return trade-off, all expected returns
above the riskless rate are due to factor risk premiums.
2
Armitage (1995) reviews event study methods and evidence of their performance.
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3.3 NOISE TRADING
With the apparent inability to explain the closed-end discount puzzle within the
framework of the efficient market hypothesis, recent attempts at explaining the
phenomenon have adopted alternative theories that involve investor irrationality.
The investor sentiment theory proposed by Lee et al (1991a), and developed from the
De Long et al (1990a) noise trader approach to finance, has been especially popular.
We first describe the noise trader model before discussing the investor sentiment
theory of closed-end funds and empirical evidence for and against it.
3.3.1 The noise trader model
The 'noise trader' model asserts that rational traders in financial markets interact with
noise traders. These noise traders are uninformed market participants who are active
traders and stock markets generate irrational valuations because of the their activities.
When noise traders are present, large positive returns are immediately followed by
further large positive returns in the short term. Their irrational trading activity
imparts so much risk to the markets that informed rational operators fear to trade
against them. This is because arbitrage by rational investors, who have finite time
horizons, is risky and therefore limited.
It is usually assumed that dealing by rational investors will dampen fluctuations
caused by noise traders. But this is not necessarily the case if noise traders follow
positive feedback trading strategies (De Long et al, 1990b). That is, they buy shares
when prices rise and sell shares when prices fall. It may pay rational investors to act
quickly and buy shares ahead of noise traders. Noise traders then 'jump on the
bandwagon' later and push prices even further away from fundamental value. This
will further increase volatility.
The existence of noise traders can explain some of the stock market anomalies and
empirical results cited in 3.2.1. In particular, if share prices are not determined solely
by fundamentals, they may be more volatile than that dictated by fundamentals.
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3.3.2 Investor sentiment and the closed-end fund puzzle
Investor sentiment has long been seen as a possible source of discount variation over
time. Zweig (1973), for example, considered the differential effect on US closed-
end fund shares and their underlying net assets of trading by 'professionals' and
'non-professionals'. He claimed that his approach demonstrated sufficient
forecasting value to warrant further investigation. But it was not until the 1990s that
the investor sentiment theory became popular and attracted serious scrutiny.
Lee et al (1991a) argue that US discount movements are driven by changes in the
sentiment of small investors who are the dominant owners of US closed-end funds.
Institutional investors fail to offset fully the irrational fluctuating sentiment of small
investors because discount movements are cross-sectionally correlated (i.e.
systematic) and arbitrageurs have finite time horizons. The discount on closed-end
funds is then interpreted as an individual investor sentiment index. The theory
requires that discounts vary stochastically because it is precisely this discount
volatility that is responsible for the underpricing, in equilibrium, of closed-end funds
relative to their underlying assets.
Lee et al identify a number of testable implications of the theory: discounts across
different funds will tend to move together; new issues of closed-end funds will tend
to occur when seasoned funds sell at a premium or a small discount; and there should
be contemporaneous correlation between closed-end fund discounts and share prices
of small firms (which tend to be held by small investors).
3.3.3 Empirical evidence
Lee et al (1991a) present empirical evidence based on monthly data for 20 US equity
funds over the period July 1965 to December 1985 which supports the investor
sentiment theory. Discounts of individual domestic funds tend to move together.
The average pairwise correlation of annual changes in discounts among domestic
equity funds is 0.389 and the average pairwise correlation of monthly changes in
3
According to Lee et al (1991a), in 1988, the average institutional ownership in the smallest 10% of
the firms on the NYSE was 26.5%, the average institutional ownership in the largest 10% of the firms
on the NYSE was 52.1% and the average institutional ownership in the US domestic equity closed-end
funds was 6.6%.
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discounts among domestic equity funds is 0.248. Discounts tend to be low in years
when there are many new issues. The mean value-weighted discount4 at the
beginning of years when one or more domestic equity fund started is 6.40% whereas
the mean value-weighted discount at the beginning of years when no domestic equity
fund started is 13.64%. Finally, closed-end fund discounts tend to narrow when
small firm shares perform well and tend to widen when small firm shares perform
poorly.
Chen et al (1993), using the same data as Lee et al, argue that the correctly measured
comovement between fund discounts and small firm returns is neither strong enough
nor robust enough to support the investor sentiment theory. In particular, they
emphasise the virtual disappearance of the relation between discounts and small firm
returns in the second half of the test period (1975-1985). In response, Chopra et al
(1993) defend the evidence presented by Lee et al arguing that Chen et al select the
weakest evidence for criticism. Evidence that changes in discounts across funds are
correlated, that new funds start up when seasoned funds are at a premium or a small
discount are ignored. But one could argue that these observations can be explained
without appealing to investor sentiment theory. If funds are invested in the same type
of assets (e.g. US equities) and are held in similar structures, discounts might be
expected to move together. And profit maximising behaviour suggests that new
funds will be started when seasoned funds are trading at a premium or at a small
discount.
Swaminathan (1996) provides additional evidence concerning the relationship
between US closed-end fund discounts and small firm returns. If individual
investors' optimism pushes stock prices too high then we would expect that as these
temporary deviations are corrected, stock prices would tend to fall, implying that
future returns will be low. This would give rise to positive covariance between
current discounts and future small firm returns. Swaminathan does in fact show that
discounts forecast small firm returns, which is consistent with investor sentiment
theory. However, Swaminathan also shows that discounts contain information about
4
Some funds had relatively short life spans and others had missing data points. The value-weighted
discount index had monthly memberships ranging from 7 funds to 18 funds.
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future economic activity (earnings growth rate and inflation) which is not consistent
with investor sentiment theory.
Using the signal extraction technique of French and Roll (1986) to measure noise,
Brauer (1993) estimates that on average only about 7% of the variance of weekly
changes in US closed-end fund discounts can be attributed to noise trading activity.
The sample of funds and the period of observation (1966-1990) are similar to those
of Lee et al. Brauer concludes that the variability of US closed-end fund discounts
over time is far greater than can be accounted for by investor sentiment.
Elton et al (1998) find no evidence that small investor sentiment, as measured by the
change in discount of US closed-end funds, is an important factor in the return
generating process for US equities. Using a five-index model rather than a two-index
model reverses the pattern of sensitivities to sentiment across size categories reported
by Lee et al (1991). Other findings do not support the notion that small investor
sentiment is a priced factor.
Ammer (1992) makes the straightforward point that UK investment trusts are owned
predominantly by institutional investors, yet the stylized facts about UK investment
trust discounts are similar to those for US closed-end funds. Indeed, UK discounts
are generally larger than US discounts. He argues that the discount puzzle cannot
therefore be dismissed as an anomaly concerned with small investors.
Hoskins (1994) shows that US closed-end funds of the same type (stock, bond or
international funds) have discounts that move together. It is not clear why this
discount comovement occurs as it is not explained by the general sentiment of small
investors. If investor sentiment is the explanation, there would have to be three
types of sentiment: one for stock funds, one for bond funds and one for international
funds.
Hardouvelis et al (1993), Suh (1993) and Bodurtha et al (1995) study US country
funds (i.e. closed-end funds invested in a single country) to test for investor
sentiment. Country funds are particularly useful for detecting movements in
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sentiment because fund prices are determined in the local equity market whereas
underlying net asset values are determined in foreign equity markets. Country funds
therefore capture the differences between local sentiment and foreign sentiment,
unlike the Lee et al (1991a) investor sentiment theory which simply measures the
differential sentiment between small US investors and those influencing the broader
US market. All three studies report a persistent common component in the
fluctuations of different country fund discounts, despite exchange rate volatility and
the varying degree of investment restrictions imposed by countries. They suggest
that this is because fund share prices reflect time-varying sentiments of US investors
while their NAVs do not.
Demirgures (1993) examines the structural stability between country fund prices and
NAVs using Chow tests. The data consists of weekly fund prices and NAVs for all
40 US country funds trading in April 1993, with observation periods for each fund
stretching from the initial offering to April 1993 or date of open-ending, if
appropriate. Although NAVs explain much of the variation in country fund prices,
the explanatory power is unstable over time, supporting the notion that noise traders
who trade stochastically are affecting fund prices.
Levis and Thomas (1997) extend the evidence on the investor sentiment theory to
country funds listed in London. Their research supports the notion that movements
in the average level of discount for funds invested in a given country reflect the
sentiment of UK individual investors, proxied by the volume of retail funds flowing
into the corresponding unit trust sector. The same result does not hold for
institutional funds flowing into these unit trust sectors. This is surprising because
institutions are the dominant investors in UK country funds. However, they find no
evidence, at the individual trust level, of a statistically significant relation between
variability of the discount and the percentage of equity held by individual
shareholders. Levis and Thomas (1997) also observe contemporaneous movement in
US and UK discounts of similar country funds suggesting that investor sentiment, but
not necessarily small investor sentiment, towards a given country pervades both US
and UK stock markets.
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3.4 VOLATILITY
This section reviews work relating to the excess volatility of closed-end fund shares.
As discussed in 3.2.1, if closed-end fund share returns are more volatile than
underlying NAV returns, this contradicts the efficient market hypothesis. Most of
the studies concern US closed-end funds, but we would expect the behaviour of UK
investment trust discounts to be similar to that of US closed-end funds with the same
underlying assets, apart from differences due to ownership structure, gearing or
taxation (see Section 2.7).
Section 3.4.1 shows how the variance of closed-end fund share return can be split
into three components and 3.4.2 discusses problems confronted in practice when
assessing the contribution of these three components. We then look at previous work
on variance decomposition for US closed-end funds in 3.4.3. Although there have
been no studies dedicated to variance decomposition for US country funds and UK
investment trusts, there have been studies for such funds, concentrating mainly on
other issues, which provide useful evidence; these studies are discussed in 3.4.4 and
3.4.5 respectively. The literature emphasises the importance of discount volatility as
a component of total risk, so 3.4.6 reviews work relating specifically to discount
volatility. Finally, 3.4.7 considers the implications of previous research for the
empirical work to be undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 looks at variance
decomposition for UK investment trusts and Chapter 5 looks at the cross-sectional
variation in discount volatility for UK investment trusts.
3.4.1 Components of total risk
Variance of share return (total risk) is defined as the average squared difference
between the share returns and the mean return. This is an appropriate measure of risk
if the distribution of returns (or log returns) approximates a Normal distribution,
being symmetric about the mean with few outliers. Variance of return is easy to
estimate, simple to understand, and is a measure that is widely used in the financial
world.5
sThe downside risk measure analogous to variance is semi-variance. This is the average squared
difference between downside returns and the mean return. It is of no benefit, of course, if the
distribution is symmetric. The advantage of semi-variance over variance is that it does not increase
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Discount variation over time contributes to the variance of returns from investment
trust shares. Furthermore, discount changes may be correlated with returns from the
underlying net assets of the trust.
We now develop a model which splits the variance of return to shareholders into
three components. It is similar to the model derived by Sharpe and Sosin (1974) for
US closed-end funds.
Let P, = share price of investment trust at time t
A, = net asset value per share at time t
Assume that dividends are added to Pt and to A, in a consistent way to avoid discount
discontinuities. Then 'discount return' for period t is defined as:
log, (1 + R,d ) = log, (P, / Pt_x) - log, (A, / A,_j)
= log, (1 + P,')-log, (1+ /?,*)
where log, (1 + Rp) is the share price return in period t
and log, (1 + R\A) is the NAV return in period t.
It is helpful to take logarithms as the returns are additive and their distributions are
more symmetric.
Rearranging, we obtain:
log, (l + R,')= log, (l + R,")+ log,(l + Rf)
That is, share price return is equal to NAV return plus discount return. The time
intervals for these returns could be any length - one week, one month or even a year.
with the possibility of large upside return, thereby avoiding giving a false impression of the risk
involved. But it is rarely used in practice and is not suitable for this study as it cannot conveniently be
split into components.
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The standard statistical formula for the variance of the sum of two random variables
then gives:
Varjlog, (l + !<;•)} = Var{\og, (l + )} + Var{log, (l + /?,")}
+ 2C0v{log,(l + R,*),log,(l + i?,D)}
Thus, the variance of share return has been split into the following three components:
a) Variance of NAV return.
b) Variance of discount return6
c) Twice the covariance between NAV returns and discount returns.
The volatility of different stock markets and their covariances, which are directly
reflected in the variance of NAV return, is a topic that has been well researched (e.g.
Solnik, 1996). Less well researched have been the other two components of risk:
variance of discount return; and twice the covariance between NAV returns and
discount returns.
If investors are rational, the variance of closed-end fund share returns should equal
the variance of the corresponding NAV returns, since a closed-end fund share is a
claim on the fund's underlying portfolio. For this to be the case, the covariance
between NAV return and discount return must be sufficiently negative to cancel out
the variance of discount return.
3.4.2 Problems with variance decomposition studies
Short-term volatilities in share prices are partly driven by technical factors related to
market imbalances (e.g. liquidity, bid-ask spreads), but the impact of these factors
will be diversified away through time. Infrequent trading of shares (hence stale
prices) will also bias variance estimates but again this problem will reduce as the
return interval is increased, and it will also be less important for larger more
marketable closed-end funds.
6
For monthly returns, the square root of b) is often known as 'discount volatility'.
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NAV is derived from the underlying portfolio which contains shares whose prices
will have different degrees of staleness. So the NAV time series acts like a moving
average of past 'true' prices and may be artificially smooth as a result. This effect
will be greater the higher the proportion of unquoted shares in the underlying
portfolio. On the other hand, we might expect a sharp jump in the prices of unquoted
shares on revaluation. This will act as an outlier and will be squared in calculating
the variances.7 The covariance term could also be affected. But again these effects
will have less impact with longer return intervals.
The question of dividend recognition requires consideration (see 4.4.1). When shares
go ex-dividend, there is a discontinuity in the share price. For US closed-end funds,
the NAV is continually updated for accrued earnings, so dividend recognition of the
fund shares and the NAV correspond, and there is no discount discontinuity. But for
UK investment trusts, revenue items are excluded from the NAV calculation, so there
is a discount discontinuity when the shares go ex-dividend.
All the above problems can be reduced by using longer return intervals, but this
means that the period of observation needs to be longer for there to be sufficient data
points. Unfortunately, this leads to time series estimation problems. That is, the
variances are sample estimates of changing portfolios. As the variances are affected
by all the observations in the time series, they will be imperfect estimates of the true
variances. This holds for both the variance of the closed-end fund share returns and
the variance of NAV returns. Nevertheless, there is an implicit assumption that the
estimation problem will affect them identically.
Finally, there is the question of survivorship bias. Shares which do not survive for
the entire period of observation are excluded from the data set, and if such shares
have particular variance decomposition characteristics, this will bias the results.
However, there would seem to be no obvious reason why the variance decomposition
of non-survivors should be different from that of survivors.
7
Empirical evidence in Chapter 5 suggests that this is a less important influence. Correlation between
stdevnavr and %u/q is -0.34.
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3.4.3 US closed-end funds
There have been two variance decomposition studies for US closed-end funds, one by
Sharpe and Sosin (1974) using both annual and quarterly return intervals and one by
Pontiff (1997) using monthly return intervals. In addition, there have been a variety
of studies, primarily concerned with other matters, which provide evidence
concerning the covariance between discount returns and NAV returns.
Variance decomposition studies
Sharpe and Sosin (1974), using annual data from 1933 to 1972 on ten US closed-end
funds invested largely in US equities, observe excess volatility of closed-end fund
share prices compared with underlying NAV for eight of the ten funds (see Table 3.1,
column 5). Rp,RA and R° are the returns on the shares, NAV and discount
respectively. On average, the standard deviation of return on the shares is
approximately 17% greater than that of its underlying net assets. Note also that the
correlation coefficient between discount returns and NAV returns is negative for six
of the ten funds (column 4). Funds for which the correlation coefficient is
significantly different from zero (5% level, two tail test) are indicated by an asterisk.8
However, an issue which is particularly important for long-term studies of this type is
that variances are sample estimates of changing portfolios (see 3.4.2). Note also that
it is only a small sample of funds.
Using quarterly returns for eight of the funds over the period 1966 to 1973, Sharpe
and Sosin find that the standard deviation of return on a share is approximately 28%
greater on average than that of its underlying net assets (Table 3.2). The correlation
coefficient in column 4 is negative for five of the eight funds but is not significantly
different from zero (5% level, two tail test) for any of the funds.9 They conclude that
a fund's discount and the risk and expected return on the discount play a crucial role
in determining the risk and return characteristics of closed-end funds.
8
Assuming a normal distribution for both NAV returns and discount returns.
9
Assuming a normal distribution for both NAV returns and discount returns.
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Table 3.1: Annual data 1933 - 1972 (% per year)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fund a(R") a(RA) a(RD) Corr(RA,RD) (j(Rp)/o(RA)
Adams 23.21 20.62 8.87 .09 1.13
Carriers 18.37 18.32 7.07 -.21 1.00
Dominick 17.75 16.00 7.69 -.02 1.11
General Amer. 20.86 18.72 12.77 -.13 1.11
Lehman 18.34 16.95 10.04 -.15 1.08
Madison 21.43 17.60 14.17 .46* 1.56
Niagra 21.42 18.32 11.09 .03 1.17
Surveyor 20.87 15.84 11.85 .12 1.32
Tri Con 21.89 18.14 15.53 -.16 1.21
U.S. For 19.90 19.93 12.00 -.43* .99
Average 1.17
Table 3.2: Quarterly data 1966 - 1973 (% per quarter)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fund a(Rp) a(RA) <y(RD) Corr(RA,RD) a(Rp) / CJ(Ra)
Adams 7.62 7.11 5.70 -.30 1.07
Carriers 7.54 6.75 4.84 -.22 1.12
Dominick 9.04 8.48 4.58 -.19 1.07
Intn. Hold 10.70 7.76 5.26 .33 1.38
Lehman 10.76 8.35 7.03 .00 1.29
Madison 11.41 9.46 8.10 -.11 1.21
Tri Con 8.14 7.83 4.07 -.17 1.04
U.S. For 10.56 8.00 5.04 .27 1.32
Average 1.28
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Pontiff (1997), using monthly data from July 1965 to December 1985 on 52 US
closed-end funds, including both equity funds and bond funds, calculates the figures
(%2) in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Monthly data 1965 - 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Var(Rp) Var(RA) Var(R°) 2Cov(RA,RD) Corr(RA,RD)
Average 51.15 37.89 37.33 -25.42 -0.34
Median 37.52 24.72 19.62 -7.74 -0.18
Table 3.3 shows negative covariance between discount returns and NAV returns.
Pontiff also reports, when bimonthly returns are used, that the negative covariance
between discount returns and NAV returns persists.
Pontiff then computes, for each fund in the sample, the natural log of the ratio of the
share return variance to the NAV return variance. The average ratio is 0.494 which
implies that the variance of the average fund's monthly return is 64% greater than
the variance of its underlying NAV return. This means that the standard deviation of
the average fund's monthly return is 28% greater than that of its underlying NAV
return. This excess volatility is largely idiosyncratic and unrelated to aggregate
market risk.
Although Pontiff's results are biased to the extent that infrequent trading or bid-ask
spreads bias the variance estimates, when calculated for two monthly, three monthly
and four monthly intervals, the average log variance ratios are still significantly
different from zero. And since the magnitude of these biases is the same regardless
of the return interval whereas variance increases as the return interval increases, this
suggests that the biases are not severe. Log variance ratios for intervals greater than
four months are not presented.
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Other relevant studies
A number of other studies have looked, directly or indirectly, at the covariance
between discount returns and NAV returns, using return intervals ranging from
weekly through to annual.
Anderson and Born (1987) regressed weekly share returns for a sample of 17 US
closed-end funds invested mainly in domestic equities against corresponding weekly
NAV returns over the period 1970 to 1981. For 15 of the 17 funds, the slope
coefficient is significantly less than unity at the 5% level implying negative
covariance between discount returns and NAV returns.
Using monthly data over the period 1965 to 1985, Chen et al (1993) carry out
regressions of value-weighted returns of share prices of a portfolio of equity closed-
end funds (RSP) on value-weighted returns of net asset value of the corresponding
closed-end funds (RNAV). They obtain the following relationship:
RSP = 0.002 + 0.951.RNAV
Now since the return on the discount (RD) is simply RSP - RNAV, we obtain:
RD = 0.002 + 0.951.RNAV-RNAV
Hence RD = 0.002 - 0.043.RNAV
This implies negative covariance between monthly discount returns and monthly
NAV returns.
Malkiel (1977), using quarterly data over the period 1965 to 1972 for US closed-end
funds invested mainly in domestic equities, tests for any systematic relationship
between changes in fund discounts (ADISC)10 and changes in the Standard & Poor's
500 Stock Composite Index (SP) as part of a time series regression analysis. The
regression results are:
10 The change in discount is a measure of the (absolute) return on the discount.
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ADISC = -32.67 + 0.20RED + 30.21SP(r) / SP(t - 1) + 3.79DUM
(0.82) (3.19) (1.90)
where RED is redemption less sales of open-end mutual funds
and DUM is a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 for observations starting
in 1970 and 0 prior to that time. (This is included because in 1970 a major
brokerage firm started underwriting and actively selling open-end funds
whereas previously it had concentrated on the sale of closed-end funds.)
t-statistics are shown in parenthesis under the coefficients.
Malkiel's results show that fund discounts narrow when the US domestic equity
market falls and increases when the market rises. This suggests a negative
covariance between discount returns and NAV returns, given that the funds are
invested mainly in US domestic equities. Malkiel argues that the negative covariance
is due to an increase (or decrease) in the contingent capital gains tax liability (see
Section 2.7) as the equity market rises (or falls).
Brickley et al (1991) find positive and significant covariance between premium
changes (or, alternatively, discount returns) and NAV returns, using annual data on
37 domestic equity closed-end funds over the period 1954 to 1985. In other words,
discounts tend to widen with poor NAV performance (a 'double whammy' effect).
This suggests that the negative covariance observed with shorter return intervals may
dissipate with annual return intervals.
3.4.4 US country funds
There have been no variance decomposition studies specifically for US country
funds, but a number of studies primarily concerned with investor sentiment provide
useful evidence on excess volatility and variance decomposition with weekly return
intervals.
Hardouvelis et al (1993) study 35 US country funds for which at least 9 months of
data is available over the period January 1985 to January 1993. They report that
discounts vary substantially over time, contributing to a variance in weekly fund
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returns which is on average three times that of weekly NAV returns. More precisely,
the mean of the natural log of the ratio of the share return variance to the NAV return
variance is 1.17, with standard error of 0.57. Fund prices are 'sticky' with respect to
the host country's stock market. The average local market beta for the NAV return
(fund share return) is 0.608 (0.428) with weekly data and 0.718 (0.600) with
quarterly data, suggesting negative covariance between discount returns and NAV
returns.
Bodurtha et al (1995) look at weekly data for 33 country funds trading on US
exchanges during the 261-week period covering 1986 to 1990. They report that
country fund premiums (and share prices) tend to be more volatile than domestic
equity fund premiums (and share prices). There is negative covariance between
discount returns and NAV returns but the weekly standard deviation of fund share
price changes is still more than twice that of NAV changes.
Klibanoff et al (1998) study weekly data for 39 country funds over the period January
1986 to March 1994. The standard deviation of price returns (5.50%) is much greater
than the standard deviation of NAV returns (3.49%). They also document
systematic underreaction of country fund prices to NAV changes. When NAV rises
by one per cent in a given week, fund share prices rise by only 0.64%. Even two
weeks after the initial change in NAV, fund share prices only incorporate 80% of the
NAV return. This confirms the negative covariance between country fund discount
returns and their NAV returns which had been reported in previous research.
3.4.5 UK investment trusts
A few research papers have touched on the question of excess volatility for UK
investment trusts, but the main emphasis of each of these papers has concerned other
matters. They generally employ monthly return intervals. There is currently no
published research that looks directly at the decomposition of the variance of
investment trust share returns.
Corner and Matatko (1982) examine the monthly returns on 92 investment trusts over
the period 1974 to 1979. The average standard deviation of share price total returns
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is 8.6% whereas the average standard deviation of net asset value total returns is
5.8%. However, this study covered a period in which discounts varied widely, both
cross-sectionally and over time. The sector average discount climbed to around 40%
in 1974 and again in 1976 (see Figure 2.1). This period is now viewed in investment
trust circles as quite an unusual period.11
Armitage and Whittaker (1990) looked at monthly data over the relatively short
period from January 1988 to July 1989 for the following investment trust subsectors:
UK non-specialists; North America; Europe; Japan; and Far East. They discovered a
strong inverse relationship between the size of the sub-sector average discount and
the relevant stock market index. Given that NAV returns for specialist trusts will be
closely related to movements in the host stock market, this suggests positive
covariance between discount returns and NAV returns (a 'double whammy' effect).
However, the months studied cover a period of narrowing discounts on UK
investment trusts and rising world equity markets.
Draper and Paudyal (1991) regressed monthly changes in the average discount (DDt)
on the 41 largest trusts over the period 1975 to 1986 against the monthly total return
on the FT-Actuaries All Share Index (RMt) together with the average discount change
for the previous month. They came up with the following relationship:
DDt = 0.897 - 0.781RM, - 0.198DDt X
(1.69) (-10.53)* (-3.26)*
R2 = 0.41
An asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level, with t-statistics shown in
parenthesis. There is a clear negative relationship between changes in the average
discount and returns on the UK equity market. This implies a positive relationship
between discount returns and returns on the UK equity market. As very few of the
largest trusts are invested entirely in the UK, this suggests the possible influence of
UK market sentiment on trust share prices and hence discounts.
11 Due to the capital gains tax rules applying to investment trust shareholders at the time, there was a
tax incentive for investors to sell investment trust shares before other shares at times of sharp market
falls (e.g. 1974) leading to very wide discounts.
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Cheng et al (1994) consider monthly discount changes for the 63 investment trusts in
the FT-Actuaries All Share Index over the period 1985 to 1989. They show that
discounts tend to narrow as the UK equity market rises and widen as it declines.
Again, this may be due to UK specific sentiment given that most trusts in the sample
are international with NAVs at least partly determined in foreign markets. It could
also be interpreted as overreaction in the pricing of trust shares.
Levis and Thomas (1997), using available daily data for 43 UK country funds over
the period 1985-95, show that when the relevant foreign currency weakens relative to
sterling, the discount narrows. And when the local market strengthens, the NAV
reflects the change, on average, much more strongly than the market value of the
country fund's equity and thus the discount widens. This implies that with daily data,
there is negative covariance between NAV returns and discount returns. This is
consistent with the negative covariance findings for US country funds, with
covariance generally calculated using weekly data.
3.4.6 Discount volatility
Both the Sharpe and Sosin (1974) and Pontiff (1997) variance decomposition studies
emphasise the importance of discount volatility as a component of total risk. Lee et
al (1991a) claim that their individual investor sentiment theory explains all parts of
the closed-end fund discount puzzle, including discount volatility. Additional
evidence from country funds suggests that US investor sentiment causes discount
fluctuations for US country funds and UK investor sentiment causes discount
fluctuations for UK country funds, with sentiment towards a given country pervading
both US and UK stock markets (see 3.3.3). This section reviews other research
relating to the underlying reasons for discount volatility and its cross-sectional
variation.
Ability to discount arbitrage
Hoskins (1994) concentrates on the analogy between US closed-end fund discount
volatility and basis volatility in derivative securities, in that they are both a spread
between two highly correlated prices. Basis volatility in derivatives markets is most
prevalent when cash-market hedges are difficult to transact, so Hoskins examines all
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the factors that affect the ability of discount arbitrage traders to buy closed-end fund
shares trading at a discount and to sell short the fund's underlying portfolio. He
carries out a cross-sectional multiple regression analysis with discount volatility,
based on weekly intervals, as the dependent variable. The two most significant
explanatory variables are NAV volatility and turnover (number of shares traded as a
proportion of shares outstanding) of the fund shares themselves. The former makes it
more difficult to hedge the exposure to NAV. The latter is by far the most significant
explanatory variable, suggesting that when fund share turnover is high, liquidity is
insufficient to keep discounts stable. Thus, low liquidity for fund shares is the
primary contributor to discount volatility. This suggests that discount volatility may
be related to the size of the closed-end fund. Total assets, which is highly correlated
with market value of the closed-end fund and therefore should be a reasonable
indicator of the level of liquidity for the fund shares, is indeed negatively correlated
with discount volatility. However, it is not a significant explanatory variable in the
regression analysis.
Negative autocorrelation ofdiscount movements
If closed-end fund share prices include transient noise, the discount time series will
pick up the noise and discount movements will show the same negative
autocorrelation as the noise. Negative autocorrelation of discount movements could
also be caused by staleness of either the closed-end fund shares or the NAV, or both
provided that the staleness is not synchronised.
Hoskins (1994) carries out a time series analysis of weekly discount movements for
28 US domestic equity funds and 24 US international equity (mainly single country)
funds over the period 1965 to 1992. The most prominent feature revealed is negative
autocorrelation of discount movements. To measure the effect, he computes the
discount return autocorrelation for each fund separately and then takes the average.
For the domestic equity funds, the average autocorrelations are -0.235 for weekly
return intervals and -0.240 for monthly return intervals. For the international funds,
the average autocorrelations are -0.228 for weekly return intervals and -0.177 for
monthly return intervals. After careful analysis, he attributes the negative
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autocorrelation effect to a combination of three factors - stale fund share prices, low
fund share liquidity and stale NAVs.
Cheng et al (1994) consider monthly discount changes for 63 investment trusts over
the period 1985 to 1989. They observe high negative autocorrelation in discount
changes of -0.234 on average. All but 5 of the 63 trusts have negative autocorrelation
coefficients, and almost half are significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
The evidence of negative autocorrelation of discount movements suggests that the
importance of discount volatility as a component of total risk will tend to reduce as
the return interval is increased.
3.4.7 Implications of published research on volatility for UK investment trusts
In Chapter 4, we investigate the components of total risk for a sample of UK
investment trusts. Based largely on the evidence from studies of US closed-end
funds, we can expect excess volatility of trust share returns compared with NAV
returns. US studies also emphasise the importance of the discount volatility
component of total risk but negative autocorrelation, reported for both US discounts
and UK discounts, suggests that the importance of discount volatility will reduce as
the return interval is increased. While US studies are consistent in reporting negative
covariance between discount returns and NAV returns, for return intervals up to
quarterly, this may be partly due to the changing value of contingent capital gains tax
liabilities as the value of underlying net assets rise and fall. This tax effect does not
apply to UK investment trusts and the little evidence available concerning the sign of
the covariance term for UK investment trusts is mixed.
In Chapter 5, we analyse the cross-sectional variation in discount volatility for UK
investment trusts. Results from Hoskins' study of US closed-end funds suggest that
variance of NAV returns and turnover of the trust shares themselves (also known as
'trading velocity') will be significant explanatory variables. Direct evidence from
UK country funds suggests that the percentage of a trust's equity held by individual
shareholders and the percentage of underlying assets held in the UK should be
included as explanatory variables.
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3.5 SUMMARY
3.5.1 Market efficiency and investment trusts
Many rational explanations for closed-end fund discounts have been proposed but
even taken together, they seem incapable of explaining all parts of the discount
puzzle. In particular, none of the arguments explain why discounts fluctuate so
widely over time.
There is some support, both in the UK and in the US, for profitable decision rules
based on discounts, particularly for investors with low transaction costs, such as
institutions. But it is difficult to come to a firm conclusion as regards market
inefficiency because of the 'joint hypothesis' problem.
3.5.2 Noise trading
The apparent failure of rational explanations for the discount puzzle casts doubt on
the rationality of the market and many researchers have turned their attention to
behavioural finance, in particular noise trading, as a possible explanation. In the
noise trader model for financial markets put forward by De Long et al (1990a,
1990b), rational investors interact in financial markets with noise traders who are less
than fully rational. Their model suggests that share prices will be more volatile than
that dictated by the fundamentals and that share prices will overreact to changes in
the fundamentals. Lee et al (1991a) extend the De Long et al model. They provide
evidence which suggests that discounts are an individual investor sentiment index
and that the same investor sentiment risk also affects the returns from small firms and
other stocks traded mainly by individual investors. Their theory is compelling
because other explanations seem incapable of explaining all parts of the closed-end
discount puzzle, but the theory has been the source of much controversy in the last
decade. Empirical evidence on the investor sentiment hypothesis for US closed-end
funds is mixed. A number of studies on US country funds detect a common
component in the fluctuations of their discounts reflecting time-varying sentiments of
US investors in general rather than specifically individual investors.
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3.5.3 Volatility
Studies of US closed-end funds document fund share returns as being more volatile
than their NAV returns but the effect appears to reduce as longer time intervals are
employed. Research specifically on US country funds also shows that fund shares
are much more volatile than their underlying NAVs. The excess volatility of closed-
end fund returns compared with underlying NAV returns in all the published US
studies contradicts the efficient market model but is consistent with the noise trader
model.
Many studies of US closed-end funds report negative covariance between discount
returns and NAV returns. One exception is Brickley et al (1991) who find positive
covariance using annual data over the period 1954 to 1985. This suggests that the
negative covariance relation observed by other authors using return intervals ranging
from weekly to quarterly may dissipate when longer return intervals are considered.
Negative covariance between discount returns and NAV returns is also observed for
US country funds based on weekly data.
The importance of discount volatility as a component of total risk is emphasised for
all types of US closed-end fund considered. However, negative autocorrelation in
discount changes is also reported, implying that discount volatility is a more
important component of total risk for shorter return intervals. The considerable
variation in discount volatility across the US closed-end fund sector seems to be
related to the ability of discount arbitrage traders to operate successfully, thereby
adding liquidity to the market for closed-end fund shares.
Very little research has been carried out on excess volatility for UK investment trusts,
although Corner and Matatko report that share prices are much more volatile than
NAVs over the somewhat unusual period from 1974 to 1979. Little research has
been directed at analysing discount volatility or the covariance between discount
returns and NAV returns. We investigate these matters in Chapters 4 and 5.
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CHAPTER 4 - COMPONENTS OF TOTAL RISK
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The variance of share returns (total risk) of a closed-end fund can be split into three
components. These are: variance of NAV returns; variance of discount returns; and
twice the covariance between NAV returns and discount returns (see 3.4.1).
Pontiff (1997) observes a negative covariance term in his study of US closed-end
funds, but it is not sufficiently negative to cancel out the variance of discount returns.
In other words, US closed-end fund prices are more volatile than fundamentals
(excess volatility) even though there is a tendency for prices to underreact to
fundamentals (negative covariance). He concludes that, since a share in a closed-end
fund is a claim on the fund's underlying portfolio, this excess volatility contradicts
the efficient market model.
As explained in Section 2.7, investors in US closed-end funds inherit a contingent
capital gains tax liability. Investors will therefore prefer ceteris paribus to invest in
funds with a lower proportion of unrealised capital gains. Consequently, as the
proportion of NAV represented by unrealised capital gains increases so should the
discount. Therefore, we would expect, for tax reasons alone, negative covariance
between NAV returns and discount returns for US closed-end funds. This issue is
not discussed in Pontiff (1997).
UK closed-end funds (investment trusts) do not suffer from the direct capital gains
tax effect that applies to US closed-end funds. The underlying fund of an investment
trust is exempt from tax on capital gains (see Section 1.2). Investment trusts may
therefore be regarded as more suitable vehicles for testing market efficiency.
If movements in investment trust discounts over time reflect investor sentiment and
do not conform to the efficient market model, there may be opportunities for
investors to generate excess returns systematically by exploiting errors in the pricing
of trusts. As discussed in 3.2.3, various studies have claimed that it is possible to
make excess returns through decision rules based purely on discounts variation over
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time. While there is evidence to support these claims historically in the US, the
evidence is less convincing for the UK. A proper analysis of variance decomposition
for UK investment trusts may allow more sophisticated decision rules to be devised
which will be more successful in generating excess returns.
In this chapter, we investigate the importance of the three components of the variance
of share returns for UK conventional investment trust shares. The analysis will be
carried out using monthly returns over the 15 year period from January 1982 to
December 1996, but it will also be carried out using three and six-monthly returns,
over three shorter (5 year) periods of observation and separately for three sub-sectors.
The results are compared and contrasted where possible with those of the Pontiff
(1997) variance decomposition analysis for US closed-end funds.
4.2 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION, EFFICIENT MARKETS AND NOISE
TRADERS
Section 3.2.2 described a number of arguments that have been advanced to explain
the discount puzzle within the efficient markets framework but none of them seem
capable of explaining the wide variations in discounts over time. The most likely
candidate is the agency cost argument in that the capitalised value of management
fees will vary as the discount rate varies. However, changes in this discount rate will
tend to coincide with changes in the discount rate for the underlying assets, using a
discounted dividend approach to valuing the underlying assets. In any case, there is
little empirical evidence to support the notion that discounts are a consequence of
capitalising future management fees.
In an efficient market, one would expect that the variance of share returns over n time
intervals would equal n times the variance of share returns over one time interval.
But if noise traders are affecting prices in the market, this would be reflected in mean
reversion of the discount. The variance of share returns over n time intervals would
then be less than n times the variance of share returns over one time interval, and the
relative importance of the variance of discount returns as a component of total risk
would be lower with greater return intervals.
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Consistent with the De Long et al noise trader model is the notion that, in the absence
of any capital gains tax complications such as in the US closed-end fund market,
discounts will tend to narrow when the value of underlying assets rise. A rise in
stock markets will encourage noise traders to look for ways into the market, and
investment trusts, which provide a ready-made portfolio of shares, will meet this
demand. On the other hand, a fall in the market for the underlying assets will tend to
cause a widening of the discount leading to a 'double whammy' effect.
4.3 DATA
The sample consists of the 50 largest trusts as at 31 December 1981 (i.e. those with
market capitalisation greater than £10m at that time) which survived until the end of
1996. Concentrating on larger trusts reduces the problem of infrequently traded
shares and hence stale share prices distorting variance and covariance estimates.
They are all constituents of the FT-SE Actuaries All Share Index on 31 December
1996, with the exception of British Investment Trust.1 Trusts in the sample are listed
in Appendix 3.
The following data were collected from Datastream.
a) monthly share prices, adjusted for capital changes etc
b) monthly undiluted NAVs
c) monthly fully diluted NAVs
d) ex-dividend dates
e) dividend payments
The following data were obtained from the AITC to provide a check for the major
results in this chapter. NAV is undiluted. Total return means return including
reinvestment of net dividends.
1 The reason for exclusion of British Investment Trust from the index was that the vast majority of
shares were tightly held. The trust was unitised in 1997, after the end of the period of observation.
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a) monthly share price total return2
b) monthly NAV total return3
c) monthly discount to NAV
4.4 MEASUREMENT ISSUES
There are two measurement issues which must be discussed before defining the
variables to be used in the analysis, namely dividend recognition and warrants.
4.4.1 Dividend recognition
There is a discontinuity in share prices when they go ex-dividend. For US closed-end
funds, the NAV is continually updated for accrued earnings and the underlying NAV
reduces by the amount of the dividend on an ex-dividend date4, so there is no
discontinuity in the discount to NAV. But for UK investment trusts, dividend
recognition is different for trust shares and the corresponding NAV. Revenue items
in the current financial year are excluded in the NAV calculation5 so that while the
share price recognises dividend accrual prior to the ex-dividend date, the
corresponding NAV does not. In other words, using terminology borrowed from
bond markets, the share price is 'dirty' while the corresponding NAV is 'clean'. As a
consequence there is a discount discontinuity at the ex-dividend date for UK
investment trusts and hence ceteris paribus a corresponding apparent negative
discount return. Whether this problem is important in the context of the current
investigation is an empirical question which is best answered by examining a sample
of trusts.
2 Net dividends are reinvested in the shares of the trust company at the time the shares are quoted ex-
dividend.
3 Net dividends paid to shareholders are reinvested in the NAV and assumed to be uniformly
distributed throughout the year. Net dividends are actual net dividends paid rather than estimates.
4 To compute NAV between the ex-dividend date and the payment date for US closed-end funds,
dividends are subtracted as an account payable before computing NAV.
5 This is the case for NAVs published by both Datastream and the AITC. When trusts announce
NAVs with accrued earnings included, the earnings are stripped out of the NAV.
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Table 4.1 shows the three components of total risk for the first 10 trusts in the main
sample6 over the 5 year period, January 1992 to December 19967, using Datastream
data.
Table 4.1: Impact of dividend adjustments on components of risk
Not adjusted Adjusted Difference
Company Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCov Var(navr) Var(disr) 2Cov Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCov
ATST 10.2 2.3 1.8 10.2 2.0 1.3 0.0 0.3 0.6
AMTS 14.2 11.8 2.2 14.2 12.1 2.1 0.0 -0.3 0.2
AOT 12.7 2.7 2.2 12.7 2.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.4
BNKR 15.2 6.0 -2.7 15.2 6.0 -2.2 0.0 0.0 -0.5
BTI 13.2 4.2 1.1 13.2 4.1 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.3
BSET 12.6 5.6 0.4 12.6 5.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
BITS 15.6 4.8 0.4 15.6 5.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.7
BUT 18.4 5.3 -1.0 18.4 5.8 -0.9 0.0 -0.5 -0.1
DIG 19.2 4.6 0.6 19.2 5.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 1.5
DNDL 13.5 6.1 -0.9 13.5 5.6 0.1 0.0 0.5 -1.0
Average 14.5 5.3 0.4 14.5 5.4 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.2
The last two columns show that adjustments8 to correct for dividend recognition
make very little difference to the results.
4.4.2 Warrants
If there is an issue of warrants outstanding, it is normal practice in the investment
trust industry to make adjustments to NAV on a per share basis by treating warrants
as exercised if dilution of NAV would occur, to give a 'fully diluted' figure.
Discounts are then calculated by relating share price to fully diluted NAV. Recently,
however, some analysts and researchers (see, for example, Smith New Court (1994)
and Gemmill and Thomas (1997)) have argued that once the warrants are traded
separately, discounts should be calculated on a 'package' basis. That is, if there are
five times as many shares as warrants in issue, share price plus one fifth of the
warrant price should be compared with the undiluted NAV per share in the discount
calculation. This approach fully takes into account the way in which any value for
the warrants reduces the value of the shares, but is rarely used in practice. If the
approach were to be adopted in our study of components of total risk, for consistency
the undiluted NAV should also be used to calculate NAV returns. Again, whether
this problem is of any importance in the context of the current investigation is an
6 In alphabetical order, so effectively randomly selected.
7
Complete dividend information is not available for the earlier periods from Datastream.
8 Share prices were 'cleaned' for dividend accrual to eliminate discontinuities at ex-dividend dates.
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empirical question which is best answered by examining those trusts which are
affected.
Table 4.2 shows the three components of total risk over the 15 year period of
observation from January 1982 to December 1996 for all those trusts having warrants
outstanding at some point in that period, using Datastream data. Nine trusts are
affected out of the total sample of 50 trusts.
Table 4.2: Impact of calculating returns on a 'package' basis
Fully diluted Package Difference
Company Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCov Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCov Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCov
EDIN 20.8 6.9 6.7 20.8 6.9 7.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3
ENSC 22.1 13.5 3.4 22.9 13.5 3.2 -0.8 0.0 0.1
FLMJ 39.1 23.6 3.4 41.9 24.4 2.1 -2.9 -0.8 1.3
FCP 26.2 20.0 9.7 26.9 21.4 13.2 -0.8 -1.3 -3.5
OIT 25.5 11.5 -4.7 26.1 11.5 -5.0 -0.6 0.0 0.4
SCIN 19.9 7.1 3.2 21.3 7.1 3.7 -1.4 0.0 -0.6
THRG 27.7 25.9 -0.3 27.7 25.9 0.9 0.0 -0.1 -1.2
TRY 24.0 25.2 5.7 24.0 25.2 5.8 0.0 0.0 -0.2
WTAN 25.4 6.3 3.0 25.9 6.5 4.2 -0.6 -0.1 -1.2
Average 25.6 15.6 3.3 26.4 15.8 3.9 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6
The last three columns show that calculating returns on a package basis makes very
little difference to the results.
4.4.3 Definition of variables
It is clear from the above that adjustments to account for either dividend recognition
or warrants on a package basis, make no qualitative difference to the results.
Hereafter we therefore use share prices unadjusted for ex-dividend discontinuities
together with fully diluted NAVs, as is normal practice for market participants, using
data collected from Datastream. Dividends are then ignored in calculating the three
components of total risk.9
9 Dividends are included in the AITC return data, as explained in Section 4.3. This AITC data is used
as a check on the main results of this chapter.
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4.5 RESULTS
In this section, we examine the components of total risk empirically for UK
investment trusts. We are implicitly assuming no structural changes over the period
of observation.
4.5.1 Monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/96 (15 years)
Table 4.3a shows the results using monthly data over the entire 15 year period of
observation.10 The variance of share return (total risk) is shown in Column (2).
Columns (3), (4) and (5) give the figures for the three components of total risk (all
measured in % ) for each trust in the sample, together with an average figure for the
whole sample. Column (6) gives the correlation coefficient between NAV return and
discount return.
For the average trust, variance of NAV return represents only about 63% of the
variance of share return so there is clear evidence of 'excess volatility'. Variance of
discount return represents about 30% of the variance of share return, and twice the
covariance is positive and accounts for the remaining 7%.
So with monthly data, variance of discount return makes an important contribution to
total risk for the average trust. Note, however, that there is considerable cross-
sectional variation in the variance of discount return, ranging from 5.39 to 37.64. In
other words, discount volatility is far greater for some trusts than for others. The
factors which influence this cross-sectional variation in discount volatility11 will be
analysed in detail in Chapter 5.
Table 4.3b shows the percentage of the total variance represented by its three
components for all trusts in the sample. Note that the percentage of total risk
represented by the variance of discount return ranges from 17.83% to 65.06%.
10
Very similar results were obtained using AITC data.
11
Discount volatility is defined to be the standard deviation, rather than the variance, of monthly
discount return.
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Table 4.3a: Results with monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/96
Company Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr Fisher
ATST 27.61 17.99 6.51 3.09 0.143 0.144
AMTS 39.02 25.71 12.51 0.79 0.022 0.022
AOT 37.43 22.22 7.69 7.47 0.286 0.294**
BNKR 34.48 23.73 9.52 1.22 0.040 0.041
BTI 30.58 19.44 8.00 3.13 0.126 0.126
BSET 36.30 20.24 10.01 6.01 0.211 0.214**
BITS 22.49 20.38 8.15 -6.01 -0.233 -0.237**
BUT 31.94 23.44 7.69 0.81 0.030 0.030
DIG 35.89 27.86 8.68 -0.65 -0.021 -0.021
DNDL 29.48 21.70 7.81 -0.04 -0.001 -0.001
DWW 30.35 23.26 7.90 -0.80 -0.030 -0.030
EDIN 34.45 20.83 6.92 6.66 0.277 0.285**
ENSC 38.98 22.11 13.50 3.35 0.097 0.097
FAM 50.62 30.78 17.37 2.46 0.053 0.053
FCV 40.01 30.25 9.13 0.62 0.019 0.019
FUT 41.84 24.90 13.37 3.54 0.097 0.097
FFE 73.82 40.50 19.62 13.61 0.241 0.246**
FLMJ 66.15 39.07 23.63 3.44 0.057 0.057
FMN 27.63 16.88 8.12 2.61 0.112 0.112
FOV 42.82 22.51 11.17 9.09 0.286 0.295**
FCP 55.94 26.18 20.05 9.66 0.211 0.214**
FCS 37.72 24.71 12.47 0.53 0.015 0.015
FRCL 36.34 24.49 7.88 3.96 0.143 0.143
GOR 73.34 45.18 15.10 12.98 0.249 0.254**
GVS 49.97 38.43 11.73 -0.19 -0.004 -0.004
GTJA 72.42 39.75 37.64 -4.95 -0.064 -0.064
ELGN 41.04 27.03 9.52 4.46 0.139 0.140
KLC 31.70 18.62 9.61 3.45 0.129 0.129
KOS 35.46 21.67 9.45 4.32 0.151 0.152*
MRCH 36.89 23.60 8.38 4.88 0.173 0.175*
MKI 34.53 25.42 9.03 0.09 0.003 0.003
MNKS 31.34 23.98 6.49 0.87 0.035 0.035
MUT 30.07 21.10 10.24 -1.27 -0.043 -0.043
MYI 31.30 19.94 10.25 1.11 0.039 0.039
MSM 48.22 33.31 13.12 1.78 0.043 0.043
MVN 26.73 15.21 17.41 -5.86 -0.180 -0.182*
OIT 32.32 25.50 11.50 -4.65 -0.136 -0.137
SCAM 28.45 13.69 9.13 5.60 0.251 0.256**
SCEA 37.37 24.05 7.53 5.75 0.214 0.217**
SCIN 30.17 19.88 7.10 3.18 0.134 0.135
SMT 35.87 25.93 6.39 3.52 0.137 0.138
SAT 25.45 18.44 5.39 1.60 0.080 0.081
STS 31.49 20.38 6.57 4.52 0.195 0.198**
SRW 23.38 19.76 7.80 -4.16 -0.167 -0.169*
TMPL 33.36 20.94 8.27 4.12 0.156 0.158*
THRG 53.21 27.66 25.85 -0.30 -0.006 -0.006
TRCD 36.49 24.16 8.59 3.72 0.129 0.130
TRY 54.94 24.00 25.25 5.67 0.115 0.116
TRU 46.32 23.81 13.50 8.96 0.250 0.255**
WTAN 34.76 25.37 6.34 3.03 0.120 0.120
Average 38.97 24.72 11.50 2.74 0.086 0.088**
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Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of correlation coefficients between NAV returns
and discount returns. The correlation coefficient is positive for 39 of the 50 trusts.
Figure 4.1 - Distribution of correlation coefficients with























To test whether the correlation coefficient for trust i is significantly different from
zero, we calculate the Fisher statistic (Column (7) of Table 4.3a). This is defined as:
- 1, 1 + P,z< =7los.rr2 i — p,
where p; is the correlation coefficient.
Then, assuming a normal distribution12 for both NAV return and discount return, the
correlation coefficient for trust i is significantly different from zero at the 5% level





where n is the number of observations.
Similarly, the correlation coefficient for trust i is significantly different from zero at
the 1% level (two tail test) if:
The tests are robust to violations of the normality assumptions and the results are sufficiently strong
to remain unchallenged.
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where n is the number of observations.
= 0.1936
Trusts for which the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero at the
5% (1%) level are indicated by an asterisk (two asterisks) in Table 4.3a. In all, 14
(11) of the 50 trusts have correlation coefficients which are positive and significantly
different from zero at the 5% (1%) level and only 3 (1) trusts have correlation
coefficients which are negative and significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%)
level.
The only trust with a negative correlation coefficient which is significantly different
from zero at the 1% level is British Investment Trust. The vast majority of the shares
in this trust were tightly held by the British Coal Pension Scheme throughout the
period of observation. As a result there was an inactive market in the shares, which
might explain why the shares tended to be slow in responding to changes in NAV.
There is no direct contingent capital gains tax effect tending to cause a negative
covariance term for UK investment trust shareholders as was described in Section 4.1
for US closed-end funds. Nevertheless there may be indirect tax influences. For
example, shareholders may be reluctant to sell their shares if, in doing so, they
crystallise a capital gains tax liability. They are therefore less likely to sell their
shares as the market rises so that discounts may tend to narrow. This is consistent
with the observed positive covariance between NAV returns and discount returns.
If we assume13 a homogeneous underlying population (p1 = p2 = p3 = = p50)
then the average correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5%
level (two tail test) if:
1.960
where N is the number of trusts
= 0.021
13 We also assume independent observations, which is not strictly true because the observations are
made over the same period of time, and that the Z\ are roughly normally distributed.
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The average correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level
(two tail test) if:
2.576
= 0.027
The calculated value for z in Table 4.3a is 0.088 which is positive and significantly
different from zero at the 1% level, suggesting a 'double whammy' effect for the
investment trust sector. That is, discounts widen when NAVs fall and discounts
narrow when NAVs rise. It could be argued, however, that the homogeneous
population assumption is invalid because the trusts in the sample are drawn from
different sub-sectors, within which there may be different mechanisms working. We
will therefore repeat the above test for more homogeneous sub-sectors in 4.5.7.
4.5.2 Comparison with Pontiff's results for US closed-end funds
Pontiff (1997) measures excess volatility by calculating the log variance ratio for
each fund in his sample (see 3.4.3). This ratio is defined as the logarithm14 of the
ratio of the variance of share return to the variance of NAV return. It will have a
value of zero if variance of share return is equal to the variance of NAV return. The
average of the log variance ratios using figures in Table 4.3a is 0.444 which
compares with an average of 0.494 using monthly returns for the sample of US
closed-end funds in Pontiff's study. This suggests that there is similar excess
volatility for UK investment trusts as for US closed-end funds. However, it must be
remembered that the period of observation for this UK study is January 1982 to
December 1996 whereas the period of observation for Pontiff's study of US closed-
end funds is July 1965 to December 1985. Pontiff's sample also includes bond funds
as well as equity funds.
Table 4.4 shows the figures for the variance of share returns and the components of
total risk for the average trust (from the bottom of Table 4.3a) together with
corresponding figures from the Pontiff variance decomposition analysis.
14 The logarithm of the ratio is taken to reduce skewness.
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Table 4.4: Comparison of results for average trust with those of Pontiff (1997)
Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar
UK investment 38.97 24.72 11.50 2.74
trusts (82-96)
US closed-end 51.15 37.89 37.33 -25.42
funds (65-85)
Note that variance of discount return is far greater on average for US closed-end
funds than for UK investment trusts. This is consistent with the apparently greater
success of decision rules based on discounts for US closed-end funds (see 3.2.3). But
it should again be stressed that the period of observation for the Pontiff (1997) study
is earlier than the present study and includes the 1970s which were characterised by
extreme movements in closed-end fund discounts both in the US and in the UK.
Note also the large negative covariance term for the average US closed-end fund
compared with a small positive (but significant at the 1% level) covariance term for
UK investment trusts. The negative covariance term for US closed-end funds may
partly reflect the contingent capital gains tax liability effect.
4.5.3 Longer return intervals
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the results for the same analysis as in 4.5.1 but with three-
monthly return intervals and six-monthly return intervals respectively. The results
for longer return intervals emphasise the importance of the investor's time horizon in
the risk assessment of investment trusts. There is still evidence of 'excess volatility'
but the effect reduces with longer return intervals. For the average trust, variance of
NAV return represents 69% of variance of share return for three-monthly intervals
and 81% for six-monthly intervals.
82
Table 4.5: Results with three-monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/96
Company Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr Fisher
ATST 80.54 57.38 10.60 12.35 0.250 0.256
AMTS 134.23 93.61 26.39 14.00 0.141 0.142
AOT 125.71 80.15 14.97 30.08 0.434 0.465**
BNKR 118.96 77.11 23.24 18.30 0.216 0.220
BTI 93.88 67.58 12.18 13.89 0.242 0.247
BSET 99.36 64.70 16.54 17.82 0.272 0.279*
BITS 79.65 64.44 15.39 -0.18 -0.003 -0.003
BUT 102.37 77.98 13.52 10.69 0.165 0.166
DIG 102.30 86.21 12.56 3.46 0.053 0.053
DNDL 122.48 91.60 17.21 13.44 0.169 0.171
DWW 116.91 88.96 13.96 13.76 0.195 0.198
EDIN 99.48 73.66 10.84 14.73 0.261 0.267*
ENSC 108.66 77.79 19.78 10.91 0.139 0.140
FAM 177.40 97.29 39.56 39.87 0.321 0.333*
FCV 114.65 96.75 10.82 6.96 0.108 0.108
FUT 139.93 79.46 27.18 32.74 0.352 0.368**
FFE 283.22 162.88 47.72 71.41 0.405 0.430**
FLMJ 225.02 154.88 46.14 23.60 0.140 0.140
FMN 87.27 63.77 18.03 5.39 0.079 0.080
FOV 137.54 82.77 19.45 34.73 0.433 0.463**
FCP 182.49 99.82 38.66 43.28 0.348 0.364**
FCS 135.24 92.91 20.43 21.53 0.247 0.252
FRCL 120.49 85.70 16.32 18.17 0.243 0.248
GOR 279.21 180.92 37.34 59.93 0.365 0.382**
GVS 201.94 169.23 17.75 14.72 0.134 0.135
GTJA 220.74 146.38 68.05 6.20 0.031 0.031
ELGN 142.11 104.06 15.33 22.35 0.280 0.287*
KLC 90.31 62.46 19.55 8.16 0.117 0.117
KOS 131.50 80.69 20.78 29.52 0.360 0.377**
MRCH 101.65 73.58 15.33 12.53 0.187 0.189
MKI 100.15 83.23 17.02 -0.10 -0.001 -0.001
MNKS 121.12 86.85 14.90 19.05 0.265 0.271*
MUT 88.22 67.67 14.57 5.88 0.094 0.094
MYI 96.93 68.21 19.85 8.72 0.118 0.119
MSM 209.20 140.13 24.23 44.09 0.378 0.398**
MVN 90.39 50.75 30.07 9.40 0.120 0.121
OIT 145.08 92.30 19.44 32.78 0.387 0.408**
SCAM 73.01 49.44 16.18 7.27 0.128 0.129
SCEA 98.12 80.81 10.40 6.80 0.117 0.118
SCIN 88.27 67.95 13.86 6.35 0.103 0.104
SMT 126.88 90.59 11.75 24.13 0.370 0.388**
SAT 80.68 59.37 11.21 9.94 0.193 0.195
STS 86.60 64.08 16.35 6.07 0.094 0.094
SRW 96.31 71.57 26.47 -1.71 -0.020 -0.020
TMPL 94.29 62.74 14.68 16.59 0.273 0.281*
THRG 131.33 98.11 58.89 -25.25 -0.166 -0.168
TRCD 104.74 71.21 17.10 16.15 0.231 0.236
TRY 189.22 115.03 58.67 15.27 0.093 0.093
TRU 129.60 88.28 22.76 18.26 0.204 0.207
WTAN 115.95 92.19 15.09 8.52 0.114 0.115
Average 128.43 88.70 22.38 17.05 0.196 0.202**
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Table 4.6: Results with six-monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/96
Company Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr Fisher
ATST 151.38 134.54 13.26 3.46 0.041 0.041
AMTS 243.06 220.66 30.34 -7.67 -0.047 -0.047
AOT 205.69 163.01 16.39 25.40 0.246 0.251
BNKR 199.70 148.76 23.49 26.53 0.224 0.228
BTI 189.75 146.36 13.46 28.93 0.326 0.338
BSET 184.49 144.39 22.30 17.21 0.152 0.153
BITS 171.39 138.46 22.76 9.82 0.087 0.088
BUT 218.46 179.25 16.53 21.93 0.201 0.204
DIG 197.09 182.87 24.66 -10.09 -0.075 -0.075
DNDL 221.25 192.19 26.27 2.70 0.019 0.019
DWW 245.67 196.33 15.05 33.14 0.305 0.315
EDIN 187.94 164.55 16.70 6.46 0.062 0.062
ENSC 220.33 173.88 22.97 22.70 0.180 0.182
FAM 335.24 234.10 60.50 39.28 0.165 0.167
FCV 183.09 168.79 18.00 -3.58 -0.032 -0.032
FUT 274.03 175.75 38.21 58.07 0.354 0.370
FFE 472.09 356.00 40.18 73.37 0.307 0.317
FLMJ 477.68 384.64 66.31 25.85 0.081 0.081
FMN 144.40 141.75 17.13 -14.00 -0.142 -0.143
FOV 278.37 191.08 25.26 59.96 0.432 0.462*
FCP 387.49 258.44 49.23 77.15 0.342 0.356
FCS 279.34 194.13 29.70 53.65 0.353 0.369
FRCL 254.13 198.41 25.96 28.77 0.200 0.203
GOR 502.83 408.89 35.08 56.90 0.238 0.242
GVS 307.53 321.95 17.49 -30.85 -0.206 -0.209
GTJA 449.55 344.15 102.82 2.50 0.007 0.007
ELGN 308.54 227.06 20.75 58.71 0.428 0.457*
KLC 163.33 139.97 23.30 0.07 0.001 0.001
KOS 247.46 182.45 24.11 39.54 0.298 0.307
MRCH 185.14 150.55 24.96 9.31 0.076 0.076
MKI 193.34 157.50 23.76 11.68 0.095 0.096
MNKS 231.54 198.33 23.27 9.61 0.071 0.071
MUT 150.38 146.44 25.47 -20.82 -0.170 -0.172
MYI 203.54 192.62 31.39 -19.79 -0.127 -0.128
MSM 378.02 296.54 28.41 51.30 0.279 0.287
MVN 188.05 138.83 38.89 10.00 0.068 0.068
OIT 289.98 204.20 32.11 51.88 0.320 0.332
SCAM 124.31 113.80 19.78 -8.97 -0.095 -0.095
SCEA 177.87 167.97 15.89 -5.79 -0.056 -0.056
SCIN 179.52 149.78 11.74 17.40 0.207 0.210
SMT 238.80 189.96 10.51 37.04 0.414 0.441*
SAT 152.23 138.33 13.75 0.15 0.002 0.002
STS 166.73 153.22 14.43 -0.90 -0.010 -0.010
SRW 149.98 153.37 27.03 -29.41 -0.228 -0.232
TMPL 174.03 134.76 26.20 12.63 0.106 0.107
THRG 220.68 232.91 65.96 -75.59 -0.305 -0.315
TRCD 130.93 134.63 17.34 -20.34 -0.210 -0.214
TRY 428.87 281.52 71.47 73.35 0.259 0.265
TRU 184.11 169.08 28.24 -12.77 -0.092 -0.093
WTAN 218.75 197.98 14.72 5.84 0.054 0.054
Average 241.36 196.30 28.47 16.03 0.104 0.108**
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Table 4.7 is a summary table for the average trust with monthly, three-monthly and
six-monthly return intervals. The components are expressed as a percentage of the
variance of share returns.
Table 4.7: Importance of the three components for the average trust
Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar
Monthly 63% 30% 7%
Three-monthly 69% 17% 13%
Six-monthly 81% 12% 7%
The contribution of the covariance term to total risk for the average trust is still
relatively small at 13% for three-monthly returns and 7% for six-monthly returns.
But 46 of the 50 trusts have positive covariance terms with three-monthly returns and
36 of the 50 trusts have positive covariance terms with six-monthly returns. Figures
4.2 and 4.3 show the distribution of correlation coefficients with three-monthly and
six-monthly return intervals respectively.
Figure 4.2 - Distribution of correlation coefficients with
three-monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/96
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Figure 4.3 - Distribution of correlation coefficients with
six-monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/96
Assuming a homogeneous population, the average correlation coefficient is again
positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level (two tail test) for both
three-monthly and six-monthly returns (i.e. z > 0.048 for three-monthly returns and
z > 0.070 for six-monthly returns). The 'double whammy' effect therefore persists
for longer time intervals.
For three-monthly returns, variance of discount return contributes 17% of total risk
for the average trust compared with 30% for monthly intervals. For six-monthly
returns, the contribution of the variance of discount return reduces even further to
only 12% of total risk for the average trust. A possible reason for these different
results with different return intervals (1 month, 3 months, 6 months) is that trust
share prices and NAVs are cointegrated because this would imply negative
autocorrelation in discount movements (as reported in previous studies - see 3.4.7).
Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show the share price (P,) and net asset value (A,) time series
for Alliance Trust with monthly, three-monthly and six-monthly data respectively
over the period January 1982 to December 1996. The graphs suggest that the two
series are in fact cointegrated. A formal cointegration analysis is carried out for the
first ten trusts in the main sample in 4.5.4.
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Figure 4.4 - Alliance Trust, Monthly observations
Figure 4.5 - Alliance Trust, Three-monthly observations
Figure 4.6 - Alliance Trust, Six-monthly observations
Apr-81 Jan-84 Oct-86 Jul-89 Apr-92 Jan-95 Sep-97
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4.5.4 Cointegration analysis
If an investment trust's share price (Pt) and net asset value (A,) are cointegrated
(Cheng et al, 1994), an error correction model (ECM) may be developed to
investigate further the mean reversion of the discount (which is simply A, minus Pt,
expressed as a percentage of A,). For example, suppose the equilibrium relationship
is P, = j6.At . Then the adjustment can be represented as A(Pm - p.A,.\) where A is
negative and depends on the frequency of observation of Pt and At. The error
correction term will become larger the longer the interval between observations
because the series converge to the common equilibrium more quickly.
The Engle-Granger approach (Engle and Granger, 1987) is used to test for
cointegration for the first ten trusts in the main sample15 using data for the full 15
year period from January 1982 to December 1996. This approach is described in the
literature as a two-step procedure but in fact it involves four steps.
The first step is to carry out a unit root test for the parent series (Pt and A,). The
results are given in Appendix 4A. For monthly, three-monthly and six-monthly
returns, using both levels and logs, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root in
each case. Therefore, the series are 1(1) which is a necessary condition for
cointegration.16
The next steps are to estimate the cointegrating vector using the equation:
Pt -a + PA, + et
and to test for stationarity of the residuals (£,). The residuals are in fact stationary
(using both levels and logs) for all ten trusts analysed so that, as expected, P, and At
are cointegrated. The details are given in Appendix 4B.
The final step is to estimate the equation:
AP, =a + alAA, + A(Pf_1 - /3A,_,) + r],
where A is the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium.
15
In alphabetical order, therefore effectively randomly selected.
16
The ADF test for the first difference of the series confirms this result.
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The value of A depends on the frequency of the observations as can be seen from
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 which give the value of A (using both levels and logs) for
monthly, three-monthly and six-monthly intervals for the ten trusts. The tables show
that the estimated value of A normally increases with less frequent observations,
which means that the two series P, and A, converge towards the common equilibrium
more quickly as the frequency of observation reduces.
Table 4.8: Estimated value of A (levels)
Trust Monthly Three-monthly Six-monthly
ATST -0.123 -0.270 -0.262
AMTS -0.215 -0.399 -0.593
AOT -0.179 -0.309 -0.532
BNKR -0.092 -0.167 -0.232
BTI -0.360 -0.449 -0.399
BSET -0.072 -0.113 -0.215
BITS -0.219 -0.317 -0.566
BUT -0.264 -0.334 -0.421
DIG -0.095 -0.089 -0.215
DNDL -0.054 -0.090 -0.160
Table 4.9: Estimated value of A (logs)
Trust Monthly Three-monthly Six-monthly
ATST -0.175 -0.310 -0.421
AMTS -0.250 -0.548 -0.616
AOT -0.232 -0.398 -0.631
BNKR -0.187 -0.349 -0.350
BTI -0.399 -0.588 -0.542
BSET -0.100 -0.164 -0.257
BITS -0.226 -0.374 -0.575
BUT -0.229 -0.368 -0.411
DIG -0.091 -0.106 -0.211
DNDL -0.058 -0.107 -0.177
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4.5.5 Period of observation split into three five-year sub-periods
Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 give separate results for three five-year sub-periods -
January 1982 to December 1986, January 1987 to December 1991, and January 1992
to December 1996, using monthly returns.17 Note that the end of the first five-year
period is just after 'Big Bang' of the London Stock Exchange (October 1986) and
just before the international stock market crash of October 1987. Private investors'
consciousness of investment trusts also increased in the second half of the 1980s,
which could be reflected in the results for the second and third periods. An
alternative approach to the five-year divisions would be to consider bull and bear
periods separately, but the entire 15 year period might be described as a bull market.
We will, however, consider October 1987 separately.
Comparing Columns (2) and (3) of the three tables shows that the variance of share
returns (total risk) and the variance of NAV returns are much higher in the second
five-year period reflecting the turbulent equity markets worldwide during and after
the October 1987 crash.
Comparing Column (4) of the three tables suggests a downward trend in discount
volatility over time. This may reflect some market participants' growing belief in the
success of trading strategies based on selling low discount trusts and buying high
discount trusts (see 3.2.3). Another possible reason for the reduction in discount
volatility could be the reduction in transaction costs. The bid-ask spread has reduced
considerably, particularly since Big Bang in October 1986. Also, transfer stamp duty
for share purchases was 2% at the beginning of 1982 but was reduced to 1% in
March 1984 and reduced further to 0.5% in October 1986.
Comparing the results for the three sub-periods suggests consistency over time for
the variance of discount returns. High (or low) variance of discount return for a trust
in one period is generally followed by high (or low) variance of discount return for
the same trust in the subsequent period. This is interesting as it indicates that the
variance of discount return may be predictable. In Chapter 5 we seek to explain the
cross-sectional variation in discount volatility.
17
Very similar results were obtained using AITC data.
90
Table 4.10: Results with monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/86
Company Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr Fisher
ATST 23.76 13.62 10.88 -0.73 -0.030 -0.030
AMTS 31.57 20.92 12.89 -2.19 -0.067 -0.067
AOT 29.24 15.09 12.82 1.32 0.048 0.048
BNKR 29.05 14.41 15.90 -1.23 -0.041 -0.041
BTI 24.60 11.40 13.09 0.11 0.004 0.004
BSET 32.53 15.30 14.29 2.89 0.098 0.098
BITS 15.42 13.18 8.36 -6.02 -0.287 -0.295*
BUT 23.31 14.88 9.89 -1.44 -0.059 -0.059
DIG 24.13 14.33 13.24 -3.38 -0.123 -0.123
DNDL 16.70 10.59 7.18 -1.06 -0.061 -0.061
DWW 24.39 16.89 11.83 -4.26 -0.151 -0.152
EDIN 27.26 14.42 10.38 2.43 0.099 0.100
ENSC 34.45 17.86 22.49 -5.80 -0.145 -0.146
FAM 42.48 26.97 20.29 -4.70 -0.100 -0.101
FCV 23.99 16.08 8.59 -0.67 -0.029 -0.029
FUT 25.74 19.24 17.16 -10.47 -0.288 -0.297*
FFE 53.55 29.51 24.97 -0.91 -0.017 -0.017
FLMJ 49.39 33.57 21.92 -6.00 -0.111 -0.111
FMN 22.12 15.51 11.93 -5.23 -0.192 -0.195
FOV 38.17 17.96 17.82 2.35 0.066 0.066
FCP 33.80 17.32 22.12 -5.54 -0.142 -0.143
FCS 27.21 18.28 12.69 -3.70 -0.121 -0.122
FRCL 30.94 18.73 12.06 0.15 0.005 0.005
GOR 34.21 19.77 12.40 2.00 0.064 0.064
GVS 28.11 14.90 13.30 -0.09 -0.003 -0.003
GTJA 85.64 47.96 48.87 -11.01 -0.114 -0.114
ELGN 26.80 20.08 12.89 -6.06 -0.188 -0.191
KLC 22.28 13.29 11.58 -2.55 -0.103 -0.103
KOS 29.68 13.32 15.48 0.87 0.030 0.030
MRCH 27.20 12.87 12.45 1.85 0.073 0.073
MKI 15.90 13.69 12.03 -9.66 -0.376 -0.396**
MNKS 23.52 18.15 10.79 -5.34 -0.191 -0.193
MUT 31.56 12.16 16.93 2.43 0.085 0.085
MYI 31.40 13.91 14.63 2.82 0.099 0.099
MSM 38.10 16.87 17.40 3.77 0.110 0.110
MVN 14.49 13.94 11.33 -10.60 -0.422 -0.450**
OIT 26.89 26.49 17.44 -16.75 -0.390 -0.411**
SCAM 23.77 9.38 13.71 0.68 0.030 0.030
SCEA 29.93 15.64 12.11 2.15 0.078 0.078
SCIN 28.06 14.28 13.10 0.67 0.025 0.025
SMT 25.20 18.41 9.81 -2.97 -0.110 -0.111
SAT 20.26 13.94 8.44 -2.09 -0.096 -0.096
STS 24.25 13.31 9.15 1.76 0.080 0.080
SRW 12.80 10.67 5.37 -3.19 -0.211 -0.214
TMPL 27.49 13.64 11.68 2.13 0.085 0.085
THRG 33.55 10.07 16.58 6.79 0.263 0.269*
TRCD 30.91 14.30 13.98 2.58 0.091 0.092
TRY 32.78 8.73 18.45 5.51 0.217 0.221
TRU 34.50 8.58 19.48 6.34 0.245 0.250
WTAN 29.37 17.95 11.02 0.39 0.014 0.014
Average 29.45 16.65 14.46 -1.63 -0.045 -0.047*
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Table 4.11: Results with monthly returns from 1/87 to 12/91
Company Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr Fisher
ATST 44.71 30.07 6.52 7.99 0.285 0.293*
AMTS 57.90 42.41 13.26 2.19 0.046 0.046
AOT 65.62 38.70 7.80 18.80 0.541 0.606**
BNKR 55.90 41.44 6.89 7.45 0.220 0.224
BTI 48.42 33.62 6.91 7.76 0.254 0.260*
BSET 57.90 32.28 10.37 15.00 0.410 0.436**
BITS 31.47 32.49 11.59 -12.41 -0.320 -0.331*
BUT 50.29 37.22 8.16 4.83 0.138 0.139
DIG 59.58 50.19 8.37 1.00 0.024 0.024
DNDL 53.14 40.30 10.12 2.68 0.066 0.066
DWW 47.36 38.37 8.65 0.33 0.009 0.009
EDIN 55.55 34.34 7.14 13.84 0.442 0.475**
ENSC 56.36 36.07 10.53 9.60 0.246 0.251
FAM 82.62 48.06 22.04 12.32 0.189 0.192
FCV 66.21 57.07 9.81 -0.66 -0.014 -0.014
FUT 65.92 39.02 13.57 13.11 0.285 0.293*
FFE 111.44 48.10 26.47 36.25 0.508 0.560**
FLMJ 97.01 44.61 36.65 15.48 0.191 0.194
FMN 34.66 23.07 6.41 5.09 0.209 0.213
FOV 70.05 35.44 12.46 21.78 0.518 0.574**
FCP 94.86 38.05 29.25 27.10 0.406 0.431**
FCS 60.34 42.39 15.14 2.75 0.054 0.054
FRCL 58.66 40.52 8.03 9.95 0.276 0.283*
GOR 143.68 84.08 25.51 33.51 0.362 0.379**
GVS 86.14 74.46 16.87 -5.10 -0.072 -0.072
GTJA 79.35 38.90 38.20 2.21 0.029 0.029
ELGN 76.75 46.81 11.78 17.85 0.380 0.400**
KLC 46.53 29.17 11.02 6.24 0.174 0.176
KOS 57.53 36.65 10.46 10.25 0.262 0.268*
MRCH 56.70 39.92 7.41 9.22 0.268 0.275*
MKI 65.12 46.26 9.54 9.16 0.218 0.222
MNKS 52.80 37.99 5.84 8.83 0.296 0.306*
MUT 40.51 37.95 9.53 -6.85 -0.180 -0.182
MYI 42.98 30.90 10.00 2.05 0.058 0.058
MSM 67.30 55.79 15.58 -4.01 -0.068 -0.068
MVN 40.57 22.90 26.33 -8.52 -0.174 -0.175
OIT 47.03 36.39 11.39 -0.73 -0.018 -0.018
SCAM 47.01 23.20 10.68 12.92 0.410 0.436**
SCEA 59.89 42.14 6.24 11.32 0.349 0.364**
SCIN 46.42 34.80 5.59 5.93 0.212 0.216
SMT 57.86 43.02 5.43 9.25 0.303 0.313*
SAT 38.58 31.18 4.37 2.97 0.127 0.128
STS 49.74 32.61 5.84 11.11 0.403 0.427**
SRW 42.15 35.88 8.59 -2.28 -0.065 -0.065
TMPL 50.61 34.29 7.23 8.93 0.284 0.292*
THRG 66.69 49.99 37.76 -20.70 -0.238 -0.243
TRCD 56.74 42.51 7.20 6.91 0.197 0.200
TRY 73.86 48.99 20.96 3.85 0.060 0.060
TRU 67.06 46.90 10.86 9.14 0.203 0.205
WTAN 57.76 45.11 5.82 6.71 0.207 0.210
Average 60.87 40.65 12.84 7.25 0.179 0.188**
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Table 4.12: Results with monthly returns from 1/92 to 12/96
Company Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr Fisher
ATST 14.36 10.21 2.32 1.80 0.185 0.187
AMTS 28.29 14.23 11.78 2.25 0.087 0.087
AOT 17.69 12.74 2.71 2.21 0.188 0.191
BNKR 18.47 15.23 6.01 -2.73 -0.143 -0.144
BTI 18.46 13.17 4.19 1.09 0.073 0.073
BSET 18.55 12.56 5.59 0.40 0.024 0.024
BITS 20.73 15.59 4.77 0.37 0.021 0.021
BUT 22.66 18.39 5.27 -0.99 -0.050 -0.050
DIG 24.30 19.17 4.56 0.57 0.030 0.030
DNDL 18.72 13.53 6.11 -0.91 -0.050 -0.050
DWW 18.60 13.95 3.44 1.19 0.086 0.086
EDIN 21.13 13.49 3.42 4.15 0.305 0.315*
ENSC 26.39 12.35 7.91 6.02 0.305 0.315*
FAM 27.47 17.84 10.20 -0.56 -0.021 -0.021
FCV 30.33 17.96 9.20 3.11 0.121 0.122
FUT 34.07 16.32 9.75 7.86 0.312 0.322*
FFE 56.18 42.79 8.05 5.24 0.141 0.142
FLMJ 51.12 37.51 12.98 0.62 0.014 0.014
FMN 25.80 11.90 6.22 7.56 0.439 0.471**
FOV 19.76 13.51 3.56 2.65 0.191 0.193
FCP 40.32 23.15 9.42 7.62 0.258 0.264*
FCS 26.30 13.74 9.95 2.58 0.110 0.111
FRCL 19.58 14.06 3.76 1.73 0.119 0.120
GOR 42.83 31.43 7.90 3.44 0.109 0.110
GVS 33.81 23.63 5.39 4.70 0.208 0.211
GTJA 52.44 30.32 26.67 -4.48 -0.079 -0.079
ELGN 19.63 13.79 4.22 1.60 0.105 0.105
KLC 26.40 13.24 6.53 6.52 0.350 0.366**
KOS 17.99 14.38 2.57 1.01 0.083 0.084
MRCH 27.07 18.23 5.40 3.38 0.170 0.172
MKI 22.21 15.99 5.79 0.42 0.022 0.022
MNKS 17.58 15.80 2.99 -1.19 -0.087 -0.087
MUT 17.78 12.87 4.50 0.40 0.027 0.027
MYI 19.14 14.47 6.43 -1.74 -0.090 -0.090
MSM 38.25 26.75 6.70 4.71 0.176 0.178
MVN 23.79 7.70 15.05 1.02 0.047 0.047
OIT 23.12 13.54 6.05 3.48 0.192 0.194
SCAM 14.78 8.50 3.26 2.98 0.283 0.291*
SCEA 22.33 14.24 4.45 3.58 0.225 0.229
SCIN 15.72 10.37 2.78 2.52 0.235 0.239
SMT 24.01 15.77 4.14 4.03 0.250 0.255
SAT 17.41 10.15 3.52 3.68 0.308 0.318*
STS 19.89 14.56 4.74 0.59 0.035 0.035
SRW 15.04 12.33 9.55 -6.73 -0.310 -0.321*
TMPL 22.22 14.59 6.11 1.49 0.079 0.079
THRG 58.38 21.50 23.91 12.76 0.281 0.289*
TRCD 22.09 15.86 4.75 1.45 0.083 0.084
TRY 57.05 13.24 36.98 6.71 0.152 0.153
TRU 38.09 16.08 10.48 11.34 0.437 0.468**
WTAN 17.12 12.58 2.37 2.13 0.195 0.198
Average 26.51 16.51 7.49 2.47 0.125 0.128**
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The contribution to total risk of the covariance term tends to be relatively small for
each of the three periods. In the first five year period, 22 of the trusts have positive
covariance and 28 of the trusts have negative covariance. The distribution of
correlation coefficients is shown in Figure 4.7. For the average trust in the first
period the correlation coefficient is negative (significant at 5% level, two tail test).
But note the change of sign in the correlation coefficient for the average trust. For
the second and third periods it is positive (in both cases significant at 1% level, two
tail test). The distribution of correlation coefficients for the second and third periods
are shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 respectively.
Table 4.13 is a summary table for the average trust in each of the three sub-periods,
with the results in percentage form. The components are expressed as a percentage
of the variance of share returns.
Table 4.13: Importance of the three components for the average trust
Var(navr) Var(disr) 2 x Covar
1/82 - 12/86 57% 49% -6%
1/87- 12/91 67% 21% 12%
1/92 - 12/96 62% 28% 9%
The main features of Table 4.13 are the reduction in the relative importance of
discount volatility for the average trust after the first period, and a negative
covariance term in the first period followed by a positive covariance term in the
second and third periods..
One possible reason for the apparent negative covariance term in the first 5-year
period is that share prices were slow to react to changes in underlying NAVs prior to
Big Bang, not least because information was not available.
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Figure 4.7 - Distribution of correlation coefficients with
monthly returns from 1/82 to 12/86
Figure 4.8 - Distribution of correlation coefficients with
monthly returns from 1/87 to 12/91
Figure 4.9 - Distribution of correlation coefficients with
monthly returns from 1/92 to 12/96
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There is strong evidence of a positive correlation coefficient between discount
returns and NAV returns since 1987. One possible reasons for this is the indirect
capital gains tax effect discussed in 4.5.1. A more likely reason is overreaction to the
fundamentals by market participants in the investment trust sector since Big Bang. A
positive covariance term is consistent with noise traders 'jumping on the bandwagon'
as regards NAV performance.
Private investors (who are noise traders in the Lee et al investor sentiment model)
became much more aware of investment trusts in the second half of the 1980s. The
AITC carried out a successful marketing campaign in 1984/85, savings schemes
started to become popular in the mid-1980s, and Personal Equity Plans (PEPs)
emerged in 1987. But according to the investor sentiment theory of the discount, the
growing importance of private investors (noise traders) should be reflected in a
widening discount. This is not observed. The sector average discount narrowed over
the period 1/87 - 12/96 (see Figure 2.1).
4.5.6 Effect of the October 1987 crash
October 1987 was an exceptional month and arguably could be distorting the results.
In this month, for trusts in the sample, the unweighted average NAV return and
discount return were -31% and -4% respectively. The analysis is therefore repeated
with the month of October 1987 excluded. Figures for the average trust for both the
full period of observation and the five-year period from January 1987 to December
1991 are shown in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14: Results for average trust with month of October 1987 removed
Var(shr) Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar Corr Fisher
1/82-12/96 31.51 18.98 11.19 1.34 0.056 0.056**
1/87-12/91 38.90 23.87 11.89 3.09 0.125 0.129**
The differences caused by removing the month of October 1987 from the data set can
be observed by comparing the figures in Table 4.14 with the average figures in Table
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4.3a (for 1/82-12/96) and Table 4.11 (for 1/87-12/91). As might be expected,
variance of share price return, variance of NAV return and variance of discount
return are all reduced by the exclusion of October 1987. The average correlation
coefficient between NAV returns and discount returns has also been reduced
substantially although it is still significantly positive (at the 1% level, two tail test)
for both the full period of observation and the five year period from January 1987 to
December 1991.
Table 4.15 shows the three components of risk for the average trust with and without
October 1987 removed, expressed as a percentage of the variance of share returns.
Table 4.15: Importance of the three components for the average trust
(with and without October 1987 removed)
Var(navr) Var(disr) 2xCovar
1/82 - 12/96 with 10/87 63% 30% 7%
without 10/87 60% 36% 4%
1/87 - 12/91 with 10/87 67% 21% 12%
without 10/87 61% 31% 8%
The reduction in the importance of the covariance term on excluding the month of
October 1987 suggests that the positive correlation between discount return and NAV
return observed in the last decade or so may be partly related to liquidity, as one of
the main features of the October 1987 crash was the difficulty in being able to deal.
The unweighted average discount return for the five trusts specialising in the Far East
(including Japan) was -17% in October 1987, a severe 'double whammy' effect. Yet
the average NAV return for these five trusts in October 1987 was -32%, very similar
to the average of -31% for the total sample. As institutions hold the vast majority of
the shares in these trusts, this suggests an institutional investor sentiment effect
('herd instinct') rather than an individual investor sentiment effect.
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4.5.7 Sample split into sub-sectors
Most investment trusts in the sample fall into one of three broad categories:
international; UK; and geographical. We therefore calculate the average correlation
coefficient for each of these sub-sectors. There are 23 international trusts, 12 UK
trusts and 12 geographical trusts. Of the remaining three trusts out of the sample of
50, one is a venture capital trust and two are European trusts.
Table 4.16: Average correlation coefficients for sub-sectors.
Period International UK Geographical
(23 trusts) (12 trusts) (12 trusts)
1/82 - 12/86 -0.028 0.002 -0.068
1/87 - 12/91 0.236** 0.069 0.203**
1/92- 12/96 0.118** 0.130** 0.103**
1/82 - 12/96 0.111** 0.053* 0.090**
Table 4.16 gives the figures for the three five-year periods and for the whole 15 year
period. Positive and significant correlation coefficients are observed for each of the
sub-sectors for both the later 5-year periods, with the exception of UK-invested trusts
in the period 1/87 - 12/91 for which the correlation coefficient is positive but not
significant. For the early period 1/82 - 12/86, negative correlation coefficients are
observed for the international and geographical sub-sectors but they are not
statistically significant. For the whole 15 year period, the average correlation
coefficient is positive for all sub-sectors. It is significant at the 1% level for
geographical and international trusts but only at the 5% level for UK-invested trusts.
It is not clear why the 'double whammy' effect is stronger for trusts investing
overseas. This is an interesting area for future research.
4.5.8 Suggested decision rules
The analysis suggests that a decision rule based not only on the level of the discount
but also based on exploiting the positive covariance term might be successful. For
example, trusts on wide discounts would only be purchased if the NAV has risen x%
and trusts on narrow discounts would only be sold if the NAV has fallen x%. This
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would mean less dealing activity in carrying out a particular decision rule but should
also result in higher abnormal returns.
If we assume that the investor sentiment theory of the discount is at least partially
true, trusts with high discount volatility should stand on high discounts. This
suggests that a decision rule based not only on the level of the discount but also on
the level of discount volatility might be successful. Thus, trusts on high discounts
would only be purchased if their historic discount volatility were below a certain
level. Trusts on narrow discounts would only be sold if their historic discount
volatility were above a certain level.
4.6 SUMMARY
The results for the entire 15 year period of observation provide strong evidence of
excess volatility of share returns compared with NAV returns, and is consistent with
the existence of noise traders operating in the market. This is true for monthly, three-
monthly and six-monthly returns although the effect reduces as the return interval
increases because some of the transient noise is being removed. This excess
volatility contradicts the efficient market model although indirect capital gains tax
effects (reluctance to sell shares as the market rises) may be partly responsible and
time series estimation problems could be distorting the results.
The covariance term is small but has been significantly greater than zero for the
average trust since 1987 which means that discounts have tended to widen (or
narrow) when the underlying NAV falls (or rises). This contrasts with the negative
covariance term reported by Pontiff (1997). Again, this 'double whammy' effect
could be due to noise traders overreacting to changes in the fundamentals (NAVs).
The direct contingent capital gains tax problem for US closed-end funds discussed in
Section 4.1, which works in the opposite direction, is not relevant to the current UK
study.
The results for monthly returns over the entire period of observation show the
variance of discount return to be less important than in the Pontiff (1997) study of US
99
closed-end funds but still represents 30% of the variance of share returns for the
average UK trust. There is, however, considerable cross-sectional variation in the
magnitude of this discount volatility and there seems to be persistence in the relative
importance of discount volatility for a given trust. As the return interval is increased,
discount volatility becomes less important. This is because the trust share price and
underlying NAV time series are cointegrated implying negative autocorrelation of
discount movements.
There is clear evidence of a reduction in discount volatility over the 15 year period of
observation. This may be due both to an increase in the number of discount anomaly
traders (following the success of decision rules in the past) and a reduction in
transaction costs. It suggests that decision rules based purely on discount movements
may not generate excess returns in future. However, assuming that the positive
covariance between discount returns and NAV returns persists, decision rules based
partly on this 'double whammy' effect and partly on discount movements might still
lead to excess profits.
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CHAPTER 5 - CROSS-SECTIONAL VARIATION IN DISCOUNT
VOLATILITY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
We have seen that discount volatility is generally an important component of the total
risk for UK investment trusts, but the magnitude of this discount volatility varies
widely across the sector. In this chapter, we test various potential sources of discount
volatility by examining whether they can explain the cross-sectional variation in
discount volatility for UK investment trusts. This may help to explain why discounts
fluctuate so widely over time.
We again use the following notation:
Pt = share price of investment trust at time t
At = net asset value per share at time t
Then 'discount return' for period t is defined as (see 3.4.1):
log, (1 + R?) = log, (/>, / P(_,) - log, (A, / A(_,)
= loge(l + <)-loge(l + ^)
where loge (1 + R,P) is the share price return in period t
and loge (1 + RtA) is the NAV return in period t.
We define discount volatility to be the standard deviation of monthly discount return.
The marked difference in the ownership of US closed-end funds and UK investment
trusts is relevant to the analysis in this chapter. Typically, individuals hold a much
higher percentage of the equity of US closed-end funds compared with UK
investment trusts and there is considerably more variation in the importance of
individual shareholders across the UK investment trust sector. It should therefore be
relatively easy in the case of UK investment trusts to test whether discount volatility
increases with the proportion of shares held by individuals who, according to the Lee
et al (1991a) investor sentiment theory, are the 'noise traders' responsible for
discount volatility. Their irrational activity creates (systematic) risk and informed
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rational investors who have limited time horizons fear to trade against them. The
more individuals (noise traders) who are shareholders, the greater the discount
volatility we would expect.
One possible problem in studying the variation in discount volatility across the UK
investment trust sector is that the timing of NAV reporting is not consistent for
different trusts. NAVs may be published daily, weekly or monthly. Monthly NAVs
are generally not known until up to ten days after the month-end.1 However,
Datastream and Reuters estimate NAVs for most investment trusts on a daily basis.
This means that month-end share prices should be largely based on accurate NAV
data, thereby minimising inaccuracies from this source in calculating discounts and
discount volatility. Hoskins (1994) does not suffer from this problem at all in his
cross-sectional analysis of US discount volatility. US closed-end funds have reported
NAVs to pricing agencies on a weekly basis since 1965 and Hoskins uses weekly
data in calculating discount volatility.
As discussed in Chapter 4, there is a discontinuity in the share price when the share
goes ex-dividend, as is the case for any share. But there is no discontinuity in the
corresponding NAV because this is calculated excluding the revenue account for the
current year. As a result, there is a discontinuity in the discount when the share goes
ex-dividend. This has a slight artificial impact on discount volatility, normally but
not always tending to increase it. The effect tends to be greater for higher yielding
trusts. In 4.4.1 we investigated the effect of adjusting share prices to eliminate this
discontinuity before calculating the components of total risk. Table 4.1 shows that
the adjustment makes very little difference to discount volatility (the square root of
the variance of discount return). We will therefore not worry about adjusting for
share price discontinuities in this chapter.
Again, as discussed in Chapter 4, some trusts have warrants in issue. If so, it is
normal practice in the investment trust industry to make adjustments to NAV on a
per share basis by treating warrants as exercised if dilution of NAV would occur, to
1 Datastream 'corrects' month-end NAVs when official monthly NAVs are reported whereas Reuters
does not adjust the month-end estimates retrospectively.
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give a 'fully diluted' figure. Discounts are then calculated by relating share price to
fully diluted NAV. An alternative approach is to calculate discounts on a 'package'
basis. In 4.4.2 we calculated the components of total risk using both approaches
separately for those trusts in the sample with warrants in issue but it did not make any
qualitative difference to the results. In particular, Table 4.2 shows that discount
volatility is hardly affected. We will therefore simply use the more common 'fully
diluted' method in this chapter.
We identify possible trust attributes that may influence discount volatility in Section
5.2. The data to be used in the analysis is then discussed in Section 5.3. In Section
5.4, we carry out regressions to explain the cross-sectional variation in discount
volatility using the identified trust attributes as explanatory variables and draw
conclusions from the results.
5.2 TRUST ATTRIBUTES THAT MAY INFLUENCE DISCOUNT
VOLATILITY
In this section we discuss the choice of trust attributes to be used as explanatory
variables in the cross-sectional analysis. Trust share turnover and standard deviation
of NAV return are by far the most important attributes for explaining discount
volatility in Hoskins' study of US closed-end funds (see 3.4.6) and are therefore
included in our study. All the other attributes in the Hoskins study - R-squared with
the market, portfolio turnover, dividend yield, underlying net assets, expense ratio,
share growth and average share price - are not significant as explanatory variables in
his regression equation, even at the 5% level. Nevertheless, two of the remaining six
variables chosen in our study, Ln(market value) and Ln(unadjusted share price), have
close equivalents in the Hoskins study. Precise definitions of the eight trust attributes
chosen as explanatory variables for the cross-sectional analysis are given in Table 5.1
at the end of Section 5.2.
We consider separately those factors that influence discount volatility through share
price returns and those factors that influence discount volatility through NAV returns.
Factors in the former category are related to the question of market efficiency/
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investor irrationality. Factors in the second category are concerned with
miscalculation of NAV or the method of calculating discount to NAV. There are
analogies here with two of the broad categories of factors that have been proposed to
explain the main element of the discount puzzle (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
5.2.1 Factors related to share price returns
Trust share turnover (number of shares traded divided by number of shares
outstanding), sometimes known as trading velocity, reflects the level of information
arriving at the market, and information may be regarded as the driving force for share
price movements. But the extent to which this is translated into discount movements
depends on the ability of discount anomaly traders to carry out their activities.
Hoskins finds share turnover to be a very significant positive influence on US closed-
end fund weekly discount volatility, contrary to what he expected, but his
explanation for the result relies on the fact that closed-end funds with high share
turnover tended to stand on large premiums.2 This is not the case with the 59 UK
investment trusts which form the sample to be analysed in this chapter (see Section
5.3). Of the ten trusts with the highest share turnover, only one reached a premium
of more than 12% during the five year period of observation, with the other nine
trusts each trading at a discount on average over the period.
Low marketability of the trust shares makes discount anomaly trading less profitable.
If a discount anomaly opportunity exists, there is only a small potential profit
because a relatively small order will correct the pricing anomaly. Thus, the lower
the marketability of the trust shares, the greater the discount trading range, and hence
the higher the discount volatility. Market value of a trust is often taken as a rough
proxy for marketability (see, for example, the London Business School Risk
Measurement Service). We take ln(market value) as the chosen explanatory variable
so that the same percentage difference cross-sectionally in market value at different
levels of market value has the same effect in the analysis.
2 Hoskins argues that shares could no longer be borrowed for shorting once the funds stand on large
premiums and the normal activity of traders adding liquidity to the market would be shut down. This
would greatly reduce the liquidity for fund shares, and high trading volume could then create very
large discount volatility.
104
There may be a tendency for lower share prices to be associated with larger bid-offer
spreads (as a percentage of share price), which directly increases dealing costs
associated with discount anomaly trading. This implies that trusts with lower share
prices will tend to have higher discount volatility. The share price to be used as an
explanatory variable must be 'unadjusted', that is not adjusted for subsequent capital
changes. We should also take logarithms so that the same percentage difference
cross-sectionally in share price at different levels of share price has the same effect in
the analysis. So we take ln(unadjusted share price) as an explanatory variable.
Unadjusted share price may be positively correlated with market value. Both are
related to bid-offer spread as a percentage of share price. At an appropriate point in
the analysis it may be appropriate to drop one of these two variables.
According to the investor sentiment theory, small (individual) investors deal on
'noise' rather than on the fundamentals. Rational arbitrageurs fail to offset fully the
discount anomalies created by the irrational whims of individual investors because
such arbitrageurs have finite time horizons implying that their activities are risky and
therefore limited. As there is considerable variation in the importance of individual
shareholders across the UK investment trust sector, it is easy to test whether discount
volatility is related to the percentage ofshares held by individuals.
There is a different type of investor sentiment that may be relevant to discount
volatility, namely 'UK market investor sentiment'. Investment trust shares are traded
in the UK and may therefore be subject to investor sentiment that is specific to the
UK. This UK specific sentiment will tend to increase discount volatility if the
underlying assets are held overseas. But if the underlying assets are held in the UK,
there will be a cancelling out effect and no consequent influence on discount
volatility. Furthermore, discount volatility for funds with foreign assets may partly
reflect factors that preclude costless cross-border transactions: official and unofficial
barriers to capital movements, transaction costs, time to complete transactions and
time mismatch in trading hours. We therefore include percentage of underlying
assets in the UK as an explanatory variable.
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5.2.2 Factors related to NAV return
Taking advantage of discount anomalies without exposure to movements in the
underlying market(s) is difficult if the underlying net assets are volatile because this
makes hedging the underlying net assets more difficult. But having a good hedge is
all the more important in this situation because a poor hedge will translate into larger
gains or losses. So volatile underlying net assets makes hedging difficult but also
losses (or gains) from not hedging properly tend to be large. We therefore include
standard deviation ofNAV return as an explanatory variable.
Another possible reason for the influence of standard deviation of NAV return on
discount volatility could be staleness of the trust share prices themselves. Such
staleness would imply sluggish share price response to NAV movements, so the more
volatile the NAV return the greater the discount volatility. But as discount volatility
is calculated monthly in our study rather than, say, weekly as is common in US
studies, this is likely to be of minor importance.
Standard deviation of NAV return will depend partly on the trust's area of
specialisation, as defined by the five NWS investment trust sub-sectors -
International, UK, Geographical, Europe and Venture Capital (see Appendix 2A).
International trusts should have relatively low standard deviation of NAV return.
Correlations between the returns from shares held in the 'world' market are generally
less than those between the returns from shares confined to a particular domestic
equity market such as that of the UK, even when foreign-exchange risk is fully borne
by the fund3 (see, for example, Solnik (1996)). So international diversification
reduces the standard deviation of NAV return. Geographical specialists will tend to
have high standard deviation of NAV return because they are not diversified to the
same extent, their underlying markets are often volatile (e.g. emerging markets) and
currency movements increase NAV volatility. Venture capital trusts, which have a
high proportion of unquoted assets, will tend to have low standard deviation of NAV
return because valuations of the unquoted assets have varying degrees of staleness
which tends to smooth NAV returns.
3
However, currency exposure can be managed independently of the underlying portfolio and this may
be carried out with the aim of boosting returns.
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As changes in underlying NAV are an important flow of information, it is likely that
trusts with volatile underlying net assets will attract trading activity4 so standard
deviation of NAV return will be positively correlated with the first explanatory
variable in 5.2.1, trust share turnover, leading to a possible multicollinearity problem.
Gearing will influence discount volatility indirectly through its influence on the
standard deviation of NAV return. But gearing also directly affects discount
volatility because it reduces the denominator (NAV) in the discount to NAV
calculation. This can be seen as follows:
Discount to NAV = (NAV - Value of equity)/NAV
= (Value of assets - Value of debt - Value of equity)/NAV
Therefore,
Discount to NAV = (Value of assets - Total value of the firm)/NAV (5.1)
If we hold the value of the underlying assets constant and we assume that the level of
gearing has no influence on the total market value of the individual firm, in line with
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller (1977) proposition, it follows that the
numerator of the right hand side of equation (5.1) will not depend on the level of
gearing. But the denominator (NAV) will be lower for higher levels of gearing.
Thus, movements in the difference between the value of the underlying assets and the
total market value of the firm (the discount) will be exaggerated with higher levels of
gearing because discount to NAV is expressed as a proportion of NAV rather than as
a proportion of total market value. It follows that gearing tends to increase discount
volatility.
Also, the true value of debt will be different from the nominal value of debt used in
the NAV calculation which, assuming market efficiency, will further add to discount
volatility depending on the level of gearing.
4 This trading activity may be based on the fundamentals rather than discount anomaly trading.
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Directors' valuations of unquoted investments5 may be historic to some extent, only
changing when 'something happens', such as a share stake changing hands. This is
particularly relevant to venture capital trusts which invest mainly in unquoted
companies. As explained in 3.4.2, if the underlying portfolio contains shares whose
prices have different degrees of staleness, the NAV time series acts like a moving
average of past 'true' prices and will be artificially smooth as a result. This has a
direct effect on discount volatility as it reduces the correlation between share price
returns and NAV returns. We therefore include percentage of underlying assets
which are unquoted as an explanatory variable.
It has already been noted that valuations of the unquoted assets have varying degrees
of staleness which tends to smooth NAV returns, so there may be negative
correlation between the percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted and the
standard deviation of NAV return, a trust attribute which has already been identified
as a possible explanatory variable.
5 British Venture Capital Association guidelines are followed by most trusts.
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Table 5.1: Definitions of trust attributes chosen as explanatory variables
Trust share
turnover
Average over months 1/92 to 12/96 of (no of shares traded in




Standard deviation of monthly undiluted NAV return over the
months 1/92 to 12/96
Gearing l/2*(actual gearing at 31/12/91 + actual gearing at 31/12/96)
where actual gearing is the ratio of total assets (less fixed
interest and cash assets) to shareholders' funds
Ln(market value) Natural logarithm of the average over months 12/91 to 12/96 of
the month-end market value of the trust
Ln(unadjusted price) Natural logarithm of the average over the months 12/91 to





l/2*(% assets unquoted at 31/12/91 + % assets unquoted at
31/12/96)
% of shares held by
individuals
Percentage of the share capital of the investment trust held by
individual investors (1994, where possible)6
% of underlying
assets in the UK
l/2*(% of assets in UK on 31/12/91 + % of assets in UK on
31/12/96)
6 It is debateable as to whether 'nominee' accounts should be included with individuals or institutions.
After consultation with industry practitioners, it was decided to treat half of the shares held in nominee
accounts as being held by individuals and half as held by institutions.
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5.3 DATA
The sample consists of the 59 UK investment trusts in continuous operation over the
five years from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1996 for which share trading volume
data are available on Datastream.7 These tend to be the largest trusts in the sector
and they were all constituents of the FT-SE Actuaries All Share Index on 31
December 1996. Trusts created during the period of observation are excluded. The
sample of trusts is detailed in Appendix 5.
Table 5.2 gives data sources for all variables in the analysis. Table 5.3 shows the
actual values for the dependent variable, discount volatility, and for all the
explanatory variables. A number of relevant points can be made from the study of
Table 5.3:
a) The average value for discount volatility (column 3) is 3.25% which compares
with an average value for the standard deviation of NAV return (column 5) of 4.40%.
These are a little higher than the corresponding average figures (2.74% and 4.06%
respectively) for the sample in Chapter 4 over the same period, reflecting the fact that
the sample in this chapter includes a higher proportion of geographical specialists.
b) Discount volatility varies widely across the sample, ranging from 7.22% for
Dartmoor Investment Trust to 1.60% for Kleinwort Overseas Investment Trust.
(Column 3).
c) International trusts tend to have relatively low standard deviation of NAV return,
geographical specialists tend to have relatively high standard deviation of NAV
return, and the two venture capital trusts have low standard deviation of NAV return.
(Column 5). This is consistent with points made in 5.2.2.
d) There is little variation in the level of gearing across the sector. Only one trust
in the sample, Dartmoor Investment Trust, has a high level of gearing (Column 6).
(This trust also has the highest standard deviation of NAV return and the highest
discount volatility.)
Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution of the dependent variable, discount volatility,
and Figures 5.2 to 5.9 illustrate the distributions of the explanatory variables.
7
Bloomberg was used to obtain missing values in the data.
110










Gearing NatWest Securities, Daily NAV Service,
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NatWest Securities, Daily NAV Service,
Year-end 1996
County NatWest WoodMac, Daily NAV Service,
Year-end 1991
% of shares held by
individuals8
% of underlying
assets in the UK
NatWest Securities, Investment Trust Annual, 1994-95
AITC Investment Trust Directory, Summer 1994
AITC Investment Trust Index, 1992
NatWest Securities, Shareholders Over 3%, April 1997
NatWest Securities, Daily NAV Service,
Year-end 1996
County NatWest WoodMac, Daily NAV Service,
Year-end 1991
There was some difficulty in obtaining the percentage of shares held by individuals for some trusts.
In three cases, Abtrust New Dawn, Templeton Emerging Markets and Foreign & Colonial German, an
estimate had to be made on the basis of the little information that was available on shareholdings.
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Table 5.3: Values for dependent variable and
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
trust sector discvol turnover stdevnavr gearing In(MV)
aot internatnl 0.0164 0.0277 0.0357 105 6.1216
bnkr internatnl 0.0245 0.0372 0.0390 101.5 5.6207
bti internatnl 0.0205 0.0108 0.0363 101 5.0894
bset internatnl 0.0236 0.0318 0.0362 131 5.8280
btem internatnl 0.0205 0.0252 0.0366 99.5 4.8211
edin internatnl 0.0185 0.0231 0.0367 110 6.7498
ensc internatnl 0.0281 0.0201 0.0384 102 5.2075
fcs internatnl 0.0315 0.0357 0.0371 106 5.0260
frcl internatnl 0.0194 0.0391 0.0375 108 7.2081
mnks internatnl 0.0173 0.0208 0.0397 95.5 5.9503
myi internatnl 0.0255 0.0290 0.0379 101.5 5.9685
rep internatnl 0.0438 0.0255 0.0261 105.5 5.7005
scam internatnl 0.0181 0.0266 0.0291 111.5 5.8277
scea internatnl 0.0211 0.0215 0.0377 113.5 6.2356
scin internatnl 0.0167 0.0273 0.0362 102 6.3774
smt internatnl 0.0203 0.0240 0.0397 106.5 6.6654
sts internatnl 0.0218 0.0221 0.0382 112.5 5.6021
tru internatnl 0.0324 0.0296 0.0401 107 5.7875
wtan internatnl 0.0154 0.0326 0.0372 102 6.6989
dit uk 0.0722 0.0627 0.0781 194.5 3.6389
fmn uk 0.0249 0.0330 0.0345 101 5.9980
gvs uk 0.0232 0.0439 0.0486 104.5 5.5398
iei uk 0.0705 0.0577 0.0609 129.5 3.8784
mrch uk 0.0232 0.0298 0.0427 105.5 5.5605
mgs uk 0.0416 0.0328 0.0413 87.5 4.5238
mge uk 0.0326 0.0380 0.0402 98 3.7150
mut uk 0.0212 0.0239 0.0359 95 5.6162
smc uk 0.0398 0.0775 0.0436 98.5 3.8471
tmpl uk 0.0247 0.0300 0.0382 97.5 5.2479
thrg uk 0.0489 0.0426 0.0464 126.5 5.3583
trcd uk 0.0218 0.0278 0.0398 109 5.6764
try uk 0.0608 0.0515 0.0364 116.5 4.7008
vin uk 0.0333 0.0211 0.0311 133.5 3.8101
abd geograph 0.0383 0.0581 0.0617 95.5 4.2508
amts geograph 0.0343 0.0500 0.0377 95.5 5.3580
efm geograph 0.0338 0.0311 0.0746 104.5 5.2881
fam geograph 0.0319 0.0530 0.0422 99 5.2807
fem geograph 0.0407 0.0254 0.0618 86.5 4.8158
ffe geograph 0.0284 0.0307 0.0654 118 6.1202
flmj geograph 0.0360 0.0677 0.0680 111 5.8286
fov geograph 0.0189 0.0293 0.0368 97.5 5.9143
fct geograph 0.0590 0.0607 0.0617 107.5 4.8698
fcp geograph 0.0307 0.0640 0.0497 99 5.7875
gtja geograph 0.0516 0.0535 0.0551 97.5 4.9062
gtm geograph 0.0439 0.0712 0.0720 108.5 4.2635
gor geograph 0.0281 0.0588 0.0561 120 6.3301
kos geograph 0.0160 0.0319 0.0379 103 5.2061
msm geograph 0.0259 0.0279 0.0517 109 5.3859
oit geograph 0.0246 0.0286 0.0378 97 4.8111
tem geograph 0.0456 0.0570 0.0595 89.5 5.8655
trv geograph 0.0441 0.0612 0.0705 102.5 4.8468
fev europe 0.0340 0.0440 0.0346 90.5 4.3336
fut europe 0.0312 0.0389 0.0404 101 5.3014
fef europe 0.0431 0.0503 0.0376 106.5 3.7712
fcg europe 0.0390 0.0597 0.0390 91.5 3.8254
feu europe 0.0279 0.0400 0.0392 108 4.9186
klc europe 0.0256 0.0237 0.0364 109.5 5.1377
elta vencap 0.0579 0.0339 0.0263 103.5 6.2405
feet vencap 0.0532 0.0153 0.0321 98 4.1718
explanatory variables
(8) (9) (10) (ID
In(UPrice) %U/Q %individs %UK
5.9887 3.5 9.2 41
5.1825 0.5 30.28 47.5
5.7579 3.5 16.1 54.5
4.5494 1 39.2 72.5
4.4183 7 4.68 57.5
5.6818 2 49.6 77
4.7350 4.5 16.5 48.5
5.0306 7.5 34.8 49
5.1820 4 45.9 39.5
6.2040 0.5 18.1 37.5
5.8039 24 53.1 48
5.1114 29.5 16.56 24.5
5.0230 5.5 46.1 64
4.3894 7.5 18.2 52.5
5.3952 4.5 36.2 47.5
5.3825 0.5 23.3 51.5
4.4379 1 62.1 69
5.2098 5 12.44 64
5.3928 2.5 12.5 60
4.7539 0.5 52.9 100
5.6299 15 15.1 80.5
5.5584 1 8.4 88
4.5639 15.5 19.1 91.5
5.5376 1 39.5 91.5
4.7844 1 12 96.5
4.8781 0 91.9 98
5.7913 10.5 61.2 84.5
4.7588 0 20 100
5.8043 4.5 42.2 95
4.2610 19 23.5 98.5
4.9835 0 60.5 100
3.3660 22.5 12.4 84.5
4.6705 37.5 18.1 99
5.2380 0 31.8 4
5.5500 3.5 24.2 6.5
4.2338 0.5 12 1.5
5.6372 6.5 15.3 3
4.9442 1 17.8 10.5
5.7068 2 12.8 0
5.3792 3 12.1 2
5.6303 4.5 14.6 4.5
4.5463 15.5 0.6 10
5.4642 1.5 34.5 1
5.3779 2 12 1
4.7038 0 12 0.5
5.6746 4.5 14.3 1
5.4264 7 18.7 14
5.9708 7 51.9 14
5.7826 0.5 15.7 0.5
5.4133 0 34.7 9
4.7808 4 31.2 1
5.0438 0.5 11 25
5.7279 9.5 18.4 5
4.5068 1.5 15.8 0
4.7592 0 19.2 0.5
5.4202 1 70.51 4
5.3483 17 11.6 55
5.7011 64.5 8 62.5
4.2332 65.5 6.8 74
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Figure 5.2 - Distribution of trust share turnover
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Figure 5.3 - Distribution of standard deviation of NAV
return
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Figure 5.7 - Distribution of percentage of underlying
assets which are unquoted
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5.4 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
We now carry out regressions to explain the cross-sectional variation in discount
volatility. Table 5.4 shows cross correlations for the explanatory variables. It
confirms a number of points made in Section 5.3. There is high positive correlation
between trust share turnover and standard deviation of NAV return, and also between
ln(market value) and ln(unadjusted price). Standard deviation of NAV return is
positively correlated with gearing and negatively correlated with percentage of
underlying assets which are unquoted.
Table 5.4: Cross correlations of explanatory variables





















Table 5.5 shows the expected signs for correlations between discount volatility and
each of the explanatory variables, together with the reasoning for these expected
signs.
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Table 5.5: Expected signs for correlations between explanatory variables and
discount volatility
Explanatory variable Expected sign Reasoning
Trust share turnover Positive
St dev of NAV return Positive
Gearing Positive
Ln (market value) Negative
Ln(unadjusted price) Negative
Percentage unquoted Positive
Trust share turnover is a proxy for
information flow
Standard deviation of NAV return
proxies for both the ability and the
need to hedge underlying net assets
from the discount anomaly trader's
viewpoint
Gearing exaggerates discount
movements because the discount is
expressed as a percentage of NAV
The higher the market value the more
marketable the trust shares and the
narrower the discount trading range
Lower priced shares tend to have
larger bid-offer spreads which
increases dealing costs associated
with discount anomaly trading
Valuations of unquoted assets tend to
be historic which reduces the
correlation between share price
returns and NAV returns
Percentage individuals Positive According to the individual investor
sentiment theory, individuals are
irrational noise traders who deal on
the basis of sentiment rather than the
fundamentals
Percentage UK Negative The more underlying assets held in
the UK, the less impact UK specific
sentiment will have on the discount as
there is a cancelling out effect
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Table 5.6 shows the correlation coefficients between discount volatility and each of
the explanatory variables. The signs are as expected for the first six explanatory
variables but are opposite to that expected for the last two explanatory variables,
namely percentage of shares held by individuals and percentage of underlying assets
in the UK. The magnitude of the correlation coefficients between discount volatility
and these last two explanatory variables are, however, fairly low. The last two
variables suggest little impact of investor sentiment (individuals and UK specific,
respectively) on discount volatility. We should be cautious about drawing
conclusions, however, as we are looking here at correlations in isolation of one
another.
Table 5.6: Correlations between explanatory variables and discount volatility
Explanatory variables Correlation with discount volatility
Trust share turnover 0.55







Table 5.7 shows the results of the multiple regression of discount volatility on the
eight explanatory variables (Regression (1)). The signs for the regression coefficients
are the same as the corresponding correlation coefficients in Table 5.6. The t-
statistics, however, indicate that some of the explanatory variables are far more
significant than others. Trust share turnover, standard deviation of NAV return,
ln(market value) and percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted all have t-
statistics which are significant at the 0.5% level (two-tail test). Ln(unadjusted price)
has a t-statistic of -1.80 but Table 5.4 shows that this variable is highly correlated
with ln(market value), with a correlation coefficient of 0.47, indicating possible
multicollinearity in the multiple regression.
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Table 5.7: Regressions of discount volatility on explanatory variables
Regression (1) Regression(2)
Trust attribute Coeff t-statistic Coeff t-statistic
Constant 0.03362 2.51 0.02817 3.35*
Trust share turnover 0.32392 4.32* 0.31570 4.15*
St dev NAV return 0.33962 3.31* 0.37583 3.99*
Gearing 0.00007 0.99
Ln (market value) -0.00421 -3.32* -0.00543 -4.61*
Ln(unadjusted price) -0.00349 -1.80
Percentage unquoted 0.00052 6.61* 0.00058 7.72*
Percentage individuals -0.00003 -0.47
Percentage UK 0.00002 0.64
Adjusted R-square = 0.76 Adjusted R-square = 0.74
* significant at the 0.5% level (two-tail test)
Gearing, percentage of shares held by individuals and percentage of underlying assets
in the UK have t-statistics of 0.99, -0.47 and 0.64 respectively. It is no surprise that
the t-statistic for gearing is not significant; we have already noted that there is little
variation in the level of gearing across the sample. What is perhaps surprising is that
the t-statistics for the other two variables, which both relate to investor sentiment, are
not significant. This is an important result. It suggests that one of the main parts of
the discount puzzle - that discounts fluctuate widely over time - cannot be explained
by appealing to arguments concerning investor sentiment.
Table 5.7 also shows the results of a regression of discount volatility on the four most
significant explanatory variables only (Regression (2)), with the other four original
explanatory variables excluded. The adjusted R-square is 0.74 and the constant
together with the four explanatory variables each have t-statistics which are
significant at the 0.5% level. Note the stability of the coefficients and t-statistics
across the regressions. It should be remembered from Table 5.4, however, that there
is a correlation coefficient of 0.58 between trust share turnover and standard
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deviation of NAV return, so the coefficients for these variables may be unreliable due
to multicollinearity.
The Belsley condition index for the four variables is 1,534, much greater than 20,
confirming that multicollinearity is a problem. On examination of the variance
proportions, the variables causing most collinearity are trust share turnover and
standard deviation of NAV return, as expected.
The t-statistic for percentage of assets which are unquoted is very high at 7.72. It is
interesting to note therefore that if the two venture capital trusts, Electra and Foreign
& Colonial Enterprise, which have by far the highest proportion of unquoted assets
among trusts within the sample, are removed from the data set, the t-statistic reduces
to 4.74. But this is still significant at the 0.5% level and the regression coefficient
for this variable is roughly unchanged at 0.00059 (compared with 0.00058). Given
the relatively little variation in the proportion of underlying assets which are
unquoted across the sector, however, further investigation is necessary.
To test the stability of the regression coefficients in Regression (2), we now split the
period of observation into two equal sub-periods, 1/92 to 6/94 inclusive and 7/94 to
12/96 inclusive, and carry out regressions for these two 30 month periods separately.
Discount volatility (dependent variable) together with trust share turnover and
standard deviation of NAV return (explanatory variables) are all on average much
higher in the first sub-period compared to the second sub-period. The results are
given in Table 5.8. Note that all four explanatory variables have t-statistics which are
significant at the 0.5% level for the regressions in respect of both 30 month periods,
as was the case for the full five year period. It is clear, however, that the coefficient
for percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted is unstable, being 0.00080 in
the first period and much lower at 0.00020 in the second period.9 Nevertheless, it is
still significant in the second period.
9
Figure 5.7 shows that there is little cross-sectional variation in the 'percentage of underlying assets
which are unquoted' explanatory variable.
Table 5.8: Regressions of discount volatility on explanatory variables
Period 1/92 to 6/94 Period 7/94 to 12/96
Trust attribute Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 0.03011 2.51 0.03483 5.38*
Trust share turnover 0.23121 2.82* 0.22526 3.45*
St dev NAV return 0.49108 4.04*
In(market value) -0.00667 -4.17*




Adjusted R-square = 0.70 Adjusted R-square = 0.61
To test the equality of the coefficients in the two equations, a Chow test is carried
out. It confirms that the regression equation in the second period is different from
that in the first period. The null hypothesis of equality of coefficients in the two
equations is rejected (significance of less than 0.05%).
When all eight explanatory variables are included in the regressions, each of the four
explanatory variables in Table 5.8 are significant at the 0.5% level for both 30 month
periods. The other four explanatory variables are not significant at this level,
although Ln(unadjusted price) is significant at the 1% level in the second period. In
particular, percentage of shares held by individuals is not significant in either period
(t-statistics -0.50 and -0.49) and percentage ofunderlying assets in the UK is also not
significant in either period (t-statistics 0.30 and -0.02). This confirms the earlier
observation that both small investor sentiment and UK specific investor sentiment
have little impact on discount volatility.
How does the above analysis help to explain discount volatility? The analysis
suggests that the main driving forces for discount movements are: new information
(including changes in NAV) being impounded in share prices; and volatility of NAV
returns. Discount anomaly traders try to take advantage of discount anomalies that
may result but they have limited time horizons and their activities are restricted by
transaction costs, in particular transfer stamp duty and the bid-ask spread. These
transaction costs reduced considerably over the full fifteen year period observed in
121
Chapter 4 which is consistent with the finding in that chapter that discount volatility
declined over the period.
One of the main arguments in favour of the Lee et al (1991a) investor sentiment
theory is that the wide variations in US discounts over time could only be due to
individual investors (acting as noise traders) operating in the market. Yet we find no
evidence that the proportion of shareholders who are individuals has any influence on
discount volatility in the current UK study.
5.4 COMPARISON WITH RESULTS FOR US CLOSED-END FUNDS
There has been little empirical analysis of the cross-sectional variation in discount
volatility for US closed-end funds, with the notable exception of Hoskins (1994).
Although discount volatility is calculated using weekly returns in Hoskins' US study,
there is much similarity between his results and the results for UK trusts using
monthly returns in this chapter. There are only two significant explanatory variables
reported by Hoskins but they coincide with two of the significant explanatory
variables (at the 0.5% level, two tail test) in the current study - trust share turnover
('trading velocity') and standard deviation of NAV return.
As discussed in 3.4.6, it is puzzling that total assets, which should be a reasonable
indicator of the level of liquidity for fund shares, is not a significant explanatory
variable in Hoskins' analysis. This might be due to a multicollinearity problem but
unfortunately Hoskins does not give a cross-correlation matrix for his explanatory
variables. In contrast, ln(market value) which should be a reasonable indicator of
liquidity for trust shares, has the expected sign and is significant at the 0.5% level
(two-tail test) in the current UK study. The final explanatory variable, percentage of
underlying assets which are unquoted, is not included in the Hoskins study.
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5.5 SUMMARY
In Chapter 5 we try to explain the cross-sectional variation in discount volatility for
the UK investment trust sector and draw conclusions as to why discounts fluctuate so
widely over time. The sample consists of 59 UK conventional investment trusts in
continuous operation over the five years from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1996.
Discount volatility is calculated using monthly returns. Four explanatory variables
are highly significant - trust share turnover, standard deviation of NAV return,
ln(market value) and percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted. An
adjusted R-square of 0.74 is obtained with these four explanatory variables. There is,
however, a correlation coefficient of 0.58 between the first two variables and the
Belsley condition index confirms that there is a multicollinearity problem.
The likely reasons for the significance of the four variables are as follows. Trust
share turnover is related to the level of information hitting the market and
information is the central driving force for share price movements. Standard
deviation ofNAV return proxies for both the ability and the need to hedge underlying
net assets from the discount anomaly trader's perspective. Percentage of underlying
assets which are unquoted is significant because valuations of unquoted assets tend
to be historic which reduces the correlation between share price returns and NAV
returns. Ln(market value) of the trust proxies for marketability (bid-ask spread), and
the more marketable the trust shares, the narrower the discount trading range. The
last two variables are both concerned with liquidity (of the underlying assets and the
trust shares themselves respectively).
The results of this chapter suggest that the main driving forces for discount
movements are, firstly, new information hitting trust share prices and, secondly,
volatility of NAV returns. Discount arbitrage traders try to take advantage of
discount anomalies but their activities are restricted by transaction costs and limited
time horizons. There is no evidence that either individual investor sentiment or UK
specific sentiment has any impact on discount volatility.
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CHAPTER 6 - SENSITIVITY MEASURES FOR SPLIT
CAPITAL INVESTMENT TRUSTS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Many split capital trusts were created in the late 1980s or early 1990s, a period
characterised by high levels of inflation and high interest rates by recent standards. The
subsequent reduction in inflation and interest rates had a considerable impact on certain
types of split securities due to their in-built gearing. This brought home the risks inherent
in many split securities and highlighted the need for statistics which would measure the
impact of changes in the underlying fundamental variables on different split securities.
Statistical measures of risk such as total risk, which are normally based on historical data,
are useful tools for conventional trusts but are of little use for splits. The limited life of
splits means that the risk profile of their securities change over time and analysts are often
more concerned with sensitivity to the underlying fundamental variables. Furthermore, the
traditional statistics used by analysts to assess the risks of split securities, which were
described and discussed in 2.6.9, are very crude measures of risk and give little indication
of price volatility.
It is possible to gain an insight into the risk of many split securities using 'sensitivity
measures'. These show the proportionate change in the present value of a security caused
by a small change in each of the underlying fundamental variables. In other words, they
show how various split securities should behave in response to changes in the underlying
fundamental variables. In practice, of course, split security prices will include a random
element which may affect the actual response.
Split capital investment trusts are complex but, ultimately, they just divide up the returns
from the underlying portfolio of investments in a particular way. This is similar, in
principle, to issuing debt and equity capital. Sensitivity of the individual split securities
with respect to a given fundamental variable (and weighted by their present values) should
therefore 'add up' to the sensitivity of the underlying portfolio of investments with respect
to that variable.
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Hardly any academic research has been published on split capital investment trusts. There
were a few papers published in the 1970s on US dual purpose funds, but little of that
research has relevance to this thesis.
Simple valuation models are developed for traditional split securities in Section 6.2 and for
quasi-split securities in Section 6.3. Estimation of the fundamental variables which
determine the present values of split securities is then discussed in Section 6.4. Section 6.5
demonstrates that all the basic split securities consist of one or more of three types of
component cash flow. This helps in the development of sensitivity measures for split
securities which is covered in Sections 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8. The uses of sensitivity measures
are discussed in Section 6.9 and the actual response of split securities to changes in the
underlying fundamental variables observed in the market is tested in Section 6.10.
The theory is developed in discrete time. This is consistent with reality in that dividend
payments are discrete. Investment trust analysts also generally employ 'rates' rather than
'forces' for the underlying fundamental variables. However, the mathematics is simplified
if dividends are assumed to be paid continuously and if the theory is developed in
continuous time rather than in discrete time. This approach is adopted in Adams (1999)
which is included at end of this thesis.
6.2 TRADITIONAL SPLITS
As explained in 2.6.1, a basic traditional split has its ordinary share capital divided into two
distinct categories - income shares and capital shares. Holders of income shares are
entitled to all the distributed income and a predetermined capital repayment on liquidation.
Holders of capital shares receive no income but are entitled to the remaining assets on
liquidation after the income shares have been redeemed.
Capital shares are effectively European call options' on the underlying fund, with the
predetermined capital repayment of income shares providing the exercise price of the
1
They are like European calls on non dividend paying stock, but are unusual options in the sense that the
underlying asset (portfolio of shares) can be changed by the fund managers before the expiry date. There are
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options. The holders of income shares effectively own the underlying fund but are also
writers of the call options.
By considering a simplified model for dual purpose funds in which dividends (and
management fees) are proportional to NAV, Ingersoll (1976) develops pricing formulae for
the capital and income shares of US dual purpose funds, the US equivalent of traditional
split capital investment trusts. The model predicts share price fluctuations quite well and
could be applied to UK traditional splits. However, Ingersoll uses the option pricing
methods developed by Black-Scholes whereby the formulae are derived by calculating the
price at which an option would have to stand in the market to allow a risk-free 'hedge'
between the option and the underlying asset.2 As a result, many of the fundamental
variables (see Section 6.4) which are important for risk assessment purposes are not
explicitly present in such formulae and so the 'sensitivities' derived from the Black-
Scholes formula (such as delta, theta and kappa - see Hull, 1997) are of limited use from
the point of view of risk assessment. Practitioners cannot incorporate their own views
about possible changes in the underlying fundamental variables which affect the value of
split securities.
In this chapter we only consider trusts in which the capital shares are deep in-the-money as
is normally the case (see Appendix 6A) so that the options have negligible time value and
an approach based on option theory is not required for either the capital shares or the
income shares.
Even before the introduction of a gilt strips market in 1997, risk-free spot rates4 have been
readily available from the gilt market, enabling cash flows from securities at different times
to be valued at different appropriate discount rates (including risk premiums). This
conflicts of interest between income and capital shareholders, and the managers. By deliberately changing
the portfolio composition, the managers are able to change the allocation between different stakeholders.
2 Estimation of the parameters in the Black-Scholes model applied to splits is reasonably straightforward. For
example, volatility can be estimated from the standard deviation of the return on the trust's fund, which itself
can be linked to the variances and covariances of the returns on the individual investments which comprise
the fund.
3 An example of the use of one of the Black-Scholes sensitivity measures, kappa, from the point of view of the
managers of a traditional split trust would arise if the managers were thinking of disposing of certain
investments and buying others as replacements. The change in volatility could be estimated prior to such
action, and the consequent effect on the value of the capital shares deduced by calculating kappa.
4
A spot rate is a rate paid when money is borrowed now to be repaid at a single date in the future.
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information could be used in valuing split securities to make discount rates vary with the
term of the dividend or capital payment and, of course, this would be an important
consideration in valuing the capital share option if it were less deeply in-the-money. But in
practice, redemption yields or present values based on fixed discount rates are used by
investment analysts in assessing split capital securities, and this approach is convenient for
calculating sensitivity measures in this chapter. We will also be working in real terms
rather than in nominal terms so we will effectively assume that the spot rate curve for
index-linked gilts is flat.
There may be other types of securities in the capital structure of traditional splits including
zero dividend preference shares and warrants. We will not consider these more
complicated capital structures further but the approach to risk analysis in this chapter may
be applied to these more complicated structures provided that the capital share options (and
warrants, if any) are deep in-the-money.
To simplify the discussion, we assume that the number of income shares is equal to the
number of capital shares within the capital structure of the trust in question, as is often the
case in practice. Inflation, real growth of dividends and real growth of the underlying fund
are all assumed to be constant.
6.2.1 Valuation model for income shares
Income shares can be valued by discounting the estimated future dividends plus capital
repayment. We assume for simplicity that dividends are paid annually and that the first
dividend will be received in exactly one year from now.
Dividends from the equities in the underlying portfolio are paid out of profits which in the
medium term tend to increase as the general level of prices increases plus any real growth.
The absolute level of dividend growth of the income shares should thus depend on the level
of future inflation, and in valuing the dividends from the income shares it is therefore
helpful to work in real terms rather than in nominal terms.
The present value of an income share is given by:
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where Dj is the estimated dividend per income share payable one year from now (in current
money terms5).
g is the estimated real dividend growth rate per annum.
j is the real discount rate per annum, assumed to apply to all cash flows.
/is the estimated rate of inflation per annum.
m is the period (in years) before the income shares are redeemed.
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6.2.2 Valuation model for capital shares
Capital shares receive no income so their return depends entirely on the growth of
underlying assets up to the wind-up date. We have assumed that there is little doubt that
there will be sufficient assets at the wind-up date to pay the entitlement of the income
shares, so the present value of a capital share is:
Vn _ A>(i + g*)"
(1 + j)m
R
(i + /)"(i + ;)"
(6.2)
where Ao is the value of the fund at time 0 per capital share.
g* is the estimated real growth rate per annum of the fund.
R is the redemption amount of the income shares per capital share6
//and m are defined as in 6.2.1
1
In other words, is equal to the historic dividend which has just been paid increased in line with the
expected real growth of the dividend over the next year.
6 This is the same as the redemption amount per income share because we have assumed that the number of
capital shares is equal to the number of income shares.
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There is freedom to choose g* to be different from g, unlike in the Ingersoll (1976) model
for dual purpose funds where dividend payments are proportional to the value of the
underlying fund so that g* is set equal to g.
6.3 QUASI-SPLITS
As explained in 2.6.2, quasi-splits always have zero dividend preference shares (ZDPs) in
issue but there is only one class of ordinary share capital, namely income & residual capital
shares. When such a trust is wound up, ZDPs are repaid first.
The income & residual capital shareholders effectively own the underlying fund less the
discounted redemption amount of the ZDPs, but also hold a European put option7 on the
underlying fund, with the exercise price equal to the redemption amount of the ZDPs.
Holders of the ZDPs are writers of the put options, with the exercise price of the put equal
to the redemption amount of the ZDPs; the fair value of the ZDPs is the discounted
redemption amount less the value of the put option which they have written. Again, we
only consider trusts in which the put option is of negligible value as is often the case (see
Appendix 6B) so that option valuation models are not required. We also assume a flat spot
rate curve for gilts as in Section 6.2. Quasi-splits with bank borrowing or with additional
types of securities, such as stepped preference shares or warrants, are not considered.
To simplify the discussion, we assume that the number of ZDP shares is equal to the
number of income & residual capital shares within the capital structure of the trust in
question. Inflation, real growth of dividends and real growth of the underlying fund are
again all assumed to be constant.
6.3.1 Valuation model for zero dividend preference shares
ZDPs pay no income but pay a fixed capital sum on a fixed date. The present value of a
ZDP share is therefore given by:
7
Again, they are unusual options in the sense that the underlying asset (portfolio of shares) can be changed by
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where R is the redemption amount of the ZDPs.
m is the period (in years) before the ZDPs are redeemed.
j is the real discount rate per annum, assumed to apply to all cash flows.
/is the estimated rate of inflation per annum.
6.3.2 Valuation model for income & residual capital shares
Income & residual capital shares offer high income plus all the remaining assets of a quasi-
split trust at the wind-up date, after the ZDPs have received their capital entitlement.
Valuing these shares requires an estimate of both income growth and growth of the
underlying assets up to the wind-up date. We assume that dividends are paid annually and
that the first dividend will be paid in exactly one year from now. The same discount rate is
used for income and capital.
The present value of an income & residual capital share is then given by:
where D/ is the estimated dividend per income & residual capital share payable one year
from now (in current money terms).
g is the estimated real dividend growth rate per annum.
Ao is the value of the underlying fund at time 0 per income & residual capital share,
g* is the estimated real growth rate per annum of the fund.
R is the redemption amount of the ZDPs per income & residual capital share .
//and m are defined as in 6.3.1.
8 This is the same as the redemption amount per ZDP share because we have assumed that the number of
income & residual capital shares is equal to the number of ZDP shares.
, Atd + g*r r
(1 + j)m (1 + /)m(l + j)m
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6.4 ESTIMATING THE FUNDAMENTAL VARIABLES
6.4.1 Real growth rate of dividends (g)
Real dividend growth of the income shares (traditional split) or income & residual capital
shares (quasi-split) are directly related to the real growth of dividends from the underlying
fund which will normally be invested in UK equities. Consideration of real dividend
growth from the UK equity market may therefore provide a useful starting point in the
estimation procedure. It must be remembered, however, that past dividend growth may
have been financed partly by a general reduction in dividend cover, which in turn may be
influenced by factors such as taxation and dividend controls. Real dividend growth from
the UK equity market has been 2.1% p.a. over the last fifty years.9
6.4.2 Real growth rate of the underlying fund (g*)
This estimate is clearly of crucial importance in the valuation of capital shares (traditional
splits) and income & residual capital shares (quasi-splits). Real growth of an appropriate
index may provide a useful tentative starting point in the estimation procedure. However,
growth in capital values will partly depend on changing levels of retentions and yields.
The UK equity market has given real growth in capital values of 1.7% p.a. over the last
fifty years.10
6.4.3 Future rate of inflation (/)
The market's estimate of the future rate of inflation may be derived from the gilt market. A
first order estimate is simply the redemption yield on conventional gilts less the real
9 Based on the notional dividend of the FT-SE Actuaries All Share Index and, before it commenced in 1962,
the BZW Equity Index. For the future, ACT/tax credit changes may lead to an increase in retentions, and the
current emphasis on 'buy backs' as an alternative to dividends for many companies requires careful
consideration.
10 Based on the FT-SE Actuaries All Share Index and, before it commenced in 1962, the BZW Equity Price
Index. As the latter index excludes small companies, the stated historic growth rate is a slight underestimate.
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redemption yield" on index-linked gilts of similar duration.12 An adjustment can then be
made to reflect the different risk premiums on the different types of instrument and the
various technical inaccuracies13 which arise from this measure (see Deacon and Derry,
1994). Investors can make further adjustments in line with their own views of the future
course of the economy.
6.4.4 Real discount rate (j)
The real discount rate is the real rate of return required by investors. There are a number of
approaches that can be adopted in determining the real discount rate for a particular split
security, depending on the purpose of the analysis.14
If the purpose is to assess whether the market price of a particular split security is cheap or
dear using the formulae in Sections 6.2 or 6.3, the real discount rate for a particular split
security could be estimated from similar securities, given their market prices.
Alternatively, the real discount rate could be estimated using the investor's own judgement.
This will involve choosing a required risk premium above the risk-free real rate of return
(perhaps obtained from the market for index-linked gilts). For traditional splits, a lower
risk premium would be required for income shares compared with capital shares as they
rank before capital shares and receive all the income from the underlying portfolio.
Similarly, for quasi-splits, a lower risk premium would be required for ZDPs as compared
with income & residual capital shares. For income shares and ZDPs, higher risk premiums
would be associated with less negative hurdle rates and lower cover. If the market is
efficient and ignoring taxation effects, the weighted average of the risk premiums for the
individual securities of a particular split trust should equal the risk premium appropriate to
the underlying equity portfolio.15
" The real redemption yield itself requires an inflation assumption.
12
It has been argued (Debt Management Office, 1999) that the real redemption yields on long-dated index-
linked gilts are artificially depressed at present as a result of the minimum funding requirement (MFR)
valuation rules for pension funds. The increased demand which may be arising as a result of the application
of these rules is happening at a time of reduced supply due to a reduction in government deficits.
These include the inflation risk premium for conventional gilts and the inflation lag for index-linked gilts.
14
It may be argued that different types of cash flow (e.g. bond-type income as against equity-type income)
from a particular split security should be valued using different real discount rates. This complication will not
be considered although refinements which deal with this point could be introduced into the models we derive.
1
There are different views on the appropriate risk premium for the UK equity market. Dimson (1993)
suggests a figure of 7% p.a. based on the historic return on shares as compared with the total returns on fixed-
interest stocks. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1995) proposes a range of between 3.5% and
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For other purposes, it may be appropriate to derive the real discount rate from the market.
This involves replacing the present value (V0) in the formulae in Sections 6.2 or 6.3 by the
actual market price of the security, substituting estimated values for the other fundamental
variables (g, g* and f) and then solving for the real discount rate.
6.5 THE COMPONENT CASH FLOWS OF THE BASIC SPLIT SECURITIES
Examination of equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) shows that all the basic split securities
considered in this paper can be thought of as consisting of one or more of the three
component cash flows (positive or negative), with present values Wj, W2 and W3, given in
Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Component cash flows of the basic split securities
Cash flow Present value
Stream of dividends for m years
w,=zv





Nominal amount R after m years
w2 = ——2
(1 + r)m
where (1 + r)m = (l + f)m (l + j)'"
Value of fund after m years (per share)
w Mi + s*T
(1+,r
Thus,
PV of income shares = Wj + W2
PV of capital shares = W3 - W2
PV of ZDPs = W2
PV of income & residual capital shares = W]+ W3 - W2
4.5% p.a. Wilkie (1995) suggests a premium of 2% to 5% p.a. above the yield on index-linked stocks over a
reasonably short period (less than five years) and about 1% p.a. lower than this over a longer period.
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It is useful to treat split securities as consisting of these component cash flows when
deriving their sensitivity measures in the following sections.
6.6 SENSITIVITY MEASURES
Sensitivity measures for equity investments were developed by Adams and Booth (1995 -
paper included at end of thesis). They are an extension to the concept of duration which
was developed by Macaulay (1938) and is commonly used in fixed-interest bond markets.
Duration is defined as the weighted average of the times of receipts from an investment,
where the weights are equal to the present value of the payments. Duration is effectively a
mathematical measure of the sensitivity of an investment value to changes in the nominal
discount rate in the perfect-certainty discounted cash flow (DCF) model.
Although duration has generally been applied to the risk analysis of bonds, the concept has
also been applied to the risk analysis of equities (Boquist et al (1975), Casabona et al
(1984)) using a constant dividend growth model expressed in nominal terms. A more
recent development by Leibowitz et al (1989) is the recognition that inflation, which is a
major component of the nominal discount rate, is also a major component of the nominal
dividend growth rate. As a result, the sensitivity of equity prices to nominal interest rates
is, in practice, far less than that implied by the traditional equity duration model.
Sensitivity measures show how the present value of expected future cash flows will vary as
the fundamental variables which determine the present value vary. The analysis is valid for
sensitivities to factors other than nominal discount rate. Sensitivity measures can be
calculated with respect to all the underlying fundamental variables, whether they be real
variables or nominal variables. For split capital investment trusts, these fundamental
variables will include the estimated rate of inflation, the real discount rate, and the
estimated real growth rates of both dividends and the underlying fund.
In this thesis, we define sensitivity to variable k as:
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k dk v0
Sensitivity to variable k can be thought of as the percentage change in the present value of
the investment per one percentage point change in variable k, for small changes in variable
k.
Sensitivity measures are clearly of use in comparing the risk of different split securities.
But the following should be borne in mind:
(i) The importance of a given variable in influencing the present value of a particular
security over time depends not only on the sensitivity measure with respect to that variable
but also on the volatility of that variable itself over time. Thus, although the sensitivity
measure for a particular security with respect to variable k may be relatively low, if variable
k is extremely volatile over time, it may still have an important influence on changes in the
present value of that security over time.
(ii) The sensitivity measures are all partial, and do not allow for the fact that the various
determinants may be interdependent. For example, real discount rates may tend to fall as
expected inflation rises.
6.6.1 Sensitivity measures and component cash flows
Suppose that the cash flow from a security may be split into n different component cash
flows. If the present value of the zth component cash flow is 5,,
k = 5>,
i=l




k 3k B, V„
<6-5'
i=l ^0
where Sf?! is the sensitivity to variable k of the z'th component cash flow. Thus:
Sensitivity is equal to the weighted average of the sensitivities of the
component cash flows where the weights are equal to the present values
of the component cash flows.
This is analagous to, but more general than, the result that the duration of a portfolio of
investments is the weighted average of the durations of the individual investments, where
the weights are equal to the present values of the individual investments (see, for example,
McCutcheon and Scott, 1991)16.
6.6,2 Sensitivities of the component cash flows of splits
The sensitivities of the component cash flows of split securities are given in Table 6.2.
16 In continuous time (see Adams, 1999) the sensitivity measures can be interpreted as: the weighted average
of the durations of the component cash flows which are sensitive to that particular fundamental variable. The
weights are equal to the present values (positive or negative) of the component cash flows.
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Table 6.2: Sensitivities of the component cash flows of split securities
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Henceforth, we will use the following notation for the cells of Table 6.2.
Slk = sensitivity of a stream of dividends for m years with respect to variable k.
Si = sensitivity of a nominal amount payable after m years with respect to variable k.
Si = sensitivity of the value of the underlying fund after m years with respect to variable k.
The expressions in Table 6.2 are useful for the derivation of sensitivity measures for split
securities to which we now turn.
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6.7 SENSITIVITY MEASURES FOR TRADITIONAL SPLITS
6.7.1 Income shares
Present value = Wj + W2




(k = j, govf) (6.6)
Thus, using Tables 6.1 and 6.2, sensitivity to real discount rate is given by:
(i + /)m (i + jY
Sensitivity to real growth rate of dividends is given by:
(i+/ra+jr
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/i , \m1 + g
1 + 7. + ■
R
(l + /r(l + ;T
These sensitivity measures may be evaluated for a particular issue of income shares by
choosing the appropriate values for the underlying variables (see Section 6.4). If the real
discount rate is obtained from the market then the denominator of the right hand side of
each of the above sensitivity equations is simply equal to the market price of the income
shares.
6.7.2 Capital shares
Present value = W3 -W2




(k = j,g *or/) (6.7)
Thus, using Tables 6.1 and 6.2, sensitivity to real discount rate is given by:
5, = ~m
J 1 + 7
Sensitivity to real growth rate of the underlying fund is given by:






Sensitivity to rate of inflation is given by:
Sf A0(l + g*)m(l + /)m+I +
Again, these sensitivity measures may be evaluated for a particular issue of capital shares
by choosing appropriate values for the underlying variables.
6.7.3 Example
A traditional split trust is invested entirely in a diversified portfolio of UK equities and has
equal numbers of income shares and capital shares in its capital structure. Details of the
trust are as follows:
Estimated dividend per income share, in current money terms (D;) = lOp
Redemption amount for each income share (R) = 50p
Value of underlying fund at time 0 per capital share (Ao) = 200p
Period before income shares are repaid (m) = 10 years
The income shares stand at a price of 93 V4 p in the market and the capital shares stand at a
price 81p. The 10 year par yield for conventional gilts is 8% and the real redemption yield
on a 10 year index-linked gilt is 4%.17
We first estimate the underlying fundamental variables.
The estimated rate of inflation if) is approximately 4% p.a. This is obtained from the
difference between the par yield on conventional gilts and the par real yield on index-
linked gilts. Based on historic growth figures for the UK equity market (see Section 6.4)
we estimate real dividend growth (g) of 2% p.a. and real growth of the underlying fund
(g*) of 2% p.a.
Given these estimates and setting Vo equal to 93V4 in equation (6.1) we can solve for the
real discount rate (7) for the income shares and obtain a value of 7% p.a. Similarly, setting
17
Assumes inflation at 4%.
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Vo equal to 81 in equation (6.2) we obtain a real discount rate (j) for the capital shares of
10% p.a.
We then obtain the following sensitivity measures for the income shares and the capital
shares using equations (6.6) and (6.7).
Real discount rate Real growth rate Inflation sensitivity
sensitivity sensitivity
Income shares -5.62 +3.28 -1.77
Capital shares -9.09 +11.38 +1.55
What does a figure of -5.62 for real discount rate sensitivity of the income shares mean? It
simply means that there is a fall of 5.62% in the present value of the income shares per one
percentage point rise in the real discount rate, for small changes in the real discount rate.
The figure is more exact the smaller the change in real discount rate. Similarly, the real
growth rate sensitivity of +3.28 for the income shares indicates that there is a rise of 3.28%
in the present value of income shares per one percentage rise in the estimated real growth
rate of dividends, for small changes in the real growth rate of the dividends. Other figures
in the above table are to be interpreted in a similar way.
The figure of +11.38 for real growth rate sensitivity sums up in a single figure the
sensitivity of capital shares to changes in the real growth rate of the underlying fund. It
shows that there is a rise of 11.38% in the present value of capital shares per one
percentage point rise in the estimated real growth rate of the underlying fund, for small
changes in the estimated real growth rate of the fund. Section 2.6.9 described how analysts
get an indication of the sensitivity of the capital shareholders' returns to the growth rate of
the underlying fund by calculating the gross redemption yield for different assumed growth
rates for the underlying fund. In comparing the risk of different split securities, this
involves comparing a range of figures with another range of figures. Clearly it is more
useful for many purposes to compare the sensitivity of different capital shares (and other
split securities) to inflation and separately to real growth of the underlying fund using a
single statistic in each case.
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The income shares are less real discount rate sensitive than the capital shares because they
have shorter duration. The income shares are less real growth rate sensitive than the capital
shares because part of the return from the income shares (the redemption amount) is fixed
in money terms. Income shares have negative inflation sensitivity because the redemption
payment is a fixed nominal amount. Capital shares, on the other hand, have positive
inflation sensitivity because the real value of the amount deducted from the fund and paid
to income shareholders on wind-up is reduced by an increase in expected inflation.
It is of interest to see how the sensitivity measures vary for different values of the period to
wind-up (m) rather than fixing m = 10.
Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show how the sensitivity measures for the income shares change as
the period to wind-up changes.
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As expected, Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that the income shares are more real discount rate
sensitive and more real growth rate (of dividends) sensitive as the period to wind-up is
increased. Examination of the y-axis scale of Figure 6.3 shows that the income shares are
not very sensitive to inflation expectations for all the values of m. However, inflation rate
sensitivity becomes more important if the dividend (D]) is lower in relation to the
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redemption amount (R). For example, if the redemption amount is held constant at 50p
say, then we obtain:
Sf = -165.10/(7.61 D, + 17.17)
This is illustrated in Figure 6.4.
Dividend per income share (D/) —^
Figures 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 show how the sensitivity measures for the capital shares change as
the period to wind-up changes.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show that the capital shares are more real discount rate sensitive and
more real growth rate (of the underlying fund) sensitive as the period to wind-up is
increased.
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Examination of the y-axis scale of Figure 6.7 shows that the capital shares are not very
sensitive to inflation expectations for all values of m. However, inflation rate sensitivity
becomes more important if the redemption amount (R) of the income shares is higher in
relation to the value of the underlying fund per share (Ao). In other words, the higher the
level of capital share gearing, the higher the inflation rate sensitivity. For example, if the
value of the underlying fund per share at time 0 is held constant at 200p say, then we
obtain:
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Sf = 10/? / (375.32 - 1.04/?)
This is illustrated in Figure 6.8.
Period to wind-up (years)
Redemption amount of income share (R)
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6.8 SENSITIVITY MEASURES FOR QUASI-SPLITS
6.8.1 Zero dividend preference shares
Present value = W2
Hence Sk=S2k (k = j,g,f) (6.8)
Thus, using Table 6.2, sensitivity to real discount rate is given by:
_ ~m
i+7
and sensitivity to estimated rate of inflation is given by:
-m
sf=- 1 + /
6.8.2 Income & residual capital shares
Present value = W/ + W3 - W2
This formula involves both the estimated real growth rate of dividends (g) and the
estimated real growth rate of the underlying fund (g*). These variables may not be
independent. It is within the power of the trust managers to increase g, but in doing so they
may reduce g*. To simplify the discussion, however, we will consider only sensitivity to a
single growth rate by setting g* = g. Broadly speaking, the assumption here is that the
dividend yield of the fund remains constant. Hence using equation (6.5):
Sk = W*St+W*S* =*
Wl+W3-W2




v1 + A-m(l + g)w 1







(1 + j) (l + /)m(l + ;)
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(1 + j)m (1 + /)m( (1 + j)
Sensitivity to real growth rate is given by:
A-
, \m
i i-l *1-m(l + g)m
( V1+ A ( m\a + g)m~l




V1 + j) , A)(1 + gr R
j-g (i + j)m (i + /r(i + ;)m
Sensitivity to estimated rate of inflation is given by:
mR
m+l ,(1 + /) (1 + j)
R\(l + g)m
(i+jr (i+fra+jy
If the real discount rate is obtained from the market then the denominator of the right hand
side of each of the above sensitivity equations is simply equal to the market price of the
income & residual capital shares.
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6.8.3 Example
A quasi-split trust is invested entirely in a diversified portfolio of UK equities and has
equal numbers of ZDP shares and income & residual capital shares in its capital structure.
Details of the trust are as follows:
Estimated dividend per income & residual capital share, in current money terms
(Pi) = lOp
Redemption amount of a ZDP share (R) = 50p
Value of underlying fund at time 0 per income & residual capital share (Ao) - 200p
Period before the ZDP shares are redeemed (m) =10 years
The ZDPs stand at a price of 17 p in the market and the income & residual capital shares
stand at a price 164p. The 10 year par yield for conventional gilts is 8% and the real
redemption yield on a 10 year index-linked gilt is 4%.18
We first estimate the underlying fundamental variables.
The estimated rate of inflation (/) is approximately 4% p.a. This is obtained from the
difference between the par yield on conventional gilts and the par real yield on index-
linked gilts. Based on historic growth figures for the UK equity market (see Section 6.4)
we estimate real dividend growth (g) of 2% p.a. and real growth of the underlying fund
(g*) of 2% p.a.
Given these estimates and setting Vo equal to 17 in equation (6.3) we can solve for the real
discount rate (j) for the ZDPs and obtain a value of 7.1% p.a. Similarly, setting Vo equal to
164 in equation (6.4) we obtain a real discount rate (J) for the income and residual capital
shares of 8.5% p.a.
We then obtain the following sensitivity measures using equations (6.8) and (6.9).
18 Assumes inflation at 4%.
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Real discount rate Real growth rate Inflation sensitivity
sensitivity sensitivity




A figure of -9.34 for the real discount rate sensitivity of the ZDPs means that there is a fall
of 9.34% in the present value of the ZDPs per one percentage point rise in the real discount
rate, for small changes in the real discount rate. The figure is more exact the smaller the
change in real discount rate. Other figures in the above table are to be interpreted in a
similar way.
The figure of +8.15 for real growth rate sensitivity sums up in a single figure the sensitivity
of income & residual capital shares to changes in the real growth rate of the underlying
fund. It shows that there is a rise of 8.15% in the present value of the income & residual
capital shares per one percentage point rise in the estimated real growth rate of the
underlying fund, for small changes in the estimated real growth rate of the fund. As
mentioned in 2.6.9, analysts get an indication of the sensitivity of the returns from these
shares to the growth rate of the underlying fund by calculating the gross redemption yield
for different assumed growth rates for the underlying fund. The approach is similar to that
for capital shares. Again, it is more useful for many purposes to compare the sensitivity of
different securities using a single statistic rather than try to compare a range of figures with
another range of figures.
The ZDPs are more real discount rate sensitive than the income & residual capital shares
because they have longer duration. The ZDPs have zero real growth rate sensitivity
because they pay a fixed nominal amount whereas the income and residual capital shares
clearly benefit from an increase in the real growth rate. ZDPs have negative inflation
sensitivity because the redemption payment is a fixed nominal amount. Income & residual
capital shares, on the other hand, have positive inflation sensitivity because the real value
of the amount deducted from the fund and paid to ZDP shareholders on wind-up is reduced
by an increase in expected inflation.
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Figure 6.9 illustrates how the real discount rate sensitivity of ZDPs varies with period to
wind-up.
A graph of inflation rate sensitivity of ZDPs against period to wind-up is almost identical
to Figure 6.9.
The sensitivity measures for income & residual capital shares change as the period to wind-
up changes in a similar way to those for corresponding capital shares of traditional splits
but for all the sensitivity measures and for all periods to wind-up, the sensitivities of
income & residual capital shares are lower in magnitude. The graph of inflation rate
sensitivity against period to wind-up is shown in Figure 6.10.
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6.9 USES OF SENSITIVITY MEASURES
Sensitivity measures help investment analysts to understand the risks of split securities and
they are already being discussed by investment banks. Cazenove & Co (1999), referring to
Adams (1999), state that: "His approach enables investors to understand the sensitivity of
the share price to the real discount rate, the real growth rate of the underlying assets and the
rate of inflation." In particular, sensitivity measures are useful in comparing the sensitivity
of different split securities to small changes in a particular underlying fundamental
variable. For example, based on the approach in Adams (1999), Cazenove & Co (2000)
carry out a sensitivity analysis for hypothetical 'first generation' (traditional) split
structures with different levels of capital share gearing. A similar analysis is also carried
out for hypothetical 'second generation' (quasi) splits.
ZDPs pay a fixed nominal amount and are normally compared with fixed-interest
securities, in particular gilt strips. As a result, duration (or sensitivity to the nominal
discount rate) is commonly employed in assessing risk for ZDPs (see, for example, Smith
New Court, 1992).19 The sensitivity measures in this chapter therefore develop techniques
that are already used, albeit in a very limited way, in the analysis of ZDPs.
19 The separate measurement of sensitivity to inflation and to the real discount rate, the two components of the
nominal discount rate, is not considered.
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The income shares and capital shares of traditional splits, and the income & residual capital
shares of quasi-splits are neither fixed-interest nor equity investments. It is therefore useful
to assess separately their sensitivity to inflation and to the real discount rate. This is a new
approach.
Capital shares (traditional splits) and income & residual capital shares (quasi-splits) are
particularly sensitive to the growth rate of the underlying fund. This is recognised by
analysts, who calculate the gross redemption yield of these securities for different projected
growth rates of the underlying fund. But sensitivity measures developed in this chapter
enable analysts to compare not only the sensitivity of the present value of different split
securities to small changes in inflation using a single statistic but also, separately, the
sensitivity of the present value of different split securities to small changes in the projected
real growth rate of the underlying fund in a single statistic.
Another possible use of sensitivity measures for all types of split securities is to examine
the historic standard deviations of and correlations between interest rates and inflation to
generate measures of 'typical' shocks, and then to show their effect on the present value of
different split securities with various terms to maturity, and on the present value of split
securities in high and low real interest rate/growth environments.
6.10 ACTUAL SENSITIVITY TO CHANGES OBSERVED IN THE MARKET
If the analytical approach of market operators does not mirror the approach adopted in
deriving the sensitivity measures for present values, then split securities will not respond to
changes in the underlying fundamental variables in the way predicted by the sensitivity
measures. Random noise will also affect the actual response. In this section we test the
response of split securities to changes in the underlying fundamental variables observed in
the market. We must, of course, consider finite rather than infinitesimal changes in the
underlying fundamental variables over finite periods of time. As the prices of split
securities will drift over time (for example, towards the redemption value in the case of
income shares or ZDPs) independently of changes in the underlying fundamental variables,
it is not sensible simply to compare the actual percentage share price change over the
period in question with the response predicted by sensitivity measures over the same
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period. Instead, we will consider a series of short time periods and calculate the correlation
coefficient between the actual percentage change in price and the percentage change in
price predicted by the sensitivity measures applied to changes in the underlying
fundamental variables.
Empirical testing of sensitivity measures is fairly straightforward in the case of split
securities for which real growth rate of the underlying fund is normally unimportant
(income shares and ZDPs). On the other hand, empirical testing of sensitivity measures is
fraught with difficulty for those split securities for which sensitivity to real growth rate of
the underlying fund is important. A small (undetectable) change in long-term real dividend
growth expectations for the underlying shares20 can have a sizeable impact on the value of
the underlying fund and this, in turn, can have a very considerable impact on the price of
(highly-geared) capital shares or income & residual capital shares.
In 6.10.1, 6.10.2 and 6.10.3 we test the response of income shares, capital shares and ZDPs
respectively to simultaneous changes in the real discount rate (j) and the expected inflation
rate if) using ten six-month periods covering the five years up to 31 December 1996. The
change in the real discount rate (dj), measured in percentage points, is obtained from the
index-linked gilt market and the change in the expected inflation inflationary expectations
(df), also measured in percentage points, is obtained from the index-linked and
conventional gilt markets.21 The technical inaccuracies that arise in estimating future
inflation from the gilt market (Deacon and Derry, 1994) tend to cancel out when
determining changes in inflationary expectations.
The values for dj and df shown in Table 6.3 are derived from the ten year par yield for
index-linked gilts (rry) with a 5% inflation assumption and the ten year par yield for
conventional gilts. The data was provided by HSBC.
20 This translates into a much higher change in the real growth of the underlying fund up to the redemption
date.
21
Although the real redemption yield on index-linked gilts may be artificially depressed at present (Debt
Management Office, 1999), the period being examined ends on 31 December 1996, well before this problem
started arising.
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Table 6.3: Changes in real discount rate and inflation rate
rry f dj df
31/12/91 4.27 5.43
30/06/92 4.47 4.62 0.20 -0.81
31/12/92 3.92 4.22 -0.55 -0.40
30/06/93 3.53 4.23 -0.39 0.01
31/12/93 2.88 3.16 -0.65 -1.07
30/06/94 4.02 4.49 1.14 1.33
30/12/94 3.95 4.84 -0.07 0.35
30/06/95 3.85 4.65 -0.10 -0.19
29/12/95 3.56 3.85 -0.29 -0.80
28/06/96 3.90 4.02 0.34 0.17
31/12/96 3.54 4.02 -0.36 0.00
6.10.1 Income shares
There are only three traditional split capital trusts which have no warrants outstanding,
have equal numbers of income shares and capital shares in issue, have uncomplicated
repayment terms and for which data is available from Datastream for the whole five year
period of observation. These are Aberforth, Archimedes and Lloyds Smaller Companies.
If we assume reasonably stable real dividend growth rate expectations for the income
shares, we would expect a positive correlation coefficient between actual share price
movements and those predicted using sensitivity measures applied to observed market
changes in the real discount rate and inflationary expectations. The details are given in
Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.
Table 6.4: Aberforth Income Shares
Sj s, Sj.dj+Sf.df Price %change
in price
31/12/91 -5.51 -0.21 104
30/06/92 -4.94 -0.19 -0.93 96 -7.69
31/12/92 -5.09 -0.27 2.79 91 -5.21
30/06/93 -4.89 -0.27 1.98 89 -2.20
31/12/93 -5.04 -0.37 3.46 93 3.93
30/06/94 -4.98 -0.36 -6.23 92 -0.54
30/12/94 -4.67 -0.34 0.22 88 -4.35
30/06/95 -4.18 -0.30 0.53 79 -10.23
29/12/95 -4.21 -0.39 1.45 77 -2.53
28/06/96 -3.80 -0.34 -1.50 73 -5.84
31/12/96 -3.78 -0.37 1.37 78 6.90
Correl 0.17
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Table 6.5: Archimedes Income Shares
Si s, Sj.dj+Sf.df Price %change
31/12/91 -4.65 -0.05 280
in price
30/06/92 -4.48 -0.06 -0.89 255 -8.93
31/12/92 -4.41 -0.08 2.49 220 -13.73
30/06/93 -4.34 -0.09 1.72 210 -4.55
31/12/93 -4.55 -0.11 2.92 269 28.10
30/06/94 -4.58 -0.13 -5.33 248 -7.81
30/12/94 -4.21 -0.10 0.28 255 2.82
30/06/95 -3.92 -0.12 0.44 210 -17.65
29/12/95 -3.77 -0.14 1.23 186 -11.43






Table 6.6: Lloyds Smaller Companies Income Shares
Si s, Sj.dj+Sf.df Price %change
31/12/91 -3.83 -0.69 37
in price
30/06/92 -3.67 -0.77 -0.21 36 -2.70
31/12/92 -3.15 -0.68 2.33 31 -15.28
30/06/93 -3.22 -0.88 1.22 30 -1.64
31/12/93 -3.16 -0.94 3.04 34 13.33
30/06/94 -2.94 -0.88 -4.86 32 -5.88
30/12/94 -2.63 -0.84 -0.10 29 -10.94
30/06/95 -2.44 -0.90 0.42 27 -7.02
29/12/95 -2.27 -0.92 1.42 27 0.00
28/06/96 -1.96 -0.83 -0.93 24 -9.43
31/12/96 -1.78 -0.81 0.70 24 -2.08
Correl 0.33
We do in fact observe a positive correlation coefficient for all three income shares. But the
correlation coefficient for Aberforth Income shares at only 0.17 is lower than for the other
two income shares. A possible reason for this is that the income shares and capital shares
of Aberforth Split Level Trust can be combined (one plus one) and traded as units which
would have identical characteristics to ordinary shares in a 'sister' non split level trust,
Aberforth Smaller Companies Trust. There is a degree of arbitrage between the units and
the ordinary shares of the sister trust. Thus the price of the units is to some degree driven
by the price of the ordinary shares of the sister trust; in turn, the price of the units will to
some extent drive the price of the income shares rather than vice versa.
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6.10.2 Capital shares
We adopt a similar approach for the capital shares of Aberforth, Archimedes and Lloyds
Smaller Companies. We would expect a positive correlation coefficient but note that the
22
important term Sg*dg* is not included because of the difficulties explained above. The
results are as follows:
Table 6.7: Aberforth Capital Shares
Si sf Sj.dj+Sf.df Price %change
in price
31/12/91 -11.86 0.28 118
30/06/92 -11.27 0.26 -2.60 126 6.78
31/12/92 -10.84 0.28 6.09 129 2.38
30/06/93 -10.29 0.21 4.23 159 23.26
31/12/93 -9.77 0.19 6.47 189 18.87
30/06/94 -9.36 0.19 -10.89 175 -7.41
30/12/94 -8.89 0.19 0.72 169 -3.43
30/06/95 -8.44 0.17 0.85 193 14.20
29/12/95 -7.94 0.15 2.31 223 15.54
28/06/96 -7.48 0.13 2.67 265 18.83
31/12/96 -7.02 0.12 2.69 271 2.26
Correl 0.48
Table 6.8: Archimedes Capital Shares
Si sf Sj.dj+Sf.df Price %change
in price
31/12/91 -10.67 0.16 315
30/06/92 -10.18 0.20 -2.27 283 -10.16
31/12/92 -9.76 0.23 5.52 270 -4.59
30/06/93 -9.37 0.22 3.81 300 11.11
31/12/93 -8.79 0.17 5.85 390 30.00
30/06/94 -8.48 0.19 -9.80 360 7.69
30/12/94 -8.09 0.18 0.66 408 13.33
30/06/95 -7.62 0.18 0.78 405 -0.74
29/12/95 -7.17 0.19 2.07 418 3.21
28/06/96 -6.60 0.17 -2.40 395 -5.50
31/12/96 -6.04 0.15 2.37 394 -0.25
Correl 0.59
22
g* is the estimated real growth rate per annum of the underlying fund up to redemption.
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Table 6.9: Lloyds Smaller Companies Capital Shares
S, s, Sj.dj+Sf.df Price %change
in price
31/12/91 -9.58 0.05 60
30/06/92 -9.27 0.05 -1.95 67 11.67
31/12/92 -8.60 0.05 5.08 55.5 -17.16
30/06/93 -8.21 0.04 3.36 72 29.73
31/12/93 -7.62 0.04 5.29 79 9.72
30/06/94 -7.28 0.04 -8.63 83 5.06
30/12/94 -6.81 0.04 0.52 81 -2.41
30/06/95 -6.33 0.03 0.67 90 11.11
29/12/95 -5.84 0.03 1.81 101 12.22
28/06/96 -5.36 0.02 -1.98 115 13.86
31/12/96 -4.92 0.02 1.93 123 6.96
Correl -0.08
The correlation coefficients for Aberforth capital shares and Archimedes capital shares are
both positive at around 0.5 or more. The correlation coefficient for Lloyds Smaller
Companies is, however, marginally negative. Such a result is not surprising given that the
term Sg*dg* has not been included in the analysis.
6.10.3 Zero dividend preference shares
There are only three quasi-split trusts which have no warrants outstanding, have equal
numbers of ZDPs and income & residual capital shares in issue and for which data is
available from Datastream for the whole five year period of observation. These are
Edinburgh Income, Fleming Income & Capital and Invesco Recovery. The results are as
follows:
Table 6.10: Edinburgh Income ZDPs
Si s, Sj.dj+Sf.df Price %change
in price
31/12/91 -7.93 -7.90 40.5
30/06/92 -7.48 -7.49 4.82 46.5 14.81
31/12/92 -7.03 -7.04 7.11 51.75 11.29
30/06/93 -6.54 -6.56 2.67 53 2.42
31/12/93 -6.08 -6.14 11.26 60 13.21
30/06/94 -5.59 -5.58 -15.09 57.25 -4.58
30/12/94 -5.11 -5.09 -1.56 59 3.06
30/06/95 -4.61 -4.62 1.48 61 3.39
29/12/95 -4.23 -4.17 5.03 72.5 18.85
28/06/96 -3.72 -3.69 -2.15 72.5 0.00
31/12/96 -3.23 -3.20 1.34 74.75 3.10
Correl 0.79
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Table 6.11: Fleming Income & Capital ZDPs
Sy s. Sj.dj+Sf.df Price %change
31/12/91 -9.64 -9.64 29.5
in price
30/06/92 -9.22 -9.24 5.88 35 18.64
31/12/92 -8.86 -8.80 8.77 42.75 22.14
30/06/93 -8.33 -8.31 3.37 42.25 -1.17
31/12/93 -7.85 -7.92 14.31 47.75 13.02
30/06/94 -7.33 -7.34 -19.47 43 -9.95
30/12/94 -6.90 -6.84 -2.06 46.5 8.14
30/06/95 -6.37 -6.37 1.99 46.5 0.00
29/12/95 -5.95 -5.94 6.94 54.25 16.67






Table 6.12: Invesco Recovery ZDPs
s, sf Sj.dj+Sf.df Price %change
31/12/91 -6.50 -6.52 99
in price
30/06/92 -6.07 -6.09 3.98 116 16.67
31/12/92 -5.62 -5.64 5.78 127 9.96
30/06/93 -5.14 -5.16 2.14 131 3.35
31/12/93 -4.67 -4.73 8.86 146 11.43
30/06/94 -4.19 -4.19 -11.61 143 -1.88
30/12/94 -3.72 -3.70 -1.17 149 3.83
30/06/95 -3.22 -3.23 1.07 154 3.19
29/12/95 -2.78 -2.77 3.51 171 10.89
28/06/96 -2.30 -2.28 -1.42 176 3.23
31/12/96 -1.80 -1.80 0.83 180 2.56
Correl 0.77
As expected, the correlation coefficient is high (close to 0.80) for all three ZDPs examined.
6.11 SUMMARY
The inadequacy of statistical measures of risk based on historic data for splits and the need
for statistics that measure the sensitivity of split security values to changes in the
underlying fundamental variables, suggests that 'sensitivity measures' may be useful in the
risk analysis of split securities.
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An alternative approach to risk analysis for certain types of split capital investment trust
security is presented in this chapter. Following the approach of Adams and Booth (1995),
sensitivity measures for these securities are derived. The sensitivity measures show the
percentage change in the present value of expected future cash flows per one percentage
point change in an underlying variable, for small changes in that variable. Thus a single
figure can be calculated for real discount rate sensitivity, for real growth rate sensitivity and
for inflation rate sensitivity of each security. This should be of considerable use to
practitioners in the investment trust sector.
The formulae and graphs presented in Sections 6.7 and 6.8 show that, for all the securities
considered, real discount rate sensitivity is negative and increases with period to wind-up,
as expected. For traditional splits, capital shares are more real discount rate sensitive than
income shares; for quasi-splits, ZDP shares are more real discount rate sensitive than
income & residual capital shares. Real growth rate sensitivity is positive for all securities
for which it is relevant, and again increases in magnitude with period to wind-up. For
traditional splits, income shares have lower real growth rate sensitivity than capital shares.
Inflation rate sensitivity is negative for income shares and for ZDP shares but is positive
for capital shares and for income & residual capital shares.
Sensitivity measures help investment analysts to understand the risks of split securities. In
particular, they are useful in comparing the sensitivity of the present value of different split
securities to small changes in the underlying fundamental variables. But testing sensitivity
measures empirically is fraught with difficulties. There is some evidence of positive
correlation between the percentage change in share price and the percentage change
predicted by the sensitivity measures for income shares and for capital shares. As
expected, there is a very strong positive correlation coefficient for the ZDPs examined.
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION
Many arguments to explain the closed-end fund discount puzzle have been advanced
that are consistent with the efficient market model, including miscalculation of NAV,
agency costs and tax timing. But even taken together they seem incapable of
explaining all parts of the puzzle. In particular, they do not explain why discounts
fluctuate so widely over time. Meanwhile, many researchers have claimed that
decision rules based on discounts can systematically generate superior investment
returns and in recent years attention has shifted towards explanations of the discount
anomaly based upon irrational investor behaviour. Most of this work relates to US
closed-end funds although a few papers concentrate on UK investment trusts.
The De Long et al (1990a) noise trader model asserts that stock markets generate
irrational valuations because of the activities of noise traders (uninformed investors).
Rational investors do not eliminate these irrational fluctuations in prices because they
have finite time horizons so that arbitrage activity is risky and therefore limited.
When noise traders are present, large positive returns tend to be followed by further
large positive returns in the short-term.
Lee et al (1991) extend the De Long et al model, arguing that movements in the
discounts of US closed-end funds reflect changes in the sentiment of individual
investors who are the dominant owners of the funds. Institutional investors are the
rational investors according to the model. Discount movements are cross-sectionally
correlated so investor sentiment risk is systematic and priced in equilibrium. The
theory requires discounts to be volatile because it is this volatility which is
responsible for the underpricing of closed-end fund shares relative to their underlying
net asset values (NAVs). This investor sentiment theory has received serious
scrutiny in the last decade but no consensus view on the validity of the theory has yet
emerged.
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Research on US closed-end funds shows that fund shares are much more volatile than
their underlying NAVs. This contradicts the efficient market model.1 The
importance of discount volatility as a component of total risk is emphasised but
negative autocorrelation in discount changes implies that discount volatility is a less
important component of total risk for longer return intervals.
Many studies of US closed-end funds report negative covariance between discount
returns and NAV returns. This is not what investor sentiment theory predicts as the
presence of noise traders implies positive covariance. A partial explanation may be
that a rise (or fall) in NAV increases (or reduces) the contingent capital gains tax
liability.2 There is no corresponding tax argument to complicate a similar study of
UK investment trusts.
•5
Work by Hoskins (1994) on the ability to discount arbitrage shows that fund share
turnover (i.e. trading velocity) and standard deviation of NAV return are significant
explanatory variables in a cross-sectional analysis of discount volatility for US
closed-end funds. These variables relate to the ability of discount arbitrage traders to
perform their operations. However, total assets, which may be regarded as a crude
indicator of share liquidity, is not a significant explanatory variable.
Very little research has been carried out on excess volatility for UK investment trusts.
There has been no variance decomposition study in the UK to provide evidence on
the relative importance of the three components of total risk. There has also been no
work analysing UK discount volatility. This thesis fills these gaps in the literature. It
provides evidence of excess volatility which is mainly due to discount volatility but
is also due to a positive covariance term in the variance decomposition study. This is
consistent with noise trader theory. However, a cross-sectional analysis of discount
volatility does not confirm that individual investor sentiment affects discount
1 Possible reasons for excess volatility which are consistent with the efficient market model include
corporate activity and changing perceptions of future management actions, but these do not seem
capable of explaining the observed discount volatility.
2 Realised capital gains are taxed, so unrealised capital appreciation increases potential tax liabilities.
3 Discount arbitrage traders seek to buy closed-end fund shares trading at a discount and sell short the
fund's underlying portfolio.
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volatility. The main conclusions and shortcomings of the research are discussed in
Sections 7.1 and 7.2. Areas for future research are also signposted.
An entirely separate approach to risk analysis is carried out in this thesis for split
capital investment trusts because statistical measures of risk based on historical data
are of limited use. The restricted life of splits means that the risk profile of their
securities change over time and investment analysts are often more interested in the
sensitivity of split securities to changes in the underlying fundamental variables. An
alternative approach to the risk assessment of split capital investment trust securities
is proposed. The main conclusions and shortcomings of this research together with
suggestions for future research are discussed in Section 7.3. No previous research on
split capital investment trusts has been published in the academic literature.
7.1 CONVENTIONAL TRUSTS: COMPONENTS OF TOTAL RISK
Defining total risk as variance of share return, the importance of the three
components of total risk are investigated: variance of NAV return, variance of
discount return and twice the covariance between NAV return and discount return.
Monthly data from Datastream for the 15 year period from January 1982 to
December 1996 are used for the analysis. The sample consists of the 50 largest trusts
at the start of the period which survived until the end of the period.
For the average trust using monthly returns, variance of NAV return represents only
about 63% of total risk, so there is clear evidence of 'excess volatility'. This
contradicts the efficient market model. The corresponding figure for the Pontiff
(1997) study of US closed-end funds is 74%, but his sample includes bond funds as
well as equity funds and looks at the earlier period from July 1965 to December
1985.
With longer time intervals, excess volatility is reduced. For the average trust,
variance of NAV return represents 68% of total risk for three-monthly intervals and
81% of total risk for six-monthly intervals.
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Variance of discount return (its square root is 'discount volatility') represents about
30% of total risk for the average trust using monthly returns but this figure varies
considerably across the sector. So discount volatility is normally an important
component of total risk with monthly returns. Nevertheless, discount volatility for
the average trust is far lower than for the average US closed-end fund in Pontiffs
study. This could be explained by the earlier period of observation in the US study
which includes the 1970s, a decade characterised by extreme movements in both US
closed-end fund discounts and UK investment trust discounts.
With longer return intervals, the variance of discount return is a less important
component of total risk, emphasising the importance of an investor's time horizon.
For three-monthly returns, variance of discount return contributes only 17% of total
risk for the average trust. For six-monthly returns, the contribution of the variance of
discount return reduces even further to only 12% of total risk. This implies that, in
assessing risk, short-term investors should be concerned with discount volatility as
well as variation in NAV return whereas most investors should be primarily
concerned with variation in NAV return rather than the often quoted volatility (of
share return) based on monthly data. The reduction in the importance of discount
volatility with longer return intervals is consistent with the De Long et al noise trader
model because some of the transient noise will be removed with longer return
intervals.
Cointegration analysis is useful in investigating the interaction between investment
trust share price and corresponding NAV that leads to discount volatility. For each
of the first ten trusts in the sample, it is shown that the trust's share price and the
underlying NAV are indeed cointegrated. This is consistent with the negative
autocorrelation in discounts reported in previous studies and explains why variance
of discount return is a less important component of total risk for longer return
intervals.
The covariance term is small but significantly greater than zero for the average trust,
which means that discounts tend to widen (or narrow) when the underlying NAV
falls (or rises). This is in stark contrast to the negative covariance term reported in
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Pontiff's study of US closed-end funds. So there is a tendency for investment trust
share prices to overreact to the fundamentals. This is true for monthly, three-monthly
and six-monthly returns taking the whole period of observation.
Splitting the 15 year period of observation (1982-96) into three five-year sub-periods
and comparing the variance components for the three periods highlights a number of
issues. Firstly, there appears to be a downward trend in discount volatility over time.
This probably reflects a growing awareness among market participants of successful
discount trading strategies together with a reduction in transaction costs. Secondly,
high (or low) discount volatility for a trust in one period is generally followed by
high (or low) discount volatility for the same trust in the subsequent period. Thirdly,
the covariance term is negative for the average trust in the first five-year period but
significantly positive in the second and third five-year periods. Thus, trust shares
were generally slow to react to changes in underlying NAVs before Big Bang in 1986
but generally overreacted to changes in NAVs in the 10 years following Big Bang.
This is consistent with the Lee et al investor sentiment theory in that there was
greater private shareholder involvement in investment trusts during the 10 year
period following Big Bang compared with the previous five years. However, there
was also a marked narrowing of the sector average discount over this period which is
contrary to what would be expected from investor sentiment theory.
Variance of share price return, variance of NAV return and variance of discount
return are all reduced if the exceptional month of October 1987 is excluded. The
average correlation coefficient between NAV returns and discount returns also
reduces substantially although it is still significantly positive for both the full 15 year
period of observation and the relevant five year sub-period. This reduction in the
importance of the covariance term suggests that the 'double whammy' effect may be
partly related to liquidity as one of the main features of the 1987 Crash was the
difficulty in being able to deal. It could be that the impact of noise traders on
discounts is exaggerated at times of poor market liquidity. Yet the five trusts
specialising in the Far East (including Japan) suffered a severe 'double whammy'
effect in October 1987 and the ownership of these trusts was predominantly
institutional. This suggests an institutional investor sentiment effect (a 'herd' instinct
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as it is sometimes described by practitioners) rather than an individual investor
sentiment effect.
Evidence of the 'double whammy' effect is stronger for international and
geographical specialist trusts than for UK trusts. Positive and significant correlation
coefficients are observed for each of the three sub-sectors for both the later 5-year
periods, with the exception of UK-invested trusts in the period 1/87 - 12/91, for
which the correlation coefficient is positive but not significant. If the existence of
noise traders is the underlying reason for the 'double whammy' effect, then why are
they more in evidence for trusts investing overseas? This is an interesting area for
further research.
One potential problem with the variance decomposition analysis is that short-term
volatilities in share prices are partly driven by technical factors related to market
imbalances (e.g. liquidity, bid-ask spreads). However, as the analysis is carried out
using monthly (or longer) return intervals rather than daily or weekly, this should not
influence the results to any great extent. Infrequent trading of shares (hence stale
prices) will also bias variance estimates but again this problem reduces as the return
interval increases, and it will also be less important for the larger more marketable
trusts which make up the sample.
NAV is derived from the underlying portfolio which contains shares whose prices
will have different degrees of staleness. So the NAV time series acts like a moving
average of past 'true' prices and may be artificially smooth as a result. Stale prices
for shares in the underlying portfolio will also tend to increase discount volatility and
will tend to make the covariance term more negative (or less positive). These effects
will be greater the higher the proportion of unquoted shares in the underlying
portfolio but again will have less impact with longer return intervals.
Another shortcoming of the analysis, which is true of all variance decomposition
studies, is that the variances are sample estimates of changing portfolios. As the
variances are affected by all the observations in the time series, they will be imperfect
estimates of the true variances. This holds true for both the variance of the trust
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share returns and the variance of NAV returns. Nevertheless, there is an implicit
assumption that the estimation problem will affect them identically. Clearly, this is
more of a problem with the analysis carried out over the entire 15 year period of
observation rather than the 5 year sub-periods.
The research could be extended to investigate further the underlying reason(s) for the
'double whammy' effect. A cross-sectional regression analysis with the correlation
coefficient (between NAV returns and discount returns) as the dependent variable
may shine light on the underlying reason(s) for the effect. The effect seems to be less
evident for UK trusts, so an obvious explanatory variable would be the percentage of
underlying assets held in the UK. Other explanatory variables could be: percentage
ofshares held by individuals (as implied by the individual investor sentiment theory)
and some measure of (or proxy for) liquidity such as ln(market value).
A future research question which is raised by the analysis is whether a decision rule
based not only on the level of the discount but also based on exploiting the positive
covariance term might be successful. Trusts on wide discounts would only be
purchased when the NAV has risen x% and trusts on narrow discounts would only be
sold if the NAV has fallen x%. Another decision rule which could be tested is one
based not only the level of the discount but also on the level of discount volatility.
According to the investor sentiment theory, trusts with high discount volatility should
stand on wide discounts because the risk of discounts widening is cross-sectionally
correlated and therefore priced in equilibrium. Thus, trusts on wide (or narrow)
discounts would only be purchased (or sold) if their historic discount volatility were
below (or above) a certain level. Both such decision rules could be tested over the
years since the end of the period of observation for this thesis (31 December 1996).
To sum up, the results of the variance decomposition analysis contradict the efficient
market model but are consistent with the noise trader model. There is strong
evidence of excess volatility (trust share returns are more volatile than NAV returns)
and a 'double whammy' effect (discount returns and NAV returns are positively
correlated).
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7.2 CONVENTIONAL TRUSTS: DISCOUNT VOLATILITY
The persistence of high or low discount volatility for individual trusts that was
observed over the three 5 year sub-periods in the variance decomposition analysis
suggests that discount volatility may be predictable. Furthermore, the considerable
cross-sectional variation in discount volatility indicates that a cross-sectional
regression analysis may be worthwhile. In particular, such an analysis may help to
explain one of the main parts of the discount puzzle - why discounts fluctuate so
widely over time.
To try and explain the cross-sectional variation in discount volatility, a sample
consisting of 59 UK conventional investment trusts in continuous operation over the
five years from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1996 is examined. Discount
volatility is calculated using monthly intervals. Trust attributes chosen as
explanatory variables in the analysis influence discount volatility either through share
price returns or through NAV returns. The chosen variables in the first category are:
trust share turnover, ln(market value), ln(unadjusted share price), percentage of
shares held by individuals and percentage of underlying assets in the UK. The
chosen variables in the second category are: standard deviation of NAV return,
gearing and percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted.
Four explanatory variables are highly significant - trust share turnover, standard
deviation ofNAV return, ln(market value) and percentage of underlying assets which
are unquoted. With only these four explanatory variables in the regression equation,
the adjusted R-square is as high as 0.74. The first two of these significant variables -
trust share turnover and standard deviation of NAV return - are significant in
Hoskin's study of US closed-end funds. However, the third and fourth significant
variables - ln(market value) and percentage of underlying assets which are unquoted
- are not even included as explanatory variables in the US study.
The likely reasons for the significance of the four explanatory variables in the current
study are as follows. Trust share turnover, sometimes known as trading velocity,
proxies for information flow which is the central driving force for share price
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movements. Standard deviation ofNAV return proxies for both the ability and the
need to hedge underlying net assets from the discount anomaly trader's perspective.
Ln(Market value) proxies for marketability, and the more marketable the trust shares,
the narrower the discount arbitrage bounds. Percentage of underlying assets which
are unquoted is significant because valuations of unquoted assets tend to be historic
which reduces the correlation between share price returns and NAV returns. There is
no evidence that either individual investor sentiment or UK specific sentiment has
any impact on discount volatility.
There is a correlation coefficient of 0.58 between trust share turnover and standard
deviation ofNAV return, so the coefficients for these variables may be unreliable due
to multicollinearity. The Belsley condition index for the four variables confirms that
multicollinearity is a problem. On examination of the variance proportions, the
variables causing most collinearity are trust share turnover and standard deviation of
NAV return, as expected.
To test the stability of the regression coefficients for the four variables, the period of
observation is split into two equal sub-periods, and regressions are run for these two
30 month periods separately. All four explanatory variables are highly significant for
both sub-periods as was the case for the full 5 year period but the coefficient of the
variable percentage ofunderlying assets which are unquoted is shown to be unstable;
this is not surprising as there is little cross-sectional variation in this variable.
It would be interesting to re-run the regressions using data covering the period
starting at the end of the period of observation in this thesis (31 December 1996) to
the present. Are the same four explanatory variables significant and is their relative
importance stable over time? Another interesting area for further research would be
to examine the time series behaviour of discount volatility, trust share turnover and
standard deviation of NAV return. This may throw light on their stability and
behaviour.4
4 For example, rolling discount volatility could be examined. Drop out the first observation and add
the next, calculate and then repeat procedure.
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So why are discounts so volatile? The results suggest that the main driving forces for
discount volatility are, firstly, new information hitting the market (trust share
turnover was used in the analysis as a proxy) and, secondly, volatility of NAV
returns. Discount arbitrage traders try to take advantage of discount anomalies but
they have limited time horizons and their activities are restricted, especially in the
case of less marketable investment trusts for which transaction costs are relatively
high. Individual investor sentiment does not seem to be the cause of discount
volatility.
Overall, the results of the analysis relating to conventional trusts in this thesis are
consistent with the noise trader model but do not lend support to the Lee et al
investor sentiment theory for closed-end funds.
7.3 SPLIT CAPITAL TRUSTS: SENSITIVITY MEASURES
The concepts of duration and volatility have long been applied to bonds and since the
1970s, the concept of duration has been applied to equities. Duration effectively
measures the sensitivity of a security's value to changes in the nominal interest rate.
A more recent development has been the derivation of 'sensitivity measures' for
equities (Adams and Booth, 1995) which measure the sensitivity of equity values to
small changes in a number of underlying fundamental variables, not just the nominal
discount rate.
Sensitivity measures for split capital investment trusts are derived in this thesis.
They show how the present value of expected future cash flows will vary as the real
discount rate changes, the real growth of income or capital value of the underlying
fund changes and the estimated rate of inflation changes. Thus, they can be used to
compare the sensitivity of different split securities to small changes in a particular
underlying fundamental variable.
Sensitivity with respect to a particular variable is approximately equal to the
weighted average of the durations of the component cash flows which are sensitive to
that variable. The weights are the present values (positive or negative) of the
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component cash flows. If the sensitivity measures are developed in continuous time,
the relationship holds exactly.
In developing formulae for sensitivity measures, attention is focused on two
straightforward types of split trusts: traditional splits, consisting of income shares and
capital shares, and quasi-splits consisting of zero dividend preference shares (ZDPs)
and income & residual capital shares.
The main shortcoming of sensitivity measures is that they do not take into account
the option element of splits. In other words, they are strictly valid only in the case of
split trusts for which it is very likely that the income shares (traditional splits) or
ZDPs (quasi-splits) will be repaid at their full final redemption value. However, this
condition will generally hold for splits launched at lower stock market levels than
present, unless there has been a capital reconstruction.
For all the securities considered, real discount rate sensitivity is negative and
increases with period to wind-up due to the increase in duration. Inflation rate
sensitivity is negative for income shares and for ZDPs because the redemption
payment is a fixed nominal amount. However, inflation rate sensitivity is positive for
capital shares and for income & residual capital shares because the real value of the
fixed nominal amount paid to the prior capital on wind-up is reduced by an increase
in expected inflation.
Capital shares (traditional splits) and income & residual capital shares (quasi-splits)
are particularly sensitive to the growth rate of the underlying fund due to the effect of
gearing. The sensitivity measures enable analysts to compare the sensitivity of such
securities to small changes in the estimated rate of inflation and also, separately, to
compare their sensitivity to small changes in the projected real growth rate of the
underlying fund.
The response of income shares, capital shares and ZDPs to simultaneous changes in
the real discount rate and the expected inflation rate3 is tested empirically using ten
5
Changes in the real discount rate and the expected inflation rate are obtained from the gilt market.
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six-month periods covering the five years up to 31 December 1996. This is carried
out by calculating the correlation coefficient between the actual percentage change in
price and the percentage change in price predicted by the sensitivity measures. There
is a very strong positive correlation coefficient for the ZDPs examined. There is also
some evidence of positive correlation between the percentage change in share price
and the percentage change predicted by the sensitivity measures for income shares
and for capital shares. So there is some support for the use of sensitivity measures in
the risk assessment of splits. However, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions in
the case of capital shares because (undetectable) changes in the growth prospects of
shares in the underlying portfolio can translate into very sharp changes in the real
growth rate expectations of the underlying fund up to redemption, and hence can
cause significant changes in the prices of capital shares.
Split trusts with more than two classes of shares, with bank borrowing or with other
more complicated structures are not considered. However, sensitivity measures
could be calculated for many of these structures. But again, the approach is strictly
valid only if it is very likely that prior capital will be repaid at the full final
redemption value.
An interesting area for future research would be to use a simulation approach which
properly incorporates the option characteristics of split securities but which still
allows the sensitivity with respect to the underlying fundamental variables to be
measured. Another possible line of research would be to examine the historic
standard deviations of and correlations between interest rates and inflation to
generate measures of 'typical' shocks, and then to show their effect on the present
value of different split securities. In this respect, impulse response simulation may
be used to measure how an inflation and/or interest rate shock affects split securities.
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APPENDIX 1 - The Market Model
It is well known that when a stock market goes up, most shares within that market
tend to increase in price, and when a stock market goes down, most shares tend to
decrease in price. Sharpe (1963) suggested that this common response to market
changes could be written mathematically as:
Ri, = ai + PiRmt + eit (A-1)
where
Ru is the return on the ith share in period t.
Rm is the return on the market index in period t.
a, is the constant return unique to share i.
Pi is a measure of the sensitivity of the return on share i to the return on the
market index.
eit is the random residual error in period t, assumed to be independently and
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance.
Equation (A.l) describes what is known as the Market Model. It requires that the
only common factor affecting all securities is the return on the market index. All
shares, to a greater or lesser extent, tend to move with the market.
Although Pi is generally defined in terms of monthly returns, it really reflects
relationships among expectations about the values of fundamental economic
variables over the long term.
It follows from equation (A.l) that:
=P*°l+°2{ei) (A-2)
where
erf is the variance of return on share i.
cr2m is the variance of return on the market index.
<j2 (ei) is the variance of the error term.
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The parameters ait fy and <r(e,) for share i may be estimated by studying the
historical relationship between the returns on share i and the returns on the market
index. Ri is plotted against Rm for a number of periods (say every month for 5 years)
and a 'best fit' line is drawn through the points using regression analysis. The
gradient of the line is an estimate of /), and the intercept with the y-axis is an estimate
of a,. The scatter of points about the regression line represents the residual variation
in returns after removing the market effect.
The first term on the right hand side of equation (A.2), (32a2m, known as systematic
or market risk, is related to fluctuations of the market as a whole and cannot be
eliminated by diversification. Thus, this type of risk is important to institutional
investors, as they hold diversified portfolios. The second term on the right hand side
of equation (A.2), a2 (e{), known as non-systematic or specific risk, can be
eliminated by diversification; this type of risk is unique to the company or its
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APPENDIX 3 - Sample for Components of Total Risk
Trust Mnemonic
Alliance Trust PLC atst
American Trust PLC amts
Anglo & Overseas Trust PLC aot
Bankers Investment Trust PLC bnkr
Baring Tribune Investment Trust PLC bti
British Assets Trust PLC bset
British Investment trust PLC bits
Brunner Investment Trust PLC but
Dunedin Income Growth Inv Tst PLC dig
Dunedin Smaller Co's Inv Tst PLC dndl
Dunedin Worldwide Inv Trust PLC dww
Edinburgh Investment Trust PLC edin
Electric&General Investment Co PLC elgn
English & Scottish Investors PLC ensc
Fleming American Inv Trust PLC fam
Fleming Claverhouse Inv Trust PLC fcv
Fleming Continental Euro Inv Tst fut
Fleming Far Eastern Inv Trust PLC ffe
Fleming Japanese Inv Trust PLC flmj
Fleming Mercantile Inv Trust PLC fmn
Fleming Overseas Inv Trust PLC fov
Foreign & Col Invest Trust PLC frcl
Foreign & Col. Pacific Inv Tst PLC fcp
Foreign & Colonial Smaller Co's PLC fcs
G.T.Japan Investment Trust PLC gtja
Govett Oriental Inv Trust PLC gor
Govett Strategic Inv Trust PLC gvs
Kleinwort Charter Inv Trust PLC klc
Kleinwort Overseas Inv Trust PLC kos
Merchants Trust PLC mrch
Mercury Keystone Investment Tst PLC mki
Monks Investment Trust PLC mnks
Murray Income Trust PLC mut
Murray International Trust PLC myi
Murray Smaller Markets Trust PLC msm
Murray Ventures PLC mvn
Overseas Investment Trust PLC oit
Scottish American Investment Co PLC scam
Scottish Eastern Inv Trust PLC scea
Scottish Investment Trust PLC scin
Scottish Mortgage & Trust PLC smt
Second Alliance Trust PLC sat
Securities Trust of Scotland PLC sts
St Andrew Trust PLC srw
Temple Bar Investment Trust PLC tmpl
Throgmorton Trust PLC thrg
TR City of London Trust PLC trcd
TR Property Investment Trust PLC try
TR Smaller Companies Inv Trust PLC tru
Witan Investment Co PLC wtan
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APPENDIX 4A - Test for Unit Root for P, and A,
ADF (order 5)
Monthly
Critical values: 5% = -2.879; 1% = -3.471
Trust Pt At 1nPt lnlr
ATST 0.7611 0.6701 -1.2963 -1.3663
AMTS 0.2149 0.3202 -0.8728 -0.8028
AOT -0.0602 0.0337 -1.5141 -1.5179
BNKR 0.2209 0.6353 -1.6213 -1.5347
BTI -0.1230 0.0566 -1.9731 -1.9425
BSET -1.5228 -1.7727 -2.6004 -2.7555
BITS 0.0643 0.1091 -1.6206 -1.5350
BUT 0.1277 0.6909 -1.4193 -1.5608
DIG -0.9070 -0.7756 -2.7417 -2.5933
DNDL -1.5445 -1.5758 -2.0275 -1.8953
Three-monthly
Critical values: 5% = -2.915; 1% = -3.552
Trust Pt At InPt ln/1,
ATST 0.6725 0.6492 -1.7214 -1.6461
AMTS 0.7152 0.8421 -0.6986 -0.5654
AOT 0.1191 0.2079 -1.6202 -1.5629
BNKR 0.7726 0.9521 -1.5395 -1.5676
BTI 0.0292 0.2606 -2.1927 -1.9442
BSET -1.5745 -1.6954 -2.6499 -2.7589
BITS 0.0643 0.1091 -1.6206 -1.5350
BUT 0.4895 0.3931 -1.1554 -1.3477
DIG -0.7784 -0.7189 -2.3781 -2.1777
DNDL -1.3821 -1.4816 -1.9357 -1.7561
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Six-monthly
Critical values: 5% = -2.971; 1% = -3.685
Trust Pt At InPt lii/l,
ATST 1.0708 1.2671 -1.6485 -1.3436
AMTS 0.3590 0.4591 -1.1096 -0.9253
AOT -0.1034 0.0175 -1.8035 -1.6980
BNKR 0.4770 0.7151 -1.6836 -1.7442
BTI -0.2258 0.0342 -2.3950 -2.2213
BSET -1.6324 -1.8787 -2.3931 -2.7792
BITS 0.1103 0.1580 -1.7833 -1.6810
BUT 0.1063 0.1480 -1.3229 -1.5218
DIG -0.9085 -0.8043 -2.6533 -2.4013
DNDL -1.4299 -1.4716 -2.2430 -1.9555
For monthly, three-monthly and six-monthly returns we fail to reject the null
hypothesis of unit root in each case. Therefore, the series are 1(1) which is a
necessary condition for cointegration.
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APPENDIX 4B - Test for Unit Root for Residuals
Pt = a + (3A, + £,
ln(Pt) = a + /3ln(Al) + et
ADF (order 5)
Monthly






































The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for all the series considered. This
implies that the error term from the estimated cointegrating vector is stationary.
Therefore, P, and At are cointegrated.
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APPENDIX 5 - Sample for Cross-sectional Analysis of Discount Volatility
Trust Mnemonic
Abtrust New Dawn Inv Trust PLC abd
American Trust PLC amts
Anglo & Overseas Trust PLC aot
Bankers Investment Trust PLC bnkr
Baring Tribune Investment Trust PLC bti
British Assets Trust PLC bset
British Empire Sec & General TstPLC btem
Dartmoor Investment Trust PLC dit
Edinburgh Dragon Trust PLC efm
Edinburgh Investment Trust PLC edin
Electra Investment Trust PLC elta
English & Scottish Investors PLC ensc
Fidelity European Values PLC fev
Fleming American Inv Trust PLC fam
Fleming Continental Euro Inv Tst fut
Fleming Emerging Mkts Inv Tst PLC fern
Fleming European Fledgling Inv Tst fef
Fleming Far Eastern Inv Trust PLC ffe
Fleming Japanese Inv Trust PLC flmj
Fleming Mercantile Inv Trust PLC fmn
Fleming Overseas Inv Trust PLC fov
Foreign &Col EmergingMktslnvTstPLC fct
Foreign & Col Enterprise Tst PLC feet
Foreign & Col Invest Trust PLC frcl
Foreign & Col. German Inv Tst PLC fcg
Foreign & Col. Pacific Inv Tst PLC fcp
Foreign & Colonial Eurotrust PLC feu
Foreign & Colonial Smaller Cos PLC fes
G.T.Japan Investment Trust PLC gtja
Gartmore Emerging Pacific Inv Tst gtm
Govett Oriental Inv Trust PLC gor
Govett Strategic Inv Trust PLC gvs
INVESCO English & Intl.Trust PLC iei
Kleinwort Charter Inv Trust PLC klc
Kleinwort Overseas Inv Trust PLC kos
Merchants Trust PLC mrch
Monks Investment Trusts PLC mnks
Moorgate Smaller Co's Inc Trust PLC mgs
Morgan Grenfell Equity Inc Tst PLC mge
Murray Income Trust PLC mut
Murray International Trust PLC myi
Murray Smaller Markets Trust PLC msm
Overseas Investment Trust PLC oit
RIT Capital Partners PLC rep
Scottish American Investment Co PLC scam
Scottish Eastern Inv Trust PLC scea
Scottish Investment Trust PLC scin
Scottish Mortgage & Trust PLC smt
Securities Trust of Scotland PLC sts
Smaller Companies Inv Trust PLC smc
Temple Bar Investment Trust PLC tmpl
Templeton Emerging Markets IT PLC tern
Throgmorton Trust PLC thrg
TR City of London Trust PLC trcd
TR Pacific Investment Trust PLC trv
TR Property Investment Trust PLC try
TR Smaller Companies Inv Trust PLC tru
Value & Income Trust PLC vin
Witan Investment Co PLC wtan
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APPENDIX 6A - Hurdle Rates for Traditional Split Capital Trusts
TRADITIONAL SPLIT CAPITAL TRUSTS
(with no warrants outstanding)
Wind-up date Hurdle
Earliest Latest** Rate %
Aberforth Split Level 1.7.00 30.6.04 -36.7
Archimedes 30.9.98 30.9.03 -37.3
Derby* 1.1.99 31.12.03 -33.0
F&C Special Utilities 24.8.03 na -12.5
Jove 1.1.95 31.12.99 -20.9
Lloyds Smaller Cos 30.4.02 na -58.9
M&G Dual 31.12.94 31.12.96 0.0
M&G Second Dual 1.12.95 01.12.97 -87.9
MCIT 'S' 1.12.07 na -4.0
Save & Prosper Linked 1.1.95 01.1.97 -99.9
TOR 1.8.01 any -31.7
Source: NatWest Securities Daily NAV Service, 22 August 1996
* With Derby Trust, income shares are repayable after loan and debenture securities.
** The latest wind-up date is always used in the calculations in Chapter 6. The
income shareholders will require their high level of income for the maximum length
of time. The capital shareholders normally do not want their trust to be wound up
early because they would incur capital gains tax. And the managers want their
management fees for as long as possible.
Hurdle rate is the required annual growth rate of total assets to pay the full
redemption amount of the income shares. In most cases, there is a large negative
hurdle rate implying that it is extremely likely that the income shares will be repaid at
their full final redemption amount.
Sensitivity measures can also be calculated for the following split capital trusts:
MCIT; Rights & Issues; Venturi. They have no warrants outstanding but the
repayment terms are more complicated than those for traditional split capital trusts.
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APPENDIX 6B - Hurdle Rates for Quasi-split Trusts
QUASI-SPLIT TRUSTS
(with no warrants outstanding)
Wind-up date Hurdle
Rate %
Abtrust Preferred 31.5.98 -16.1
Edinburgh Income 1.5.00 -3.1
Finsbury Smaller Cos 17.12.99 -36.8
Fleming Inc & Cap 3.3.02 -9.4
Fleming Int. High Inc. 5.10.96 -96.5
Friends Provident Ethical 31.12.01 -0.3
Gartmore Brit I & G 18.12.02 -0.6
Henderson Eurotrust 31.10.02 -15.2
Hong Kong 31.12.96 -84.5
HTR Income & Growth 8.3.03 -6.4
Invesco Blue Chip 10.5.98 -7.2
Invesco Recovery 18.11.98 -11.7
Ivory & Sime Optimum 26.3.97 -57.1
Johnson Fry Euro. 31.7.04 -4.6
Johnson Fry 2nd Util. 31.12.03 -4.3
Johnson Fry Utilities 31.7.03 -8.4
Kleinwort High Inc. 30.6.98 -18.9
Source: NatWest Securities Daily NAY Service, 22 August 1996
Hurdle rate is the required annual growth rate of total assets to pay the full
redemption amount of the ZDPs. In most cases there is a large negative hurdle rate
implying that the ZDPs will be repaid at their full final redemption amount.
Sensitivity measures can also be calculated for the following quasi-split trusts: Exeter
Preferred; Gartmore Shared; Jupiter Geared. They have no warrants outstanding but
the repayment terms are more complicated than those for the normal quasi-splits in
the above table.
192
IMA Journal ofMathematics Applied in Business and Industry (1999) 10, 1-18
Sensitivity measures for split-capital investment trusts
Andrew T. Adams
Department ofBusiness Studies, University ofEdinburgh, Old College, South Bridge
Edinburgh, EH8 9YL
[Received ??? and in revised form ???]
Statistical measures of risk based on historical data are useful tools in assessing risk
for conventional investment trust securities; but they are of limited use for securities of
split-capital investment trusts, and an alternative approach is proposed in this paper. By
differentiating formulae for the valuation of discounted cash flow, with respect to the
underlying fundamental variables, 'sensitivity measures' can be derived for most securities
of split capital investment trusts. These sensitivity measures show how the present value
of expected future cash flows will vary as the real discount force changes, the real force of
increase in the income (or capital value) of the underlying fund changes, and the estimated
force of inflation changes.
1. Introduction
Investment trusts are publicly quoted UK companies whose assets consist of a portfolio of
shares or other securities. They enable investors to purchase an interest in a professionally
managed fund. Ultimate responsibility for running the affairs of an investment trust
lies with the board of directors, but day-to-day management is normally delegated to
professional investment managers.
Split-capital investment trusts (splits) are a special type of investment trust, having
more than one main class of share capital. Expected cash flows for a class of capital may
be defined in nominal terms, or may depend on the income growth or capital growth of the
underlying fund. Their innovative capital structures attempt to match the risk, income, and
tax preferences of different types of potential investor. The great majority of splits invest
entirely in the UK. They are designed to be wound up by some future date, with most
splits having an original term of seven to ten years.1 On wind-up, the trusts assets are sold,
and the proceeds are used to pay off the various classes of share capital after meeting the
entitlements of holders ofdebt, if any. However, shareholders may be given the opportunity
to roll over their investment at the end of its life.
Many split-capital trusts were created in the late 1980s or early 1990s—a period
characterized by high levels of inflation by recent standards. The subsequent reduction
in inflation and interest rates had a considerable impact on certain types of split securities
due to their inbuilt gearing. This brought home the risks inherent in many split securities,
and highlighted the need for statistics that would measure the impact of changes in the
underlying fundamental variables on different split securities.
1 Most splits have a fixed wind-up date, but for some splits there may be a range of wind-up dates, and the life
of others may be extended if an extension resolution is passed.
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Statistical measures of risk, such as standard deviation of returns, which are normally
based on historical data, are useful tools for conventional trusts but are of little use for
splits. The limited life of splits means that the risk profile of their securities change over
time, and analysts are often more concerned with sensitivity to the underlying fundamental
variables. However, it is possible to gain an insight into the risk of many split securities
using 'sensitivity measures' which were developed for equities in general by Adams &
Booth (1995). These show the proportionate change in the present value of a security
caused by a small change in each of the underlying fundamental variables. In other
words, they show how various split securities should behave in response to changes in
the underlying fundamental variables. In practice, of course, split security prices will also
fluctuate with market sentiment, which we do not consider here.
Split-capital investment trusts are complex, but ultimately they just divide up the
returns from the underlying portfolio of investments in a particular way. Sensitivity of the
individual split securities with respect to a given fundamental variable (and weighted by
their present values) should therefore add up to the sensitivity of the underlying portfolio
of investments with respect to that variable.
There are two main types of split: 'traditional splits' and 'quasi-splits'. Simple
valuation models are developed for traditional split securities in Section 2, and for quasi-
split securities in Section 3. Estimation of the fundamental variables which determine the
present values of split securities is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 demonstrates that all
the basic split securities consist of one or more of three types of component cash flow. This
helps in the development of sensitivity measures for split securities, which is covered in
Sections 6, 7, and 8. Section 9 is the conclusion.
2. Traditional splits
A basic traditional split has its ordinary share capital divided into two distinct categories:
income shares and capital shares. Holders of income shares are entitled to all the distributed
income and a predetermined capital repayment on liquidation. Holders of capital shares
receive no income, but are entitled to the remaining assets on liquidation after the income
shares have been redeemed.2 Thus, the traditional split allows investors to satisfy their
divergent preferences for the income and capital-gain components of return from an
investment fund. It can also lead to problems for the managers, however, given the
inherent conflict between the interests of income shareholders and the interests of capital
shareholders. The pursuit of high income normally leads to lower capital growth. The
structure and management of dual-purpose funds (the US equivalents of traditional splits)
are discussed by Litzenberger & Sosin (1977).3
Capital shares are effectively European call options on the underlying fund, with the
predetermined capital repayment of income shares providing the exercise price of the
2 The Statement of Recommended Practice for the Financial Statements of Investment Trust Companies
(AITC 1995) recommends that: 'Investment management fees should be allocated between capital and revenue
in accordance with the board's expected long-term split of returns, in the form of capital gains and income
respectively, from the entire investment portfolio of the investment trust company'.
3 US dual-purpose funds were dependent on a tax loophole which was closed in 1989. As a result, no new
dual purpose funds may be established in the US. All the original dual-purpose funds have now been liquidated
or converted to open-end status in accordance with rules laid down in their original charters.
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options. The holders of income shares effectively own the underlying fund but are also
writers of the call options (Ingersoll 1976). In this paper we only consider trusts in which
the capital shares are deep in the money, as is normally the case (see Appendix 1), so
that the call options have negligible time value, and an approach based on option theory
is not required for either the capital shares or the income shares. Valuation formulae for
European options, such as that of Black & Scholes, are derived by calculating the price at
which an option would have to stand in the market to allow a risk-free 'hedge' between
the option and the underlying asset.4 As a result, many of the fundamental variables (see
Section 4) which are important for risk-assessment purposes are not explicitly present in
such formulae, and so the 'sensitivities' derived from the Black-Scholes formula (such as
delta, theta, and kappa—see Hull 1997) are of limited use from the point of view of risk
assessment.5
Even before the introduction of a gilt-strips market in 1997, risk-free spot rates6 have
been readily available from the gilt market, enabling cash flows from securities at different
times to be valued at different appropriate discount rates (including risk premiums). This
information could be used in valuing split securities to make discount rates vary with
the term of the dividend or capital payment—and, of course, this would be an important
consideration in valuing the capital-share option if it were less deeply in the money. But,
in practice, redemption yields or present values based on fixed discount rates are used by
investment analysts in assessing split capital securities, and this approach is convenvenient
for calculating sensitivity measures in this paper. We are effectively assuming a flat spot-
rate curve for gilts.
There may be other types of security in the capital structure of traditional splits—
including zero-dividend preference shares (see subsection 3.1), stepped preferences
shares7, and warrants8. The purpose of issuing zero-dividend preference shares or stepped
preference shares is to add gearing to the capital shares; the capital shares receive what is
left (if anything) after all classes of prior capital have been paid their redemption values.
We will not consider these more complicated capital structures further, but the approach to
risk analysis in this paper may be applied to these more complicated structures, provided
that the capital-share options (and warrants, if any) are deep in the money.
To simplify the discussion, we assume that the number of income shares is equal to the
number of capital shares within the capital structure of the trust in question. Inflation, real
growth of dividends and real growth of the underlying fund are all assumed to be constant.
To simplify the mathematics, we will work in continuous time rather than in discrete time.
4 Estimation of the parameters in the Black-Scholes model applied to splits is reasonably straightforward. For
example, volatility can be estimated from the standard deviation of the return on the trust's fund, which itself can
be linked to the variances and covariances of the returns on the individual investments which comprise the fund
by use of mean-variance portfolio theory.
5 One use of these Black-Scholes sensitivities from the point of view of the managers of a traditional split
trust would arise if they were thinking ofdisposing of certain investments and buying others as replacements. The
change in volatility could be estimated prior to any action, and the consequent effect on the value of the capital
shares deduced by calculating kappa.
6 A spot rate is a rate paid when money is borrowed now to be repaid at a single date in the future.
7 Stepped preference shares pay dividends which rise at a predetermined rate, together with a fixed capital
sum when the trust is wound up.
8 Warrants are effectively long-term call options. They give the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy
shares (normally capital shares) at a predetermined price on one or more future dates.
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2.1 Income shares
Income shares receive all the income generated by the trust's underlying portfolio, so they
are suitable for investors who require a high income. Some income shares are entitled to
a substantial fixed capital repayment when the trust is wound up, whereas others are more
like annuities, with very little capital repayment.
Dividends from the equities in the underlying portfolio are paid out of profits which,
in the medium term, tend to increase as the general level of prices increases, plus any real
growth. The absolute level of dividend growth of the income shares thus depends on the
level of future inflation. So, in valuing the dividends from the income shares, it is helpful
to work in real terms rather than in nominal terms.
The present value of an income share is given by
rm
Vo= Doe~^~y)'df + Re~(s+^m,
Jo
where Do is the rate of payment of dividend per year per income share at time 0
(assumed payable continuously);
Y is the estimated real force of increase per annum in dividends (a force
implies continuous compounding)
<5 is the real force of discount per annum, assumed to apply to all cash flows;
<p is the estimated force of inflation per annum;
m is the period in years before the income shares are redeemed;
R is the redemption amount for each income share after m years.
Evaluating the integral gives
i
_ p-tiS-yVn
V0 = D0 + Re~(S+*)m. (1)
S-y
2.2 Capital shares
Capital shares receive the remaining assets of a traditional split-capital trust at the wind-
up date, after all other classes of capital have received their entitlement. They receive no
income, so their return depends entirely on the growth of underlying assets up to the wind-
up date. Again, we assume that there is little doubt that there will be sufficient assets at the
wind-up date to pay the entitlement of the income shares.
The present value of a capital share is;
y0 = Aoe~<-s'<)m - /?e-(i+^)m, (2)
where: Ao is the value of the fund at time 0 per capital share;
f is the estimated real force of growth per annum of the fund;
R is the redemption amount of the income shares per capital share9;
8, <p and m are defined as in subsection 2.1.
9 This is the same as the redemption amount per income share, because we have assumed that the number of
capital shares is equal to the number of income shares.
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3. Quasi-splits
Quasi-splits (also known as 'hybrid splits', 'new splits', or 'highly geared splits') always
have zero-dividend preference shares (ZDPs, see below) in issue, but there is only one
class of ordinary share capital, namely income-and-residual-capital shares (I&RCs). When
such a trust is wound up, ZDPs are repaid first. The I&RCs effectively own the underlying
fund less the discounted redemption amount of the ZDPs, but also hold a European put
option on the underlying fund with exercise price equal to the redemption amount of the
ZDPs. Holders of the ZDPs are writers of the put options, with the exercise price of the put
equal to the redemption amount of the ZDPs; the fair value of the ZDPs is the discounted
redemption amount less the value of the put option which they have written. Again, we
only consider trusts in which the put option is of negligible value, as is often the case (see
Appendix 2), so that option-valuation models are not required. We also assume a flat spot-
rate curve for gilts as in Section 2. Quasi-splits with additional types of securities, such as
stepped preference shares or warrants, are not considered.
To simplify the discussion, we assume that the number of ZDPs is equal to the number
of I&RCs. Inflation, real growth of dividends, and real growth of the underlying fund are
all assumed to be constant. Again, to simplify the mathematics, we will work in continuous
time rather than in discrete time.
3.1 Zero-dividend preference shares
Zero-dividend preference shares pay a fixed capital sum on a fixed date (or on any earlier
winding up) before any distribution can be made to ordinary shareholders. They have
no entitlement to income, so that (importantly) there is no liability to income tax. Zero-
coupon bonds (or low-coupon bonds) do not offer this tax advantage. The main influence
on the prices of ZDPs is movement in the prices of gilts with similar duration.10 The
comparison with gilts has been simplified by the introduction of a gilt-strips market in
1997. This effectively means that market prices and redemption yields of zero-coupon
gilts are available for comparative purposes, although tax differences with ZDPs as well as
the appropriate risk premium for different ZDPs need careful consideration.
ZDPs are attractive to investors who need a fixed sum at a future point in time and are
able to use their annual exemption allowance to avoid capital-gains tax. If sums of money
are required at different points in time, an appropriate portfolio of ZDPs could be created.
The present value of a ZDP is given by
P0 = /?e~(S+0)m, (3)
where: R is the redemption amount of the ZDP;
m is the period (in years) before the ZDPs are redeemed;
5 and 0 are defined as above.
10 Duration may be defined as the weighted average of the times of receipts of payments, where the weights
are equal to the present value of those payments.
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3.2 Income-and-residual-capital shares
Income-and-residual-capital shares (also known as 'highly geared ordinary income
shares') offer high income plus all the remaining assets of a quasi-split trust at the wind-up
date, after the ZDPs have received their capital entitlement. They might be looked upon
as ordinary shares partly financed through borrowing. Valuing these shares requires an
estimate of both income growth and growth of the underlying assets up to the wind-up
date. The same real force of discount will be used for income and capital.
The present value of an I&RC is given by:
rm
V0 = D0e-(S-y)'dt + Aoe'(S~a' - /?e"(,5+0)m,
Jo
where Do, Aq, R, m, y, £, 8, and <p are all defined as above. Thus
1 _ p-(8-y)m
v0 = Do + Aoe-(i-f)m - Re~{S+4,)m. (4)
8 — y
4. Estimating the fundamental variables
4.1 Real force ofdiscount per annum (8)
The real force of discount per annum is the real force of return required by investors, which
is approximately equal to the required real rate of return. This will depend on the risk-free
real rate of return (perhaps obtained from the index-linked gilt market) and the required
risk premium.11 It may be appropriate to use different risk premiums for different split
securities. It may be argued further that different types of cash flow (e.g. bond-type income
as against equity-type income) from a particular split security should be valued using
different real discount rates. These complications will not be considered further in this
paper, although refinements that deal with this point could be introduced into the models
derived in later sections.
4.2 Real force of increase per annum in dividends (y)
Force of increase in real dividends of the income shares (traditional split) or I&RCs (quasi-
split) are directly related to the real growth of dividends from the underlying fund which
will normally be invested in UK equities. Consideration of real dividend growth from the
UK equity market may therefore provide a useful starting point in the estimation procedure.
It must be remembered, however, that past dividend growth may have been financed partly
by a general reduction in dividend cover, which in turn may have been influenced by factors
such as taxation and dividend controls. Real dividend growth from the UK equity market
has been 2.1% p.a. over the last fifty years.12
" The risk premium can be assessed using the investor's own judgement or can be estimated from similar
securities, given their market prices.
12 Based on the notional dividend of the FTSE-Actuaries All-Share Index from 1962, and on the BZW Equity
Index before then. For the future, ACT and tax-credit changes may lead to an increase in retentions, and the current
emphasis on 'buy-backs' as an alternative to dividends for many companies requires careful consideration.
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Table 1
Cash flow Present value
J _ Q-(S-y)m
Stream of dividends for m years Wi = Do
<5 - y
Nominal amount R after m years W2 = Re — £e_pm, where p = S + <p
Value of fund after m years (per share) Wj =
4.3 Real force ofgrowth per annum of the fund (£)
This estimate is clearly of crucial importance in the valuation of capital shares (traditional
splits) and I&RCs (quasi-splits). Real growth of an appropriate index may provide a useful
tentative starting point in the estimation procedure. However, growth in capital values will
partly depend on changing levels of retentions and yields. The UK equity market has given
real growth in capital values of 1.7% p.a. over the last fifty years.13
4.4 Force of inflation per annum (<f>)
The market's estimate of the future rate of inflation may be derived from the gilt market.
A first-order estimate is simply the redemption yield on conventional gilts less the real
redemption yield14 on index-linked gilts of similar duration. An adjustment is then required
to reflect the different risk premiums on the different types of instrument and various
technical factors (Deacon & Derry 1994). Investors can make further adjustments in line
with their own views of the future course of the economy.
5. The component cash flows of the basic split securities
Examination of equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) shows that all the basic split securities
considered in this paper can be thought of as consisting of one or more of the three
component cash flows (positive or negative), with present values W\, W2, and W3, shown
in Table 1.
Thus:
present value (PV) of income share = W\ + W2\
PV of capital share = W2 — W2\
PV of ZDP = W2;
PV of I&RC = Wi + 1V3 - W2.
It is useful to treat split securities as consisting of these component cash flows when
deriving their sensitivity measures in the following sections.
13 Based on the FTSE-Actuaries All-Share Index from 1962, and on the BZW Equity Price Index before then.
Since the latter index excludes small companies, the stated historic growth rate is a slight underestimate.
14 The real redemption yield itself requires an inflation assumption.
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6. Sensitivity measures
Sensitivity measures for equity investments were developed by Adams & Booth (1995).
They are an extension to the concept of 'duration', which is commonly used for fixed-
interest bonds and has also been applied to the analysis of equities (see, for example,
Boquist et al. 1975). Duration is defined as the weighted average of the times of receipts
from an investment, where the weights are equal to the present value of the payments.
Duration is effectively amathematical measure of the sensitivity of an investment's value to
changes in the nominal discount rate in the perfect-certainty discounted-cash-flow (DCF)
model.
Sensitivity measures show how the present value of expected future cash flows will
vary as the fundamental variables that determine the present value vary. The analysis is
valid for sensitivities to factors other than nominal discount rate. Sensitivity measures can
be calculated with respect to all the underlying fundamental variables, whether they be
real variables or nominal variables. An advantage of working in continuous time, with
continuous forces for the underlying fundamental variables, is that the sensitivities of
payments at a single time m correspond to the duration, sometimes with a change of sign.
We define sensitivity to variable k as:
Sensitivity to variable k can be thought of as the percentage change in the present value of
the investment per one-percentage-point change in variable k.
Sensitivity measures are clearly of use in comparing the risk of different split securities.
But the following should be borne in mind.
(i) The importance of a given variable in influencing the present value of a particular
security over time depends not only on the sensitivity measure with respect to that variable
but also on the volatility of that variable itself over time. Thus, although the sensitivity
measure for a particular security with respect to variable k may be relatively low, if variable
k is extremely volatile over time, it may still have an important influence on changes in the
present value of that security over time.
(ii) The sensitivity measures are all partial, and do not allow for the fact that the various
determinants may be interdependent. For example, real force of discount may tend to fall
as expected inflation rises.
6.1 Sensitivity measures and component cashflows
Suppose that the cash flow from a security may be split into n component cash flows. If the






Then sensitivity with respect to a fundamental variable k is
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Table 2
Sensitivity to real Sensitivity to real Sensitivity to





Value of fund after
m years






where Sk' is the sensitivity to variable k of the ith component cash flow. Thus:
Sensitivity is equal to the weighted average of the sensitivities of the
component cash flows, where the weights are equal to the present values of
the component cash flows.
This is analagous to, but more general than, the result that duration of a portfolio of
investments is the weighted average of the durations of the individual investments, where
the weights are equal to the present values of the individual investments (e.g. McCutcheon
& Scott 1991).
6.2 Sensitivities of the component cash flows ofsplits
The sensitivities of the component cash flows of split securities are given in Table 2.
Henceforth, we will use the following notation for the cells of Table 2, where k is 8, y,
or <p.
Sk = sensitivity of a stream of dividends for m years with respect to variable k.
Sk — sensitivity of a nominal amount payable after m years with respect to variable
k.
Sk = sensitivity of the value of the fund after m years with respect to variable k.
The expressions in Table 2 are useful for the derivation of sensitivity measures for split
securities, to which we now turn.
7. Sensitivity measures for traditional splits
7.1 Income shares
The present value is W\ + W2■ Hence, using equation (5), we obtain
Sk=w1sl+w}sl
Wi + w2
(k =8, y,<p). (6)
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Thus, from Tables 1 and 2, sensitivity to the real discount force is given by
mD0e-{S-y)m D0(l -




Sensitivity to the real growth force of dividends is given by
~mD0e-{S-y)m £>0(1 - e~(S-y)m)
_ S-y + (S-y)2
y i _ e-(i-y)m
Do +fc~pm
S-y






These sensitivity measures may be evaluated for a particular issue of income shares by
choosing the appropriate values for the underlying variables (see Section 4).
7.2 Capital shares
The present value is W3 — W2. Hence, using equation (5), we obtain
W3Sj - W2S?
sk = —^7 77^- (Jc=S,y,<t>). (7)
"3 — "2
Thus, from Tables 1 and 2, sensitivity to the real discount force is given by
Ss — -m.
Sensitivity to the real growth force of the fund is given by
mA0e-(5-y)m
f ~ Aoe~(s~Dm - Re~pm '
Sensitivity to the force of inflation is given by
mR
S,p ~ A0ett+<Dm - R'
Again, these sensitivity measures may be evaluated for a particular issue of capital shares
by choosing appropriate values for the underlying variables.
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7.3 Example
A particular traditional split trust has equal numbers of income shares and capital shares in
its capital structure. We are given the following details of the trust:
rate of payment of dividend per annum per income share (Do) = lOp;
redemption amount for each income share (R) = 50p;
value of fund at time 0 per capital share (Ao) = 200p;
period before income shares are repaid (m) = 10 years.
Estimates of the underlying fundamental variables are as follows:
real discount force (S) — 1%;
real dividend growth force (y) = 2%;
real growth force of the fund (f) = 2%;
force of inflation (cp) = 2.5%.
We then obtain the following sensitivity measures for the income shares and the capital
shares.
Sensitivity to Sensitivity to Sensitivity to
real discount force real growth force inflation force
Income shares —5.65 3.68 —1.97
Capital shares —10 11.90 1.90
What does a figure of —5.65 for real discount force sensitivity of the income shares mean?
It simply means that there is a fall of close to 5.65% in the present value of the income
shares per one-percentage-point rise in the real discount force(the ratio is more exact for
smaller changes). Other figures in the above table are to be interpreted in a similar way.
The income shares are less sensitive to the real discount force than are the capital
shares, because they have shorter duration. The income shares are less sensitive to the real
growth force than are the capital shares, because part of the return from the income shares
(the redemption amount) is fixed in money terms. Income shares have negative sensitivity
to the inflation force, because the redemption payment is a fixed nominal amount. Capital
shares, on the other hand, have positive sensivity to the inflation force, because the real
value of the amount deducted from the fund and paid to income shareholders on wind-up
is reduced by an increase in inflation.
It is of interest to see how the sensitivity measures vary for different values of the period
to wind-up (m), rather than fixing m = 10. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show how the sensitivity
measures for the income shares change as the period to wind-up changes. As expected,
Figs 1 and 2 show that the income shares are more sensitive to the real discount force and
the real growth force (of dividends) as the period to wind-up is increased. Examination of
the y-axis scale of Fig. 3 shows that the income shares are not very sensitive to inflation
expectations, for all the values of m. However, sensitivity to the inflation force becomes
more important if the dividend (Do) is lower in relation to the redemption amount (/?). For
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Period to wind-up (years)
Fig. 1. Income shares: sensitivity to real discount force versus period to wind-up
Period to wind-up (years)
Fig. 2. Income shares: sensitivity to real growth force versus period to wind-up
0
Period to wind-up (years)
Fig. 3. Income shares: sensitivity to inflation force versus period to wind-up
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Dividend per income share (D0)
FIG. 4. Income shares: sensitivity to inflation force versus dividend
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Period to wind-up (years)
FIG. 5. Capital shares: sensitivity to real growth force versus period to wind-up
This is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Figures 5 and 6 show how the sensitivities to the real dividend growth force and the
inflation force for the capital shares change as the period to wind-up changes.
The capital shares are more sensitive to the real discount force and the real growth force
(of the fund) as the period to wind-up is increased. Examination of the y-axis scale of Fig. 6
shows that the capital shares are not very sensitive to inflation expectations, for all values
of m. However, sensitivity to the inflation force becomes more important if the redemption
amount (R) of the income shares is higher in relation to the value of the fund per share
(Ao). For example, if the value of the fund per share at time 0 is held constant—say at
200p—then we obtain
c 107?
0 ~ 313.66- R'
This is illustrated in Fig. 7.
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Period to wind-up (years)
Fig. 6. Capital shares: sensitivity to inflation force versus period to wind-up
Redemption amount of income share (f?)
Fig. 7. Capital shares: sensitivity to inflation force versus redemption amount per income share
8. Sensitivity measures for quasi-splits
8.1 Zero-dividend preference shares
The present value is W2. Hence
Sk = S2k (k = <5, </>). (8)
Thus, using Table 2, sensitivity to the real discount force is given by
Ss - -m,
and sensitivity to the estimated force of inflation is given by
S<p = -m.
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8.2 Income-and-residual-capital shares
The present value is W\ + W3 — W2. Hence equation (5) gives
WiSl + W3S? - w2sl
Sk=
Wl + W3-Wi «=s>y>^- w
Sensitivity measures may then be derived, using Tables 1 and 2, and evaluated for a
particular issue of I&RCs by choosing appropriate values for the underlying fundamental
variables.
A particular problem arises in the case of I&RCs. The estimated real growth force of
dividends (y) and the estimated real growth rate of the underlying fund (f) may not be
independent. It is within the power of the trust managers to increase y, but in doing so they
may reduce f. To simplify the discussion in the following example, we will consider only
sensitivity to a single growth force by setting f = y. Broadly speaking, the assumption
here is that the dividend yield of the underlying fund remains constant.
8.3 Example
A particular quasi-split trust has equal numbers of ZDPs and I&RCs in its capital structure.
We are given the following details of the trust:
rate of payment of dividend per year per I&RC at time 0 (Do) = 10p;
redemption amount of a ZDP (R) = 50p;
value of fund at time 0 per I&RC (Ao) = 200p;
period before the ZDPs are redeemed (m) = 10 years.
Estimates of the underlying fundamental variables are as follows:
real discount force (S) = 7%;
real dividend growth force (y) = 2%;
real growth force of the fund (f) = 2%;
force of inflation (</>) = 2.5%.
We then obtain the following sensitivity measures using equations (8) and (9).
Sensitivity to Sensitivity to Sensitivity to
real discount force real growth force inflation force
ZDPs ^10 0 =A0
I&RCs -7.64 8/71 1.07
A figure of —10 for the real discount force sensitivity of the ZDPs means that there is
a fall_o^#feT?re. Other figures in the above table are to be interpreted in a similar way.
The ZDPs are more sensitive to the real discount force than arethe I&RCs because they
( have longer duration. The ZDPs have zero sensitivity to the real growth force, because they
pay a fixed nominal amount, whereas the I&RCs clearly benefit from an increase in the real
^ growth force. ZDPs have negative inflation sensitivity, because the redemption payment
^ close to 10% in the present value of the ZDPs per one-percentage-point rise in the real
discount force (the ratio is more exact for smaller changes).
16 A. T. ADAMS
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Period to wind-up (years)
Fig. 8. Income an residual capital shares: sensitivity to inflation force versus period to wind-up
is a fixed nominal amount. I&RCs, on the other hand, have positive inflation sensitivity,
because the real value of the amount deducted from the fund and paid to ZDP shareholders
on wind-up is reduced by an increase in expected inflation.
The sensitivity measures for I&RCs change as the period to wind-up changes, in a way
similar to that for corresponding capital shares of traditional splits; but, for all sensitivity
measures and for all periods to wind-up, the sensitivities of I&RCs are lower in magnitude.
The graph of sensitivity to inflation force against period to wind-up is shown in Fig. 8.
9. Conclusion
Statistical risk measures based on historical data, such as total risk, beta, and specific
risk, are of limited use for split-capital investment trusts. The restricted life of these trusts
means that the risk profile of their securities changes over time, and investment analysts
are often more interested in the sensitivity of split securities to changes in the underlying
fundamental variables.
An alternative approach to risk analysis for certain types of security in split-capital
investment trusts is presented in this paper. Following the approach of Adams & Booth
(1995), sensitivity measures for these securities are derived. The sensitivity measures
show the percentage change in the present value of expected future cash flows per one-
percentage-point change in an underlying variable. Thus, for each security, a single figure
can be calculated for sensitivity to the real discount force, the real growth force, and the
inflation force. This should be of considerable use to practitioners in the investment trust
sector.
The formulae and graphs presented in Sections 7 and 8 of this paper show that, for
all the securities considered, sensitivity to the real discount force is negative and increases
with period to wind-up, as expected. For traditional splits, capital shares are more sensitive
to the real discount force than income shares; for quasi-splits, z^ero-dividend preference
shares are more sensitive to the real discount force than income-and-residual-capital shares.
Sensitivity to the real growth force is positive for all securities for which it is relevant, and
again increases in magnitude with period to wind-up. For traditional splits, income shares
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have lower sensitivity to the real growth force than do capital shares. Sensitivity to the
inflation force is negative for income shares and for ZDPs, but is positive for capital shares
and for I&RCs.
Sensitivity measures will help investment analysts to understand the risk of a given
split security. An obvious use is in comparing the sensitivity of different split securities
to small changes in a particular underlying fundamental variable. Another possible use is
to examine the historic standard deviations of and correlations between interest rates and
inflation to generate measures of 'typical' shocks, and then to show their effect on the
value of different split securities with various terms to maturity, and on the value of split
securities in environments of high and low growth and real interest rates.
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Appendix A.
Hurdle rate is the minimum annual growth rate in total assets required to enable repayment
of income shares at their full final redemption value. In most cases, there is a large negative
hurdle rate, implying that it is extremely likely that the income shares will be repaid at their
full final redemption value.
Sensitivity measures can also be calculated for the following split capital trusts: MCIT;
Rights & Issues; Venturi. They have no warrants outstanding, but the repayment terms are
more complicated than those for traditional split-capital trusts.
Appendix B.
Hurdle rate is the minimum annual growth rate in the total assets required to enable
repayment of ZDPs at their full final redemption value. In most cases there is a large
negative hurdle rate, implying that the ZDPs will be repaid at their full final redemption
value.
Sensitivity measures can also be calculated for the following quasi-split trusts: Exeter
Preferred; Gartmore Shared; Jupiter Geared. They have no warrants outstanding but the
repayment terms are more complicated than those for the normal quasi-splits in the above
table.
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Table Al
Traditional split-capital trusts (with no warrants outstanding)
Wind- up date Hurdle rate
Earliest Latest
Aberforth Split Level 01 07 2000 30 06 2004 -36.7
Archimedes 30 09 1998 30 09 2003 -37.3
Derby* 01 01 1999 31 12 2003 -33.0
F&C Special Utilities 24 08 2003 na -12.5
Jove 01 01 1995 31 12 1999 -20.9
Lloyds Smaller Cos 30 04 2002 na -58.9
M&G Dual 31 12 1994 31 12 1996 0.0
M&G Second Dual 01 12 1995 01 12 1997 -87.9
MCIT 'S' 01 12 2007 na -4.0
Save & Prosper Linked 01 01 1995 01 01 1997 -99.9
TOR 01 08 2001 any -31.7
* With Derby Trust, income shares are repayable after loan and debenture securities.
Source: NatWest Securities Daily NAV Service, 22 August 1996.
Table b1
Quasi-split trusts (with no warrants outstanding)
Wind-up date Hurdle rate %
Abtrust Preferred 31 05 1998 -16.1
Edinburgh Income 01 05 2000 -3.1
Finsbury Smaller Cos 17 12 1999 -36.8
Fleming Inc & Cap 03 03 2002 -9.4
Fleming Int. High Inc. 05 10 1996 -96.5
Friends Provident Ethical 31 12 2001 -0.3
Gartmore Brit I & G 18 12 2002 -0.6
Henderson Eurotrust 31 10 2002 -15.2
Hong Kong 31 12 1996 -84.5
HTR Income & Growth 08 03 2003 -6.4
Invesco Blue Chip 10 05 1998 -7.2
Invesco Recovery 18 11 1998 -11.7
Ivory & Sime Optimum 26 03 1997 -57.1
Johnson Fry Euro. 31 07 2004 -4.6
Johnson Fry 2nd Util. 31 12 2003 -4.3
Johnson Fry Utilities 31 07 2003 -8.4
Kleinwort High Inc. 30 06 1998 -18.9
Source: NatWest Securities Daily NAV Service, 22 August 1996
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Sensitivity measures for equity investments
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By differentiating a discounted cash flow valuation formula (expressed in real terms),
with respect to the underlying fundamental real variables, we derive 'sensitivity
measures' for equity investments. These show how the present value of expected
future dividends will vary as the real discount rate changes and the long-term
real dividend growth rate changes. In both cases, sensitivity depends on dividend
yield: the lower the dividend yield, the more sensitive the stock to changes in both
the real discount rate and the real growth rate. We also derive a total differential
model which allows for simultaneous changes in both the real discount rate and the
real growth rate, and briefly compare this model with the model of Leibowitz et al.
for equity duration.
1. Introduction
Duration is defined as the weighted average of the times of receipts from an
investment, where the weights are equal to the present values of the payments.
Duration is effectively a mathematical measure of the sensitivity of an investment
value to changes in the discount rate in the perfect-certainty discounted cash flow
(DCF) model.
The concept of duration was developed by Macaulay (1938). While most of the
early work on duration applied the concept to the analysis of fixed-interest bonds,
it can also be applied to the analysis of equities. This has been done by Casabona
et al. (1984) and Gould & Sorensen (1986) using a constant growth rate for dividends
in the DCF model (the Gordon-Shapiro model).
A more recent development by Leibowitz et al. (1989) has been the recognition
that inflation—a major component of nominal interest rates and hence the discount
rate—also affects the earnings/dividend growth rate. Their equity duration model
indicates that the sensitivity of equity prices to nominal interest rates will be far less
than that indicated by the duration measure derived from the traditional dividend
discount model. This is because movements in nominal interest rates often occur at
the same time as movements in expected nominal dividend growth rates. On the
other hand, movements in interest rates which are independent of movements in
expected dividend growth can have a significant effect on equity prices.
The Leibowitz et al. model concentrates on a DCF approach with cash flows
defined in nominal terms. In using a dividend discount model, however, it is important
that the financial variables be chosen to facilitate ease of estimation and stability of
the model. As equities are generally regarded as real investments, it is sensible to
analyse such investments using real variables rather than nominal variables.
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In this paper we derive 'sensitivity measures' which show the extent to which
the present value of expected future dividends is affected by changes in the underlying
real variables. The analysis is valid for sensitivities to factors other than the real
discount rate. Sensitivity measures can be calculated with respect to all the variables
which determine the present value of an investment. Using these sensitivity measures
derived from a DCF model expressed in real terms, we will develop further the work
of Leibowitz et al.
It should be emphasized that a fluctuation in present value does not necessarily
correspond to a fluctuation in price. There is, for example, much evidence of 'excess
volatility' of equity prices both for the US stock market (Shiller 1981; LeRoy 1990)
and for the UK stock market (Bulkley & Tonks 1989; Mills 1993). Nevertheless,
sensitivity measures are useful since they give an indication of the way in which
changes in the fundamental real variables affect the present value of the expected
income stream and hence the way in which such changes should affect the price. They
also provide a mathematical justification for the importance of dividend yield in
equity risk analysis.
Section 2 of this paper looks at the valuation of equities in real terms, and Section
3 discusses sensitivity measures for equities. Section 4 discusses the importance of
dividend yield in the analysis of risk and return. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2. DCF valuation (in real terms) of equity share investments
The dividends from an equity share are paid out of profits which tend to increase
as the general level of prices increases. The absolute level of dividend growth therefore
depends on the level of future inflation. In the very long term, real dividend growth for
a domestic equity market may be reasonably predictable although Wilkie (1995a,b)
shows that real dividend growth for the UK equity market has been stable around
different levels for significant periods.
The Gordon-Shapiro model which assumes constant nominal growth of dividends
can be expressed in real terms by simply redefining the variables to be in real terms
(e.g. Adams et al. 1993: Ch. 4). Such a model has the advantage of being easy to
understand but probably does not represent the reality of the valuation process
sufficiently well. Most companies will tend to smooth dividends, thus trying at least
to maintain them even when earnings are reduced due to the effects of recession.
Nevertheless, as an economy comes out of (or moves into) recession, investors would
expect abnormally high (or low) short-term dividend growth. Thus, for a limited
period, say 5 years, analysts may wish to assume a particular real rate of growth
which will allow for any temporary suppression or expansion of earnings and
dividends due to the prevailing economic circumstances and particular circumstances
of the company in question, at the time of valuation. Beyond this short-term
consideration, one would not expect dividend growth in future years to take the
smooth path assumed by a constant real growth rate of dividends. But good years
can be expected to even out bad years, and the particular timing of good and bad
years is of marginal significance.
Having specified the framework in which analysts should estimate the future
dividends to be discounted, we now propose the model. We will assume that dividends
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are paid annually and that the next dividend is due in exactly one year. Taxation is
ignored. We use the following notation:
V0 is the value of the equity share;
Dx is the estimated dividend payable one year from now;
is the estimated real dividend growth rate per annum for the first m years after
Dl is paid;
g2 is the estimated long term real dividend growth rate per annum (after m + 1
years from now);
j is the real discount rate.
Then
v - D> ry (1+*0






To obtain a finite value for the equity, we require g2 to be less than j; but it is not




where j > 0 and j > g2> — 1.
1 + 0i
(j ~ 0i)O' — 02) V 1 + j
(2.1)
Long-term real dividend growth
The appropriate long-term real rate of dividend growth should be compatible with
maintaining current (or recent) levels of dividend cover. Simply looking at past
dividend growth over the medium term, say twenty years, may provide a poor
estimate of long-term dividend growth. For example, past dividend growth may have
been financed partly by reducing dividend cover, which in turn may be influenced by
factors such as taxation and dividend controls, at the expense of future long-term
dividend growth. Looking backwards over very long periods may give better
indications of long-term sustainable real growth rates for dividends.
It is wrong simply to choose the long-term real rate of growth of the economy as
a long-term real dividend growth rate, even when corporate earnings are generated
entirely from the domestic economy. The economy grows because of additions to
physical capital and because capital and labour become more productive or are used
more efficiently, perhaps due to innovation. Dividends grow partly because capital
within a company can be used more efficiently, but largely because of the retention
of profits for reinvestment in the company. There will be some relationship, although
not a direct one, between these factors which cause dividend growth and the factors
which cause more general economic growth. These issues are discussed in Arthur
(1993).
The future long-term rate of dividend growth could be estimated by considering
the marginal return on capital of the company (or perhaps sector) and the average
level of retentions by the company. A company with a high level of retentions should,
other things being equal, have a high level of expected future profits growth and
hence dividend growth.
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Real discount rate
The real discount rate is the real rate of return required by investors. This will depend
on the risk-free real rate of return (obtained from the market for long-term
index-linked gilts) and the required risk premium.
Much work has been done, both in the UK and in the US, to determine the
apparent historical risk premium required by equity investors. This work has tended
to take the implied risk premium to be the difference between equity returns and
returns from instruments such as treasury bills or government bonds (e.g. Grubb
1993; Dimson 1993). There are a number of difficulties with this approach (Fitzgerald
1992; Wilkie 1994). For the UK, treasury bills have not been a perfect hedge against
inflation. The structure of short-term interest rates was distorted by the building-
society cartel and the monetary policy pursued in the 1970s. For much of the last
30 years, real returns from conventional gilts have been affected by unanticipated
inflation. Furthermore, equity returns have been influenced by the removal of
dividend controls and the rerating of equities arising from the perceived reduction
in their risk compared with conventional gilts in an inflationary environment.
A more appropriate way to determine the equity risk premium, and one which
can be employed directly for individual shares, is to compare the real rate of return
from index-linked gilts with the anticipated real return from equities. The latter could
be estimated as the current dividend yield plus expected long-term real dividend
growth.
Impact of inflation
Note from equation (2.1) that inflation has no effect on the value of the equity if it
neither affects real dividend growth nor the real discount rate. But, in practice,
dividend increases will not respond immediately to inflation. An increase in inflation
is likely to lead to an increase in company profits, at some stage, but this will not
feed through immediately into increased nominal dividend growth. The transmission
mechanism ofmonetary policy may also have a beneficial short-term effect on equity
prices (Pepper 1994). Indeed, the Bank of England uses equity prices as one of its
leading indicators of inflation.
In the above model, the best way to allow for the lagged way in which increased
(or reduced) inflation feeds through into dividends is by adjusting gt. Thus, an
increase in inflation, for example, may lead to a reduction in real dividend growth
in the short term, so there will be a reduction in g1. There may then be a 'catching
up phase' before dividends return to their long-term growth path. This could be
allowed for by having a second short-term dividend growth rate before dividends
return to their long term growth rate. Fuller & Hsia (1984) have suggested a simplified
approach to the three-stage nominal DCF model in which the second period is a
transition period during which the growth rate changes linearly from to g2. For
the purpose of the discussion in hand, however, little is added by complicating the
analysis in this way.
Changes in the outlook for inflation may alter the risk perception of investors
towards equity shares. In the DCF model, this would be incorporated by changing
the discount rate via the risk premium.
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3. Sensitivity measures
The extent of the proportionate change in the present value of an equity share caused
by a change in the valuation real discount rate is of particular interest to short-term
investors. Managers of non-life insurance funds, for example, are concerned about
sensitivity to the real discount rate, since a short term fall in equity values could
render a non-life insurance company insolvent, depending on the level of fixed-interest
investment and free reserves. In general, an investor who is matching long-term real
liabilities with an equity investment would be less concerned with changes in the real
discount rate than with changes in prospective real dividend growth rates. Any change
in the discount rate should affect the value of the investor's liabilities in the same
way as it affects the value of the assets. It may not be possible, however, to absorb
changes in real interest rates into the liability valuation assumptions of a life fund or
pension fund because of valuation restrictions. As a result, long-term investors should
also be interested in the sensitivity to real interest rates.
Both short-term and long-term investors will be concerned with the sensitivity of
equity values to changes in long-term real growth rates of dividends. For short-term
investors, this is due to the fall (or rise) in capital values caused by a fall (or rise) in
expected long-term dividend growth.
Sensitivity to the real discount rate
For an equity share investment, the sensitivity to the real discount rate is defined as
' dj
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Note that, if we set g{ = g2 ( = 0) in equation (3.1), we obtain the following simple




where j>0 and j>g> —1. Equation (3.2) provides a good indicator of the
sensitivity of an equity to the real discount rate, with appropriate values of j and g,
in stable economic conditions. Note that, the higher the estimated real dividend
growth rate, the higher the sensitivity to changes in real discount rates.
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Sensitivity to the real dividend growth rate
The effect on the value of an equity share caused by a change in the long-term
growth rate g2 is of more interest than the effect on the value caused by a change in
the short-term growth rate gv There are a number of possible reasons for a change
in gu two of the main ones being as follows.
• A quicker (or slower) than anticipated movement out of or into recession, or
factors specific to the company, may cause gt to be higher (or lower) than
previously estimated. The likely effect of this is to shorten (or lengthen) m in a
way which tends to cancel out the effect of the change in gt. The difficulty of
separating the effects of changes in m and g, would make sensitivity measures for
gl of spurious accuracy.
• A change in distribution policy affects gu but this is likely to cause an offsetting
effect on g2.
We now derive a sensitivity measure with respect to the long-term real growth rate
of dividends. Define the sensitivity to long-term real dividend growth as
92
dg2 K
Differentiating equation (2.1) with respect to g2 gives
so that
(3.3)
Noting that [(1 + j)/( 1 — g,)]m — 1 and j — gx are of the same sign, and since j > g2,
it may be observed from equation (3.3) that Sgi increases as g2 increases. Thus, equities
which have high expected long-term real growth rates for dividends are more
vulnerable to falls in the expected long-term real dividend growth rate.
By setting gj = g2 = g in (2.1), we can easily derive the sensitivity to real




where j > 0 and j > g > — 1.
Again, equation (3.4) provides a good indicator of the sensitivity to long-term real
dividend growth for an equity, with appropriate values ofj and g, in stable economic
conditions. Thus, sensitivity to real dividend growth increases as the real discount
rate falls and the real growth rate of dividends rises.
We will restrict the discussion hereafter to the case of a constant growth rate, i.e.
with g, = g2 = g.
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Simultaneous changes in the expected real dividend growth rate and the real discount
rate
The effect on an equity share value of simultaneous changes in j and g can be assessed
using the total differential.
dV0 = ^dj + d^dgdj dg
=> ^ = yd£dj + y-£dg=-Sjdj + Sgdg. (3.5)K vo O] V0 dg
Therefore, from equations (3.2) and (3.4),
d V0
= dg - dj
K j ~ 9
Dependency between the real discount rate and the expected real dividend growth rate
It is possible that there is a relationship between the real discount rate and the
expected real dividend growth rate. The real discount rate depends partly on the
perceived risk which, in turn, may depend partly on the level of risk indicated by
the sensitivity measures, suggesting that shares with high estimated real dividend
growth rates could be associated with high discount rates.
As a simple example, suppose that we have the cross-sectional relationship
j = a0 + a{g,
where 0 < a^ < 1 and a0 and a1 are constant across different shares at a given time.
Then dj = al dg, and therefore
dK0_(l -aQdg
v0 j-g
Thus, in this example, a change in expectations for future real dividend growth will
not fully translate into a corresponding proportionate change in present value.
Comparison with the Leibowitz et al. model
Leibowitz et al. (1989) concentrate on duration which, assuming continuous cash
flow and continuous compounding, equals the sensitivity to the nominal discount
rate. They decompose the nominal discount rate into two components, expected
inflation and the real discount rate, and implicitly assume that fluctuations in these
variables are the causes of a change in the 'theoretical price' of equities. Changes in
inflationary expectations or real interest rates are assumed to affect dividend growth
rates, thus limiting the effect of a change in interest rates on equity values.
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Leibowitz et al. derive the formula
«4--_2_fi_r +*V-—<36>Vo k- g*\ drj k-g*\ 81J
where
V0 is the theoretical price .of the stock,
k is the nominal discount rate = i + h(I, r,...),
i is the nominal risk-free interest rate, equal to r + I,
r is a real component of the nominal risk-free interest rate,
/ is an inflation component of the nominal risk-free interest rate,
h is the equity market risk premium,
g* is the nominal growth rate, equal to g0 + yr + 2/,
y is the sensitivity of the growth rate to real interest rates,
/ is an inflation flow-through parameter.
The main advantages of our model (equation (3.5)) over that of Leibowitz et al.
(equation (3.6)) are that our model (a) is formulated entirely in real terms, (b) has
the flexibility to incorporate the impact of changes in inflationary expectations on
changes in expectations of real dividend growth and the real discount rate, and (c)
includes explicitly a term giving the effects of changes in the real dividend growth
rate on equity values. The main disadvantage of our model is the absence of any
separation of the risk-free real interest rate and the risk premium, although this could
be incorporated as an extension to the model.
Sensitivity measures and observable market data
One use of sensitivity measures is to anticipate the effects of a change in economic
variables on equity prices. In particular, a change in the yield on index-linked gilts
should, according to our model, affect equity values. It is interesting to note therefore
that in the Wilkie (1995a) stochastic investment model, there is no term representing
a relationhip between the yields on index-linked gilts and equity dividend yields,
although there is a term representing a relationship between the yields on index-linked
gilts and on property. Wilkie found that a term linking the yields on index-linked
gilts and on equities was not significant, using data for the last 14 years. Preliminary
time-series work by Golias (1995), however, indicates that such a relationship has
been getting stronger in recent years as the amount of index-linked stock available
in the market has increased. This is an interesting area for further empirical research.
4. The importance of dividend yield
Note that, if we consider the aggregate of investors and assume a market that is
efficient under rational expectations—so that the present value of future dividends
is equal to the market price P—then
dP dg — dj
P j-g





because the dividend yield equals j — g. Equation (4.1) together with equations (3.2)
and (3.4), imply that low-yield shares (i.e. those with a low dividend yield) should
have greater sensitivity to changes in g and j than high-yield shares. This is consistent
with the view often expressed by practitioners that 'high-yield shares are defensive'.
It should be noted that actual share price volatility (as measured by standard
deviation of return) is also related to the uncertainty surrounding both the expected
real dividend growth rate and the market's real discount rate. A share with a low
dividend yield could therefore be less volatile than one with a higher dividend yield
if the market's estimates of real dividend growth for the latter tended to vary over
time more than those for the former. But the classically volatile stock is one with a
high expected real dividend growth rate, a high degree of uncertainty concerning the
dividend growth projections, and in an economy with low risk-free real rates of return.
The transition from the perfect-certainty model of this paper to a model which
accommodates uncertain future dividends and uncertain discount rates is an area for
further research.
Our discussion on sensitivity measures above shows that low-yield shares have
greater sensitivity to changes in the underlying fundamental real variables than
high-yield shares. This suggests that low-yield shares should generally offer higher
expected returns to reflect the higher risk premium investors would demand.
However, other factors such as taxation and market inefficiency may play a part.
Indeed, empirical evidence both in the US (e.g. Elton et al. 1983) and in the UK (e.g.
Levis 1989; Fisher & Bradford 1995) shows that low-yield shares have historically
given lower gross returns than high-yield shares.
5. Conclusion
Using a model incorporating both a short-term real dividend growth rate and a
long-term real dividend growth rate, we derived an expression for the present value
of future dividends for an equity share and hence derived sensitivity measures for an
equity share. These sensitivity measures can be useful in assessing the risk of equity
share investments. In particular, we found that low-yield shares tend to be more
sensitive to changes in both the real discount rate and the estimated long-term real
dividend growth rate, compared with high-yield shares.
Restricting the discussion to a single real growth rate (i.e. with the short-term and
long-term rates equal), we then compared our model, which is formulated entirely
in real terms, with that of Leibowitz et al. for equity duration. Particular strengths
of our model are the flexibility to incorporate the impact of changes in inflationary
expectations on the fundamental real variables, and the inclusion of a term to allow
for changes in expectations of real dividend growth rates.
One might expect that low-yield shares should offer higher expected returns than
high-yield shares to compensate for their greater sensitivity (which is in some sense
a measure of risk). In fact, empirical research both in the UK and US suggests that
low-yield shares give lower gross returns than high-yield shares.
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